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•'Official" political socialization— the self-conscious

effort of governmental and political authority to structure
and,

if possible, control the entrance of an individual into

political awareness--is a relatively neglected area of the
field of political socialization.

This study focuses on the

"official" value structure of Spanish political authority

revealed in an examination of school textbooks written and
used in the Franco years.

In three central chapters, analysis

of the textbooks is made regarding their Images of the State
its formal structure and definition; of the Individual

— human

nature, tendencies, strengths and weaknesses; and of the

Citizen

— obligations

of the Citizen to society and to the

State.
In preparation for the textbook analysis two basic areas

of approach to the study of Spanish politics had to be adapted

and defined.

The first of these concerns a typology of regimes

into which Franco Spain is to be fit.

In Chapter I it is argued

that the prevailing "authoritarian regime" characterization

iv

of Spain systematically understates the
class nature of the
Francoist dictatorship and hence deflects one's
attention from
the more nefarious and pervasive aspects of
social control
under Franco.
A second preliminary Chapter deals with a model
of

socialization appropriate to the reality of Spanish
ideology
revealed in the textbooks. Of particular concern is

the role

of the State in modifyin^r and. indeed, "creating"
values consonant with its need for social control. Explored in
this

Chapter is the way in which the family, a traditional institution and value of Spanish and Mediterranean political culture,

became a metaphor for a whole universe of political and social

relations under the Franco regime.
Chapter VI is an elaboration of the Francoist strategy
of social control and the specific mechanisms used to form and

channel popular political consciousness.

Connections are drawn

between the counterrevolutionary origins of the Franco regime
and the ideas, values and models of personal and political

interaction promoted by "official" Spain.
In Chapter VII the ideological apparatus of Francoist

rule is placed in the changing political economic context of

Spain in the 1960's and 1970 's.

The class nature of the Spanish

economic "miracle" is emphasized as crucial to an adequate con-

ceptualization of the phenomenon of f ranauismo itself and to

speculation about the course of political and social change in
post-Franco Spain.
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PREFACE
This thesis, which began as a study of franquismo

yivente, has concluded as a study of franquismo histo'rico

.

Research conducted under a Foreign Area Fellowship in Spain
in 1972-1973 has taken nearly four years (and three different

teaching positions) to be completed.

My writing would have

perhaps been easier and my judgments less precarious had this

work been finished before Franco died.

From the beginning

have been in some ways writing a counter- thesis

,

I

a thesis

against the prevailing ways of understanding Spain which seemed
to help but still miss an aspect of Spanish reality.

Therefore,

the passing of Franco from the scene and of franquismo from
the seat of power to the handmaiden of power has subjected

ray

own way of looking at Spain to the harshest possible test-that of events themselves.

speak for itself.
ray

What has been written can and will

My own view is that until now (June 1977)

judgments have stood the test of events reasonably welli

I

have been perhaps too pessimistic about the prospects for
liberal democracy in post-Franco Spain, yet, as James

R.

has argued, the verdict of history is not yet in:
It will be remarkable indeed if a liberal
democracy is successfully established in Spain
by the government of King Juan Carlos, by a
sort of historical compromise between Marxist
It would be the
parties and Bourbon monarchy.
first time in twentieth-century Europe that
an authoritarian regime has transformed itself

Kurth

viii

into a stable democracy without the violent
overthrow of the top leadership. But it would
not be the first time that political events
in Spain have surprised and astonished the
rest of the world.!
*

«

This dissertation owes a debt of gratitude primarily
to Howard Wiarda for his support, encouragement and example of

scholarly ideals and practice.

It is indebted also to Amando

de Miguel, Amparo Almarcha and my other amigos del despacho

who literally made most of the textbook analysis possible.
Those who have read and provided thoughtful reflections on the

dissertation include William Connolly, Harvey Kline and Penny
GiB.

All obviously have made a contribution to what

I

have done

well and all are hereby absolved of what is still lacking,
A year of pleasure and work in Spain was provided by
n
the Foreign Area Fellov/ship Program and the NDEA Title IV

Fellowships.

Both the pleasure and the work were shared by

my wife Pamela who was willing to divert her own career

•'this

one more time."

"Political Parallelisms in Southern Europe since 1815,"
paper delivered at the Conference on Southern Europe, Columbia
University, New York, March 21-23» 1977. p. 22.

CHAPTER

I

-OFFICIAL" POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN AN

AUTHORITARIAN-CONSERVATIVE REGIME
"Official- Political Socialization
As a sub-field or sub-discipline, political socializa-

tion has become particularly attractive and especially frus-

trating for political scientists.

Attractive because it appears

at first glance to deal with politics on the most profound
level:

by studying the process through which individuals are

introduced into a political system, the most basic elements of

politics

— its

situational definition, political behavior and

attitudes, the internalization of values

— might

be studied and

understood; frustrating because as in too many areas of political science, the analytical tools have been found wanting and
the theoretical conceptualizations that might lead to under-

'

standing, confused.
This study deals with a relatively neglected area of

political socialization, what

I

have chosen to call "official-

political socialization and which might be called political
education, indoctrination civics or "brainwashing- in other

contexts.

In my view -official" political socialization is the

self-conscious effort of governmental and, more broadly, political authority to structure and, if possible, control the

2

entrance of an individual into
political awareness. I say
individual because "official"
political socialization is not
merely concerned with children,
as in the more traditional
approaches to political socialization,
but with adults as well
Who may immigrate into a new
political system or be subject to
the demands of a changed regime.
I use the phrase
"political

awareness" as a purposely vague
description of an individual's
relation to political authority which
includes not only his
recognition or nonrecognition of specific
political symbols
such as institutions or officials, but
also the entire range
of attitudes and behavior which do
or may influence what an
individual views as political and what
activity or inactivity
he pursues in politics. The broadness of
the definition is due
to the fact that I will be writing here
about values and beliefs
that may not immediately be seen as political
but

which—

certainly in Franco Spain and perhaps, under
reexamination, in
all countries— are inherently political.
The argument

I

wish to make begins with a rather narrow

focus on what might be called the "official" value
structure
of Spanish political authority revealed in an examination
of

school textbooks written and used in the Franco years, parti-

cularly those used in courses of political education or formation (formacion)

,

the more suggestive Spanish term.

perhaps important to emphasize that

I

It is

am at this time not

concerned with the effects of political socialization!

not surveying students nor any other population.

I

am

My aim is

rather_to document the view (and.
because all textbooks are
government censored and approved,

this is the "official" view)

presented in the textbooks^of three
areas

I

believe aVe

Jm^prtant in understanding the 'natur^Tf
politi^in Francoist
5pain^ These three areas include views
of the Individualhis nature, tendencies, strengths
and weaknesses, the Stateits formal structure and definition,
and

the Citizen-that area

where the individual and the state
meet and interact.
The reasons why I have chosen to study

the content of

"Official" political socialization rather
than its affects or
results are varied. First of all. there
were pragmatic con-

siderations of my initial relative unfamiliarity
with Spain and
the difficulties of mounting a large-scale
study employing
survey techniques. Joined to this were the
political realities
my interests and the kinds of questions I thought
important

would have proved delicate if not dangerous to
Spanish

authorities.
Thirdly,

I

was concerned that current social science

techniques could not insure that a study of political attitudes
would not prove more useful to the government in repressing

political expression than to the Spanish people in increasing

their freedom and combating an image promoted within Spain and

without— for reasons

I

hope to make clear in this work— that

Spaniards are somehow lacking in the basic prerequisites for

democratic government.

This trepidation about the ethical

consequences of the methodological approach most associated

with the behavioral persuasion in
political science is of
course simply my o^vn point of view
and open to counter-claims.
However. I believe I can show-for
Spain, at least-that there
are some reasons for questioning
the validity of surveyresponse approaches to political inquiry
and. more importantly,
that the search for these reasons
contributes to an understanding
of "official" political socialization.
Fourthly, what evidence that there is about
the relation
between the content of political education
(in this case,
civics) textbooks and resultant political
attitudes suggests
that there is little measurable correlation between
the two.^

Moreover, it does not require much logic to reason
that no

matter what the content of a textbook, the way in which it
presented by the teacher can mean a world of difference.

is

This

was perhaps particularly true in Franco Spain where the

teachers of formacio n politica were a special and separate

branch of the teaching profession fairly universally hated by

their pupils both for what they taught and the way in which
they taught it.

But this is no problem.

My concern is not

with the measurable impact of these courses but with documenta-

tion of the government's "official" view of what the content of

political socialization should be.

As I will later show it is

Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jennings, "Political
Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the
United States," American Political Science Review 62, 3
(September 1968), pp. 852-867.
.

not necessary for the "official" view to be
"bought" 100% to
have effect and be effective in a program of
social
control.

Finally, the approach taken in this study and its
focus
on the "official" version of what constitutes
political reality
is justified by my own interpretation of what
C. Wright Mills

has called the Sociological Imagination.

As

I

understand

Mills, the task of each generation of social scientists
is to

ascertain the important and relevant areas for social inquiry
in their historical epoch and to make such study, if at all

possible, a contribution to humanity's struggle for greater

freedom and dignity by exposing those thoughts, movements or
structures which threaten this struggle.

It is my conviction

that the ways in which political authority controls and manipu-

lates political reality are vitally important concerns both for

Spaniards as they seek a more just future and for the liberal
democracies as they face a rising authoritarianism built on
racial, ethnic and economic fears.

Although the argument of this work begins with the
textbooks themselves it extends both forwards and backwards
from the three chapters on the texts which form the centerpiece
of this research.

In preparation for the texts two basic areas

of approach to the study of Spanish politics had to be adapted
and defined for my own purposes.

The first of these areas, to

which most of the first Chapter is devoted, concerns the

typology of regimes into which Franco Spain is to be fit.
This is no mere exercise in terminological hair-splitting for

the way in which one
conceptualizes the Spanish polity
makes
sense or nonsense out of the
textbook passages themselves,
it
is my contention that the
prevailing "authoritarian regimecharacterization Of Spain systematically
understates the class
nature of the Francoist dictatorship
and hence deflects one's
attention from the more nefarious
and pervasive aspects of
social control under Franco.
Thus, much of the first Chapter
explores the question of whether
Spain can be understood--in
class terms-as fascist, totalitarian
or authoritarian,

A second preliminary Chapter deals
with a model or
socialization that is similarly appropriate

to the reality of

Spanish ideology revealed in the textbooks.

There has long

been a debate in the socialization
literature over the relative
importance of various socialization
"agents" and the
way in

which distinct agents promote "democratic"
or "authoritarian"
citizenship values. Given less attention in
the literature is
the role of the State in modifying, indeed,
"creating" values
consonant with its need for social control.
Spain under

Franco^

is offered as a concrete example of such
"value promotion."

Explored in the second Chapter is the way in which
the family,
a traditional institution and value of Spanish and
Mediterranean

political culture, became a metaphor for a whole universe
of
political and social relations under the Franco regime.
Analysis of the textbooks as Images of the State, Individual and Citizen form the empirical core of the thesis.

Chapter VI is an elaboration of the Francoist strategy

7

of social control and the specific mechanisms
used to form and
channel popular political consciousness.
In th'is Chapter connections are drawn between the counterrevolutionary
origins of
the Franco regime and the ideas, values and models
of personal
and political interaction promoted by "official"
Spain.

In a final concluding Chapter the ideological apparatus
of Francoist rule is placed in the changing political
economic

context of Spain in the 1960's and 1970 's.

As in the original

discussion of regime typologies, the class nature of the
Spanish economic "miracle" is emphasized as crucial to an
adequate conceptualization of the phenomenon of franouismo
itself and, most importantly, to speculation about the course
of political and social change in post-Franco Spain.
Agents of Political Socialization
The study of political socialization in the United

States could probably be more appropriately titled the study
of political conformity

I

its body of socialization theory aptly

called conformity theory. 2

This is apparent from the emphasis

on consensus in the bulk of political socialization

2

Robert Parks, Po litical Socialization (University of
Massachusetts! Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 19?^) in a
review of political socialization as a sub-field of political
science makes this same point in distinguishing between
political socialization the inculcation of a society's norms
and values in an individual and political education the
development of critical awareness with acceptance based on
understanding and choice.

—

—

—

8

research^ and from the definitions of political
socialization
if
Itself where successful socialization is defined
as the

degree

to^which complete internalization of a society's
values is
accomplished. Such a conceptualization of political

sociali-

zation is consistent with my earlier definition of
"official"
political socialization and probably exactly the way in

which

the Spanish government under Franco liked to view the
process
of political "formation."

For the purposes of this study there are, however, more
important aspects of the way in which political socialization
has been defined than its conformist nature.

Among these are

3_ ^

Greenberg, "Consensus and Dissent: Trends in
Political Socialization," in Greenberg, ed
Political Socialization (New York: Atherton Press, 1970), pp. 1-10.
;

.

.

,

k

One of the more blatant, "value-free" and conformist
definitions is that by Roberta Sigel:

Political socialization is the gradual learning
of the norms, attitudes, and behavior accepted
and practiced by the ongoing political system.

The goal of political socialization is to
so train or develop individuals that they become
well-functioning members of the political society.
While the definition of a well-functioning member
will vary with the political system from
obedient passive subject in one system to active
participating citizen in another a well-functioning citizen is one who accepts (internalizes)
society's political norms and who will transmit
them to future generations.
Sigel, ed
"Political Socializationi
Its Role in the Political Process," The Annals
361 (September I965), p. 2.

—

—

—

.

,

.

.

9

Whether the process o.
socialization is seen as
reXativel,
oraera, or chaotic an.,
relate,
to this,

those influences
agents which are tak-pn
taken +^
to k
be the most important
in this
process

<

On the first point-the
degree of orderli ness
of socialization-it is useful to
.
becin with
""^^^ Greens tem's contrasting
^,
definitions of political
socialization,

^

,

•

is t^T^elllLr^^^^^
socialization
political information, vlluel and^f
instructional
agents who have b^eS foS^^'^'\'
''^^^ ^^is
responsibility! A Sroa^r
""^^f?^^
encompass all politick? iL''''^''^^^^^" ^'^'^id
^^^"^^^
infonial, delibera^e^nH
anned
at every
V^P
s
stage Of

ex '

th:\^^r:^e?^

^^w-i-j-ui*jcix

jiearn

?icL"bX°vj:rlichtri'"^

affects-

poU-

relevant social a?«?,^Hi^™i"f.°^ politically
"2"^^ ^"'^ ^l^* acquisition
of politicallv relevant
..fi
personality characteristics"

^

Sigel as well refers to
the unstructured nature
of socializationi

ot^e; experiences"

'l^i?^

incidental to

irofte^rrij^
Although both authors seemingly
recognize political
socialization as a random, unordered
process and. as in the

illan,

^Sigel,

"Political Socialization," p.

9

10

case or Sigel, nol. that
significant political learning
occur in "non-political..
contexts, it is hard to
find a reflec
tion Of this recognition
in either the research
of these two
authors or in the field of
political socialization in
general.
For understandable, though
perhaps "unscientific,"
reasons
studies Of political
socialization tend to concentrate
on one
or .ore agents of
socialization, the principal
among these
being the family, the
peer-group and the school.
This brings
us then to my second point
of interest,
the relative influeno
of various socialization
agents.
One part of the debate over
uvBi rexative
relative influence
ir,-n„„
concerns
Which Of the "big three"-family,
peer-.roup or school-is
n.ost important.

Davies? and Dawson and Prewitt^
argue for the
primacy of the family in the
formation of
children's political

culture.

Others have argued that parents
transmit party preference but only lend support to
other attitudes acquired outside the family, primarily in
school.

Some such as Margaret Mead have
stressed other factors
such as the mass media, particularly
television, as gaining

i.ation.^^SLlA^:i6lTLyLl^r!9^5):

^/^^l?'

^^ewitt, Political Socialization
^
and Co., 196977^

^""^ ^-

rRoctnr..^*?;..??'^^''?
IBostoni Little, Brown
9

^'^1 Grannis,

'

"The School as a Model of Society."
Education Bulletin. I967 and R.D.
Hofl
/T^^.''^;^^
Th e Development of Political Attitude.^
?rrh??^
in Children /.u?^"^^^'
( Chicago
Aldine, 196?).
u

^

A

1

11

more importance in a postf
igurative society.^O

m

addition,
the picture can be complicated
further by sticking to the
richness of the earlier definitions
of political socialization
and insisting on a consideration
of the "economical, historical
and structural context of society"
in which socialization takes
place and the political and economic
crises that may form

important socialization events.

-but

To the bedevilment of operational
definitions and indices
again being faithful to the original

definitions-one can

continue to add complications to what
should or must be studied
to understand political socialization.
A particularly interesting approach stresses the importance of
"indirect'' socialization (political learning in "non-political"
contexts) where
the experience of the individual is taken as
the fundamental

quality of political socialization and self- or
auto-socialization the explanatory variable.
Indeed, a review
of the

socialization literature leads one to the conclusion that the

Margaret Mead, Growinp- Up in New Guine;^ (New Yorki
W. Morrow, 1962; and Sex and Temperament in Three Pri mitive
~"

Societies (New Yorki

Dell, I963).

.^^Inga Findl, "Family versus Peer-Group in Political
Socialization," paper presented at the Political Socialization Workshop of the Joint Sessions of the European Consortium
for Political Research, Mannheim, Germany, April 12-18,
1973.
12

Pier Paolo Benedetti, "Les bases structurales de L*
'autosocialization politique de jeunes," paper presented at ECPR
Joint Sessions, April 12-18, I973.

12

empirical areas to be studied
under political socialisation
need to be significantly if not
constantly expanded on theor.t ical grounds. "^-^
Perhaps one last "complication"
should be added to this
fleeting picture of political
socialization which is a more
fundamental criticism of the theoretical
bases of the entire
area. David Marsh, in an overview
of the literature,!^ analyzed
what he believes to be three key
assumptions implicit in political socialization research to date.
The first assumption
is

that "adult opinions are in a large
part the end product of
youthful political socialization. "1^
Marsh found little
empirical evidence to justify this assumption
which is based
on an undemonstrated stability of
personality dimensions, attitudes and behavioral intentions. A second
assumption discussed
by Marsh is that "adult behavior is shaped
in part by attitudes
learned during childhood socialization. "^^ This
assumption is

undermined by evidence which documents the lack of
correspondence between attitudes and behavior.
Political
socialization.

13

IMla.. p. 1. Professor Benedetti is not merely
ing his own opinion but reflecting the point of view of voica team
of researchers from the Carlo Cattaneo institute of
Italy.

1^
"Political Socialization: The Implicit Assumptions
Questioned," British Journal of Political Science 1. k
(October 1971), pp. 453-465.
.

•^

^Ibid.

•^^

Ibid.

/156.

.

p.

.

p. 460.

13

80 dependent on the survey questionnaire,
is then threatened
with irifeLevance if the true concern
is how and ^hy people
behave the way they do rather than
the attitudes or non-attitudes-'-'^ measured by a
questionnaire.

Finally, a third assumption— that
"individual political
opinions (and more specifically their
political behavior) have
an impact on the operation of a nation's
government and political life"— was questioned by Marsh.
Here his criticism
oaitered on the relative importance of
some people's behavior
over others as it affects the political system.
Thus, for
Marsh, the study of adult and particularly
elite behavior

would seem more appropriate to an understanding of
the impact
of political socialization on the operation of the
political
system.
The reason for all these "complications" is that a

concentration on Spanish "official" political socialization
builds on several of the points made in the previous pages.

First of all, for reasons to be made more clear in the next
chapter, the family plays a unique role in the Spanish sociali-

zation process, and

I

will be spending some time discussing

17
"•Non-attitudes" are "creations" of a questionnaire.
Forced to choose among alternative answers without a "Do not
know" response or "guessing" at a response a person can produce
a completed questionnaire which measures nothing,
•^

^Ibid.

.

p. 464.

Ik
its influence and "contribution"
to "official" socialisation.
This is not. however, to deny
the argument set out above
for
the importance of "indirect"
agents.
I hope to make clear
that
the importance of the Spanish
family in the socialization
process comes not from any
theoretical view of its role but
from
the influence of the pattern
of family relations which
is continued and reinforced by "indirect"
or "non-political" sociali-

zation experiences.

Marsh's criticisms of the assumptions
or -^untested
theories" which underlie much political
socialization research
seem to me to be a further justification
for my concentration
on "official" socialization.
Although the textbooks I
will be

using were intended for children and
adolescent readers they
were written by and represent the thinking
of their adult

)q

authors.

Moreover, these adult opinions about the
substance
of political reality were those of the
elite; elite in the

sense of their educational status and position
in the adminis-^/
trative structure and also because these opinions
or teachings

received both the religious and political imprimateura
of

Spain's ruling class.

These opinions were important to this

elite even if the individual Spaniard was not aware or con-

vinced of their effect on him.
The question of the relations among personality, attitude and behavior raised by Marsh also seems to have bearing
on the approach of this study.

I

have already mentioned that,

in my mind, certain political realities and cultural traits

15

of Spain which

I

will detail in later chapters limit the

validity of attitudinal surveys.

The objection might be raised

that a concentration on the ideas or ideals of
political formation textbooks takes one as far away from real
political

behavior as does reliance on studies of personality or
attitude
What is more, I have said that my interest is not in the
meas-

urable impact of the political formation courses but in the

documentation of their "official" content.
The resolution of these apparent contradictions is that

behavior in Spain, especially political behavior under the
Franco regime had, besides personality or attitude content, an
element of coe:-cion. 19^

Although

I

hope to show that the Franco

regime evolved a method of social control which reduced the

necessity for blatant physical repression, police state terror
was still always there, whether in the back or foreground, to
"guarantee" that certain types of behavior were either produced
or prevented whether or not the "personality" or "attitude"

factor of this behavior existed.

What

I

am saying is that one

can think of this political process as a kind of crude stimulus

response model.

The political formation textbooks, together

with other areas pointed to by the texts, formed the stimulus

19

'^I am not denying that there was "persuasion" as well
as "coercion" in the system although whether this "persuasion"
was accomplished through rational presentation of alternatives
or through the manipulation of various "enemies" (the Reds, the
Protestants, etc.) and the resulting fear is, I think, an open
question. However, I do accept that auto-censura (selfcensorship) contains a strong element of persuasion; it is
probably more subtle and nefarious because it does.

i
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for the desired response; if
this response was not forthcoming
(and the response could obviously
be inactivity or depoliticization). there remained more
brutal methods of insuring
compliance. Thus, it was not
necessary for a Spaniard to agree
with his political formation
textbook that "organic democracyis the only way Spain can be
governed, he could be made to perform his proper, "organic" role.
Like most governments
the

Franco regime tried to maintain a
monopoly of legitimacy but,
unlike some, it had the "freedom" to
define the legitimate
political arena very narrowly and enforce
its definition by
almost any means necessary.
Therefore, this dissertation is concerned
with political
behavior; not merely that produced by the
textbooks through
persuasion or other means but also that behavior
enforced by
the regime.
It is, then, necessary to discover
the content of
••official" political socialization in order to
understand what

is expected and what will be enforced.

Fascist Spain- Authoritarian Spain
The "enf orcemenl;» of political behavior just referred
to

was done, of course, by a particular regime— that of
Franco.
To understand the concern of this regime with political
sociali-

zation in general and, more specifically, to be able to evaluate
the content of its "official" socialization, it is necessary to

draw a characterization of the regime that departs significantly
from the prevailing typology of Franco Spain.
To do so is to reopen a debate now nearly closed

.
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whether Spain should be cla<5«!l <• f =^
<
Classified (meaning
understood) as an
"authoritarian" or a "fascist"
regime. The article which
established the terminology of
"authoritarian" Spain and which,
in turn, has initiated a
school of "authoritarian"
i

analysis^^

was that bv
ouan J
J.
J Juan

tarian Regime

I

imz,
t.itt?

titled appropriately,

'An

Authori-

Spain.

In his article, Linz tried
to establish a category of
political systems outside the
democratic-totalitarian axis and
which was not to be considered
as an incomplete form of
totalitarian or democratic systems but
as a distinct type which
resolves, in distinctive ways,
"problems common to all political
systems, maintaining control and
gaining legitimacy, recruiting
elites, articulating interests and
aggregating them, making
decisions and relating to various
institutional spheres like
the armed forces, religious bodies,
the intelligentsia, the
20
+
w.

r)

T?^^^^^^

^* Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr..

ComDara-

Anaerson, The Political i^co nomv of ly'iOdern Snai nt
Policvin an Authority r1 an .Sj^^stem' (;:a di s on
1970 ); Samuel P
^^^^ Authoritarian PntitiV.
i^Mo^f^^^o"?
in Modem Society.
The Dynamics, o f Est abii,c.hPd One-Partv
|yg|erns (New York 1970); Susan Kaufman Purcell.
Making in an Authoritarian Regiir.ei Theoretical "Decision
Implications
from a ^lexican Case Study," World Politico
25, 5 (October
^(^{l^ PP« 28-5^j Ronald M. Schneider, The Political System of
Emergence of a '-Moder n izinp-" Authoritarian
196^-1970 (New York, 1971)? Phillippe C. Schmitter. Inte:7¥st
Conflict and Poli tical Chanfce in Brazil (Stanford, I97I)
21,
Juan J, Lmz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in
Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan, eds.. Mass Politics. Studies in
~~
Politic al Sociolof^y (New Yorki Free Press, 1973).
fl^lakin^

.
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economy, etc.

^.^^

authoritarian regimes as

S^^^H^^^ systems with limited, not responsiblp
^^-^^^^^^

'

elaborate anS
(but with distinctive mentalities)^^ithou?^?intensive nor extensive
political
^i^^""^}
mobilization
(except at some points in their
development); and in which a leader
(Sr occas'^'^^'^^^
P-er
within
f CrmaiL\!rd^.f
''"^'^
^^^^^^^^
predictLl'e'onef^5^'
•

Although Linz's brilliant analyses
of Spanish politics
and the contribution his authoritarian
typology
has made to

comparative politics is indisputable.

I

would like to suggest

in this section that Linz leaves
out one important aspect of
politics in his definition-class-which
limits its power to
give an understanding of the Franco
regime.
I believe that

Franco Spain can properly be classified as
a fascist regime
and that, in fact, doing so will enable
us to see more clearly
the role of "official" political socialization
in maintaining

social control.
"Fascism" as a tool of analysis in political science

has certainly fallen into disfavor.

Trevor-Roper, in an

article generally denying the validity of the word as a
category
of political systems, rejects "fascism" as "a word which,
by

now, is either precisely dated or a meaningless tera of
"^^
abuse.

^ Ibid.

.

p.

^^ Ibid.

.

p. 255.

22

25-!^.

24
H.R. Trevor-Roper, "The Phenomenon of Fascism," in
S.J. Woolf, ed., European Fascism (Londoni Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1968), p. 38.
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He argues, then, that "fascism"
corresponds to a certain historical period in the development
(or retrogression) of Western
industrial nations that has passed
forever.
Secondly, on a

less "value-free" level, he
states a belief that "fascism"
has
become a catch word for those of
a certain ideological persuasi
on

(presumably the left) who use it
as an expletive for all thos
e
with whom they disagree (presumably
on the right).
I would
like to answer first Trevor-Roper's
contention that the use of
the word "fascism" has become a
mere matter
of "name calling"

and.

then, discuss whether it is an
artifact of political discourse ,

The first point to acknowledge must
be that the word
"fascism" has, in fact, been overused,
primarily by those on
the left.

"Fascism" is an emotionally charged word
and its use
implies an attempt to call down moral outrage
against

the person,

behavior or system to which it is applied.

While it might be

argued that stretching a concept such as
"fascism" for the
short-run gain of moral opprobrium may have the
long-run con-

sequence of the loss of the word's moral purchase, the
moral or
value content of the concept cannot be a prima facie
basis for
its rejection in analytical use.

Such a rejection would be,

of course, the direction in which a "value-free" political

science would like to head but it is easily shown that "valueless" concepts are not obtainable if even desirable.

The

concept of "democracy," for example, has undergone immense

reformation from the Platonian "democracy" based on slavery

.

.
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and the subjugation of "lesser" citizens
such as women, to the
"mass democracy" of China, to the low
participation "liberal
democracy" of the Anglo-American experience.
As MacPherson
has pointed out^^ all those who do not define
"democracy" as

merely a process^^ must accept the historical claim
of a wide
variety of political systems to being democratic.
Most liberals
writing on politics do take the value position that
much of

the Third World and Socialist polities have misappropriated
the label of "democracy" but as MacPherson argues they
stand
on weak historical grounds in wishing to restrict the
concept

of "democracy" to the liberal democracies of Western Europe
and
the United States.

Yet few would argue for the banishment

of "democracy" from political science texts as merely an

emotionally charged, emotive concept nor,

I

believe, are there

many who would suggest it is a word limited to a certain historical period (early Greece?, 19th century Europe?) long
passed.
To deal more fully with the rejection of "fascism" as

2'd

-"C.B. MacPherson, The Real V/orld of Democracv (New Yorki
Oxford University Press, 1972)
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Linz*s definition is, revealingly, a pluralist, process definition!
We consider a government democratic if it supplies
regular constitutional opportunities for peaceful
competition for political power (and not just a
share of it) to different groups without excluding
any significant sector of the population by
force
Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime," p. 25^.

—
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an historical artifact

I

would like to turn to a longer
dis-

cussion Of Trevor-Roper's article on
"fascism." Essentially.
Trevor-Roper views "fascism" as a
combination of two social
and political systems.
"clerical conservatism" and "dynamiLC

fascism."

"Clerical conservatism" is viewed as the
heir of
19th century aristocratic conservatism
based on the Catholi-C
philosophical foundations of Pius IX and Leo
XIII.
It seeks

an ordered, hierarchical, undemocratic,

'corporative* state.

"Dynamic fascism" is for Trevor-Roper the only
proper fascism
which occurs in those countries where the middle
class
is not

only frightened and radical but powerful; where
industrialization has increased its size and made its values
dominant for
the aristocracy and the lower middle class.

He goes on to

state that:

fascism proper, what I have called
.
•dynamic fascism'— the cult of force, contemptuous of religious and traditional ideas, the
self-assertion of an inflamed lower middle
class in a weakened industrial society is
radically different from ideological conservatism, the traditional 'clerical conservatism'
of the older regime, modified and brought up
to date for the twentieth century. Both were
authoritarian. Both defended social hierarchy.
But the difference betv^een them is as great as
that between the divinely consecrated absolutism of the Stuart Kings and the naked, unconsecrated absolutism of Hobbes. Nevertheless,
these two different political forms are constantly confused. They are confused in fact
for both were brought together by common fear
of communist socialism in the 1920s. They were
.

.

—

—
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^Trevor-Roper, "The Phenomenon of Fascism," pp. 25-26.
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confused by design,
in order to attain power.
Hitler,
would pose as
.^"-^^
tW^o^^
tives, and 'conservatives,' like Franco,conservawould
pose as fascists.
The two forms were also
confused
the vocabulary of the Left. Socialists, hating both, easily treated them
as
one, and denounced the rule of Dollfuss
in
Austria, or Franco in Spain, or Horthy in
Hungary, as 'fascist.' This was excusable in
the 1930s when the confusion was general
and
politics required opposition to both. It is
less excusable now, when fascism is dead and
our need is not to oppose but to understand .28

m

.

.

.

would like to examine this last lengthy quotation
from
Trevor-Roper to see if 'fascism' is, indeed, historically
I

"dead"

and whether our current situation requires "understanding"

rather than "opposition."
It is clear from the quotation above that Trevor-Roper

does include the notion of 'class' in his definition of
'fascism

although the class element is less explicitly contained in
'clerical conservatism.'

However, it is sufficently evident

here and even more so elsewhere in his article

(p.

25) that he

views 'clerical conservatism' as a reaction to the rising lower
class co nsciousness of the 19th and early 20th centuries which
came to be embodied in and represented by socialism.

"Social-

ism, the anti-clerical workers' doctrine of the twentieth

century, which had revealed its true character in Russia, must

not be allowed to succeed, "^^

Thus, at this level 'clerical

conservatism' and 'dynamic fascism' are alike in that they are

^^
^^

Ibid.

.

p.

28.

Ibid.

.

p.

25.

.
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reactions to a lower or working cla ss consni

rn^^npc..

The difference between 'clerical conservatism*
and
•dynamic fascism' can be found by answering
the question, reaction by whom? In the case of 'dynamic fascism'
the response
is generally "the middle class," perhaps
modified by the words

-inflamed," "lower" or "new"

t

"So each stage in the rise of

European fascism can be related to a moment of middle-class
panic caused either by economic crisis or by its
consequence,
the threat of socialist revolution. "^°

Reaction by whom? in

the case of 'clerical conservatism' is not as clearly
answered

by Trevor-Roper.

"Clerical conservatism is the direct heir of

the aristocratic conservatism over which the liberal bourgeoisie

triumphed in the second half of the nineteenth century.

"^-^

It

does appear, however, that the association of the aristocracy
and the Church would indicate the title of 'upper class' as

appropriate to this group.

Therefore, as a first approximation

to Trevor-Roper's distinction between 'clerical conservatism'

and 'dynamic fascism' one might say that the former can be char-

acterized as a reaction to lower class consciousness by upper
class and traditional elites while the latter is a reaction

most associated with the middle class.
If,

then, the "objects" of reaction (the lower classes)

^^ Ibid.
^•'•

Ibid.

24.

.

p.

.

p. 25.
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in 'clerical conservatism' and
'dynamic fascism' are the same

—differing in the class or classes which lead
the reactionhow would regimes characterized as one
or the other differ?
They would, says Trevor-Roper, both be
authoritarian and both
committed to maintaining social hierarchy.
The

differences for

Trevor-Roper would seem to stem primarily from the
"civilizing"
influences of an upper-class-led reaction which
avoided the

"excesses" of 'dynamic fascism' pursued by Nazi Germany:

Who can tell how Italian fascism would have
developed had it not been for the fatal dependence^ on Nazi Germany? Mussolini might have
subsided, like Franco, into a mere Latin
dictator, preserved in power (if at all) by
electoral manipulation and diversionary
rhetoric— 'Nice, Savoy, Tunis, Malta' serving the one as Gibralter serves the other.
^Fascism' would then have a different definition, without racialism, without public
atheism, without Nordic nonsense or German
Schadenfreude.
It was German power, and
that alone, which gave a hideous similarity
to national anti-communist movements .... 32
Thus, Trevor-Roper has come to the extreme conclusion that

•dynamic fascism' is just barely applicable to Mussolini's
Italy, Hitler's early inspiration; that 'dynamic fascism'

supposedly now dead was really only a distant nightmare, a
Teutonic aberration.
But is this conclusion historicallv acceptable?

The

caveat must be observed that the "moral lapse" interpretation
of fascism and Nazism is characteristic of Liberal historians

Ibid.

.

p.

37

•
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such as Benedetto Crocei
Fascism, Nazism, was a factor, or an intellectual and moral disease, not confined to one
class, but pervading the minds and imaginations
and wills of men in general, a crisis bom of
the loss of faith not only in rational Liberal.-^-^
ism, but also in Marxism.
Thus, although Trevor-Roper includes class as part of his

analysis, an "aberration" theory of fascism, which his ulti-

mately becomes, must rest on a rejection of class as

a key

determinant in the rise of fascism,
A possible correction of this "exceptionist" view of

fascism is offered by Arno Mayer.

He argues for distinguish-

ing among three variations of rightism:

reaction, conservatism

and counterrevolution.

Conservatives are those who came to pov/er
under the rules of a system v/hich they find
Their goal is to try to preserve
changing.
the rules because they satisfy their ambitions and because conservatives have come to
believe in their internal goodness. Reactionaries are more decidedly ideological. They
wish not to preserve the rules that are
changing, but in fact to go back to even
older rules from an earlier time. Counterrevolutionaries are those we generally call
They have, in fact, a whole new
fascist.
set of rules, which puts the other two groups
For conservatives and reacinto a dilemma.
tionaries to make a coalition with the fascists,
they must violate their basic belief in rules

^-^Quoted by Angelo del Boca and Mario Giovana, Fascism
Today. A World Survey trans, by P.H. Boothroyd (London?
.^

.

Heinemenn, 1970)

>

p.

Maver. Dynamics of Counterrevolu tion in Europe.
An Analytic Framework (New Yorki Harper and Row,

^\rno
1870-1956
1971).

»

1

J.

,
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willing to forgo their ideology. 35
Mayer's essential point is
that. "Counterrevolution is
closely interlocked with
revolution. "36

Fascism, then, is to

be analytically understood
as the Right's response to
the
threat of revolution by the Left,
or what I described earlier

as rising lower class consciousness.

In the twentieth century,

this revolution is a Communist
one and thus Fascism is conceptually the antithesis of Communism.
However. Mayer is
careful to point out in his book that
Fascism and Communism
are not mere variations of
totalitarianism.

Except for a debate over whether
totalitarianism was
historically unique or a version of older
forms of tyranny or
dictatorship, Western intellectuals by the
1950
's

had agreed

on a definition of totalitarianism as
"legally unrestrained

government, dominated by a power-seeking
charismatic leader
whose instruments for total control of polity,
society, and

psyche include a single mass party, a rigid ideology,
pseudo
elections, systematic terror, state monopoly of mass
communications, and a centrally directed industrial economy. "^7

35_

^his

Summarized from Mayer by Alan Wolfe, "Waiting for
Rightyi
A Critique of the 'Fascism' Hypothesis," Review of
Radical Political Economy 5, 3 (Fall 1973), p. 55.
36,,

Mayer, Counterrevolution

^ ^Ibid

.

p.

20.

,

p.

9.
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definition glossed over differences between
the socioeconomic
causes and historical development of Fascism
and Communism to
pose Communism— the post-war replacement of

Fascism— as the

prime threat to Western parliamentarianism.

Among the differ-

ences between Fascism and Communism which
Mayer points out are
that (1) the Bolsheviks seized power from below
as a relatively
small group of militants whereas the fascists
in both Italy and

Germany seized power from the top in a virtual
collaboration of
traditional elites; (2) the Bolsheviks held power against
a

consistently hostile array of economic, political, social, bureaucratic, and ecclesiastic elites at home and their supporters
abroad, while the fascists before and after their assumption of

political control, relied on the sanction and cooperation of
the "throne, the altar and the sword";

(3) an entirely new,

revolutionary elite of propertyless politicians and experts was
formed to carry out radical programs in the political economy
and society; the fascists, while forming a distinct political
class which held sway in the areas of politics and ideas,

mingled with an old ruling class that maintained its privileged
position in status, education and economics.
If Mayer is correct (and

I

believe he is) in distin-

guishing Fascism as the counterrevolutionary opposition to left

revolution it is a powerful argument against the position that

Fascism must be dismissed from social science as an historical
artifact.

Only those who continue to maintain the "end-of-

ideology-thesis"

— now

thoroughly discredited by events

— could

.
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contena that revolution-an.
necessarU.. counte.revolutionno longer is a powerful
ana contemporary
force in worla events
If fascism, understooa
broaaiy for now as counterrevolution, must be recoffnizeri
o
recognizea as a
possible reality in a
revolutionary 20th century,
it remains to be
seen whether
fascism is a useful concept
for analyzing.^
regimes,
Whether counterrevolution
has in fact triumphea
in its inevitable reaction to revolution.

For this

would like to turn to
a scholar who believes
fascism to be such a useful
concent
concept.
Gmo rGermani in a variety
Of articles
has set forth a conception
of fascism which he
believes remains pertinent
to the analysis of
contemporary
polities. His view coinciaes
with that of Mayer in seeing
fascism as a tenuous acoommoaation
among blatant fascists
(counterrevolutionaries) ana other "new"
groups, with sectors
Of the traditional "establishment"
(reactionaries ana conservatives) with the aim of inducing
a forced "demobilization" of
the lower class. 39 Germani
maintains that these main functions
I

^VoTp''^f:/ff J!!!"^,";.?"!"?--- "

in S.J. Woolf , ea.

°^ ^""^'^
Fascist 'Regimis.
It;iy ;^d'spaS'"'S^^P°'H'\'-'^r
«""ti"gton and C.H. Moore, Authorit^r ian Pol?ti?rt^'v.J
^"^^''ty (New York.
Basic Book s,
n^
^^Q
pp. 339-379!
"Social Change ana Intergroup Conflict." in 1970),
I L
(New^York. Sxf ora UniveJsi^y
?resr\'Q641-' "^^-.Sr^^g""^"^^
391-t08, ana Sociolo<ria ae 1^ Mn,^ern^,.MxJ
ffinf^A,
(Buenos Aires
Paidos, 1969).
39 Germani,
"Political Socialization,"
3«tO-34l,
German! s views of "integration," "mobilization" pp.
and "aemobilization"
are set forth in his own Soclolofria ana the Horowitz
volume.
'

i

;
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of fascism may take on different
political forms depending on
such factors asi
1. the ideolof^ical climate predominant
at the
national and the international level
at the
period
which the regime is established;
2. the position of the country within
the international system, the characteristics
of
this system in terms of economic,
political,
and military power differentials amon^
nations and the current international
cleavages
and conflicts;
3. the degree of modernization (economic,
social, and political), already achieved by
the society (within the "middle range"
broadly
defined
)
^, the characteristics of the culture and of
the social structure and especially of the
stratification system as it has emerged from
previous transition, and as shaped by other
long-run historical factors;
5. the nature of the coalition cc-using the
various segments of the high class and elites,
and Its composition;
6. the role of the middle classes (varying
from a dynamic one, as a mass basis for the
fascist movement, to a rather passive
participation in support of the regime);
7. the role of the army (to a great extent
determined by historical sociocultural
factors mentioned in 4. above ).^0

m

^

^

.

.

.

^

He goes on to distinguish between two variations of
fascism:

"Classic" European fascism which assumed the form

of a one-party totalitarian state and other aborted or short-

lived European fascisms which became variations of an authoritarian form.

Added as well are the "military" fascisms (espec-

ially in Latin America) which are military functional substitutes for fascism.

^^

Ibid.

.

p. 3^1.

'
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Clearly, Ger.ani is the
.ost tolerant a.ong the
authors
I have presented of
the possibilities for
divergent fo^s of
fascism Which still remain
fascist (and can be usefully
classified as such) in their
essential subst^.
a demobilization
Of the lower classes by
some combination of upper
and middle
Strata.
It may seem strange at
first to speak of a "demobiliza-

tion occurring under fascism
because of the image given us of
the mass rallies, parades, etc.
which marked Nazism. But if one

focuses on any nation other than
Hitler -s Germany (and if one
will admit that fascism was a
reality in other nations besides
Germany) the fundamental "clamping
down" of the lower and working classes by the fascists is
evident. Furthermore, if one
gives a qualitative aspect to
"mobilization"'^^ where participation by virtue of increased suffrage
or additional unionization
is qualitatively different from
participation
in mass rallies,

the case for a "demobilization" can be
made even in

41

.

Linz, as might be anticipated, argues for
narrow, specific definition of fascism as tssential "a fairly
orde? to
distinguish it from pseudo- or semi-fascisms and the in
various
types of authoritarian, non-democratic, conservative
In Discussion—Fascism and Society," Woolf, Nature movements."
of Fascism
—
p. lUo,
,

ui-.^^^^^f^^ differentiates between "primary" and "secondary"
mobilization
in his schema and though it is not essential to my
line of thought here one should refer to Germani's complete
-works listed earlier to get a proper idea of his theoretical
consistency.

^
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Germany.
And What does all this
have to do with Spain
and Lin.'s
-del Of authoritarian systems?
I would maintain
that the
Choice Of language we employ
in describing political
systems
will have an important
impact upon the way in
which one
approaches both the study of
these systems and the value
position one takes in the
interpretation of their political
structure
and internal dynamics .'^'^
Thus, I reject both of
Trevor-Roper's
contentions that fascism must
inevitably become merely a
matter
Of name-calling and that
contemporary social scientists
should
or could "understand" and
not •6ppose."'^5

begins

to%T,%\tr,tlltJ!'.ll bS^Ss^^^f'm^Tn^'f '"^

'^^^
,

elual y-baT^^

"

ko£^Lih trfS:
r
t°

Union/L"'pre?erab!?f

^^"-^"^^

-

^-"t

"Theoretical Self-Consciousness,"
"^^^ Social Strunt.rp
Mass.i D.C. Heath. 1974)
contested Concepts " in P ax"^"^'
1^/''''''' (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,
Prentice Hall
121-146; Alasdair Maclntyre, Ap:ainst
the Self-^^ni:.
Schocken Books, 19?l)i
^^^^
rh^r?p^^I??o
l^"^Sciences of Man," Review
S^f J^^- '"'/I^^^^^'P'^^t^'^^^^^ ^-^1'
PPCharles
Taylor, "Neut^fllt^
"^g
?n Pni f
P^^^
Connolly and Gordon, Social Structure .^
pp. 16-59?
in William^l ^riino^^i^' ^^^^f^^^'
and goiitical
a^g
PolUicai Theory
Th^o^v ^r^"^l^""
(Lexington,

^0^^^^^

'

—

I reject a definition of fascism
so narrow as to
pv.in^.
^Ti^^
exclude it
from the analysis of contemporary political systems
I support Wolfe ("Waiting for Righty")
in his view ?hat if is Aot
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However, although

I

would not reject the term fascism

on the grounds that it has a certain
moral content,

I

would not

argue for its use as a typification of
the Spanish system
unless it contributed to an understanding
of its dynamics as
an ongoing polity.
I believe that Linz's definition
concentrating (in Germani's words) on the "form"
rather than the
•Substance" of the Spanish system lacks an
important "ideological"
dimension which Mayer and Germani include. By focusing
only on
Spain's authoritarian political aspects, in other
words, the

Linz typology misses a critical part of the Spanish
system,
namely its pattern of class dominance, a pattern defined
here
as "Fascist."
I

would expand further on this point by reference to

Jean Blondel's typology of systems offered in Comparing Political Systems.

three dimensions

"ideology."

Blondel seeks to compare countries along
i

"participation," "means of government" and

He views "participation" as the number of people

who take part in decision-making which may be represented by
a dimensional continuum from ideal "democracy" of participation

by all to pure "monarchy" of decision-making by one individual.
The dimension of the "means of government" runs from a "liberal"

to be used lightly as mere invective. As for the possibility
of divorcing study from commitment (or fact from value) advocated
by Trevor-Roper, one need only peruse the literature of the preceeding footnote to see the irresponsibility as well as faulty
scholarship required for such an undertaking,
Blondel, Comparing: Political Systems (New Yorki

1972).

Praeger,
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Diagram

Source:

I

Blondel, Comparing: Political Systems

,

p.

kO,

ideal where policy is the product of discussion and imple-

mented through persuasive Tnean^ to an "authoritarian" endpoint
with decisions made arbitrarily and executed through coercion.

A third dimension, "ideology," refers to one's position on a
conservative-radical continuum with "conservative" referring
to a position denying movement towards greater socioeconomic

equality and "radical," stressing such egalitarianism.
As can be seen from the diagram, an authoritarian-

conservative regime (where Franco Spain is placed by Blondel) is

characterized by low participation, authoritarian "means and

.

3^

a conservative ideology stressing severe social
and economic

inequality.

Blondel thus adds to his typology the facets of

class and ideology seen by Germani and Mayer as
important in
distinguishing among polities of right and left and which

are

glossed over by the catch-all terminology of "authoritarian
regime."

To expand on this point I would like to suggest cer-

tain inadequacies found in Linz's definition of an authoritarian
regime

Pluralism
A main feature of authoritarian regimes according to Linz
is their limited pluralism:

certain group interests are forcibly

prevented from political expression.

Yet a broad category such

as authoritarianism gives one no indication of the nature of

the ruling groups or, in turn, what groups they seek to exclude.

Linz himself cites as an example that religion is a group
interest forcibly excluded in Turkey and Mexico and labor one
such group in Spain,

Yet no counterpoise more striking than

traditional religion and a labor movement could be found in the
twentieth century to illustrate the differences between two
regimes such as Spain and Mexico.

Even after acknowledging the

authoritarian nature of Mexico's current system,

'

one must

still be impressed by and analytically concerned with the

fundamental though incomplete transformation produced by the

Johnson, Mexican Democracyi
Allyn and Bacon, 1971 )•

^''^Kenneth F.

View (Boston:

A Critical
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Mexican revolution in contrast to the reinstatement
of traditional interests such as the Church and the Crown
in
Franco

Spain.

In Mayer's terms, Franco Spain and Mexico tend
towards

opposite poles of a spectrum; in Blondel's, Mexico,
a populist
system, and Franco Spain, an authoritarian-conservative

one, are

separated by their quite different positions on all three
dimensions of participation, means and ideology; for Linz,

they are both "authoritarian regimes."

Mentality versus Ideolop-y
Linz in seeking to separate Franco Spain from the cate-

gory of totalitarian polities, suggests that authoritarian
regimes are characterized by "mentalities" rather than "ideologies."

The difference between the two is for Linz as follov/s:
ideolorries
•
•
are systems of thought
more or less intellectually elaborated and
organized, often in written form, by intellectuals, pseudointellectuals or with their
assistance;
mentalities
are ways
of thinking and feeling, more emotional than
rational, that provide non-codified ways of
reacting to situations. Ideologies have a
strong, Utopian element; mentalities are
closer to the present or the past. Totalitarian systems have ideologies
while authoritarian regimes are based more on distinctive
mentalities which are difficult to define. ^^-9
•

.

,

.

,

.

.

.

.

.

,

.

.

.

Since one of the purposes of this thesis is to draw the

outlines of an official Francoist ideology, the task of demon-

^8
by Linz,

Based on a distinction drawn by Theodor Geiger; cited
"Spain."

^^Linz, "Spain," p. 25?.

:
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strating the internal consistency
of Francoist political
thought must be left for later
chapters.

However, here one

might challenge the distinction
drawn between "ideologies" and
"mentalities." Consider, for example,
the contrast between
the following passages from Wolfe
and that quoted above from
Linz
Fascism is also characterized by a deemphasis on doctrine, leading to a worship
ol the ^spontaneous and the
irrational.
Mussolini said it well:
'No dogmal
Disci'^'^y program is action,
Jir+v.^'^^^i''?^-'
not thougnt.' Or, 'We think with our
blood.'
similarly, as Neumann /Behemoth (New York:
Harper Torchbooks, 1966/ points out, leaders
01 Hitler's Germany continually sacrificed
ideology to practice, Neumann in fact
goes
further by claiming that National Socialism
was guided by no political thought at all.
Mussolini, he suggests, at least had a tradition of pragmatism to fall back upon, while
the German fascists did not even have that.
No known absolutistic or counterrevolutionary
theory fits National Socialism, because
it has no theory of society .' -^"^
.

.

.

Fascism, as Neumann pointed out, goes
about as far as a capitalist country can go
in relegating ideolo^cy to a minimal role.°
The moment is important, and nothing must
stand in the way of expediency, Albert
Speer's memoirs testify to this; Hitler is
pictured as a total opportunist, one whose
moods determined policy. Since moods change,
so must the policies.
The worship of the
spontaneous and the irrational, so central
to the fascist experience, became ends in
themselves -^l
.

As can be seen from these two passages, Linz's charac

Wolfe,

"V/aiting for Righty," p. ^9.

Ibid.

p.

.
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terization of "mentalities" as emotional
and irrational can be
accommodated quite well in an explanation
of totalitarian

Germany and the pragmatism, state planning
and worship of
technocratic solutions which form the ideology

of the end-of-

ideology thesis^2

^^^^^

authoritarian ^p .^n.

one

can,

therefore, turn Linz's distinction on its
head and argue
that while the consistency and comprehensiveness
of the Franco
regime's theory of society may distinguish it
from Nazi Germany,
it does not form the basis for the distinction
between authoritarian and totalitarian polities which Linz attempts
to draw.

Apathy versus Mobilization
This feature of authoritarian regimes is clearly for

Linz an important difference between authoritarian and
totalitarian regimes.

Yet as

I

have suggested earlier, borrowing from

Germani and Mayer, a demobilization of the lov/er class is the

raison d'ete for fascist movements and, if one does not focus

exclusively on Nazi Germany, such a demobilization is apparent.
This is not to argue that there are not differences among countries such as Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, Fascist Italy and

Franco Spain but that such differences should not obscure the
sociological event of demobilization which was central to the

counterrevolutionary movements in each.

Germani, for example,

has shown in his article on the political socialization of

youth in Spain and Italy, the dilemma created for the regimes

52

Joseph LaPalombara, "Decline of Ideologyi A Dissent
and an Interpretation," American Political Science Review 60
(March I966).
.

i
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by the need to gain adherents
a,»ong youth while
maintaining
control and. likewise, of
promoting an ideal of social
justice
While repressing labor.
^^^^^^ ^^^^
differences between Spain and Italy
are explained by the fact
that Spain was not on a war-footing
and therefore did not require
the active support needed in
Italy.
Differences in mobilization
can also be accounted for by
remembering that Franco

"

'

came to

power as a result of his defeat
of revolutionary forces in the
Civil War and the systematic
elimination of opposition in the
"terror years" immediately after
the dictatorship was installed.
^As Linz mentions, regimes such as
Spain are characterized
by a depolitici7,.tion of public
life in the sense that apathyis created and, if necessary,
enforced. However, this depoli-

tioization in some areas is accompanied
by a desired or undesired politicization of other areas such
as sports which are

used by the regime to divert energies
and produce false consciousness •^S and previously innocuous functions
such as the

presentation of new publications or even death
announcements 5^
.
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Germani,

"Political Socialization," pp. 3^3-344.

5k

For an interesting look at political assassination
after
the war see Jesus M de Ivliguel, "El suicidio en
Espana," Hevista
gspanola de la Opinion Puh1 or 18 (I969),
pp. 195-233 in which
de i^'Jiguel---in typical "between- the-lines" fashion—
examines
several theories" of "suicide" in an attempt to explain
the
unexpected rise
so-called "suicides" after the Civil War.
55 Eyaristo
Acevedo, Carta Abierta a un Hinrhp (Madrid
T.^'
Ediciones 99, 1973).
,

m

•

1

56t1 was present
at several book presentations which
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Thus While the population

n,ay

not be actively mobilized
on

behalf Of the regime, there is
an active effort to depoliticize
and channel people in ways which
will be supportive of the
maintenance of control by the rulers.
There are. then, reasons why
Spain may not have been
forced as far into the internal
contradition

faced by Italy and

other fascist states of culling
mass support while carrying out
counterrevolutionary demobilization. Also
the "apathy produced
or encouraged by regimes such as
Spain is not an indication of
a lack of control of political
leadership over
the ruled but

of the fact that this conscious and
constant control can

successfully be maintained without more
totalitarian measures.
As Germani has argued:
even^if the more heterogeneous composition
•
or the ruling coalition determines the
'limited
pluralism' which defines in Linz's terms the
authoritarian version, such 'pluralism' cannot
extend beyond the limits and the interests of
coalition itself, that is, it still must
operate within the system
Outside it, the
rigid repressive controls of the authoritarian
regime operate as efficiently and oppressively
as any totalitarian-like type of control. 5°
•

•

.

afford the opportunity to political dissidents not yet exiled
of gathering without obtaining a permit and discussing political
issues
a semi-public forum.
Another example of Spanish political ingenuity was when after the death of Salvador Allende in
Chile, Spanish leftists published announcements in the necrophilia section such as "Salvador Allende, We Salute his Life and
Work," which expressed a public opinion otherv/ise impossible to
make and politicized even the obituaries. The government soon
caught on, however, and forbid any such announcements in the future.
57 The

mechanism of such control is explained more fully in

Chapter VII.
Germani, "Political Sociali zation

,

"

p.

•
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Toward a Conceptualization
of the Franco
Regime
In this section I would like
to summarize my objections
to the -authoritarian'' typology
expounded by Linz and then move
on to a richer conceptualization
of Franco Spain as a "type"
of
political system.

Although as mentioned near the
beginning of this discussion Of "authoritarian" regimes,
Linz seeks to view the
"authoritarian" type as distinctive from
democratic or totalitarian polities and not a half-way
system between the two, it
appears that many of the inadequacies
of his definition stem
from an acceptance of a false dichotomy
dra^m by this democratictotalitarian continuuni. Impressed by the
obvious difference
between the intense repression of Nazi
Germany and the relative
••looseness" of the Spanish regime, Linz
has tried to "rescue "^^

Franco Spain from a category he sees as overly
restrictive and
analytically dysfunctional. Yet within this category

of "totali-

tarianism" there are two types of polities— not one—
whidi while

superficially alike are vastly different in their mode of coming

I'^se the word "rescue" to imply some normative motivation behind the attempt to remove Franco Spain from the category
of fascist or totalitarian systems.
By this I do not in the
least question Juan Linz's excellent scholarship or commitment
to liberal democratic values.
I mean to suggest only that like
any social scientist including myself he seeks moral and rational
justifications for his actions. Thus I would maintain that
there are ethical and normative considerations behind his view
that Franco Spain v/as less nefarious than fascist and communist
systems he sees as totalitarian just as there are similar commitments behind my more critical view.

1

to power, the ruling
apparatus they created and
the social and
economic goals they pursue,
similarly, a category of
•authori
tarian" regimes subsumes
important differences between
countri
such as Franco Spain and Mexico.

These differences basically
revolve around the issue of
ideology,
the purpose for which
certain regimes have been
established and the goals which
they more or less effectively
pursue. Thus in concentrating
on the "means of

government"-

the ways in which governmental
policy is produced and implemented-the category of "authoritarian"
regimes tends to leave
out considerations of the content
of such policies and whether
a regime arose as a reaction to
rising demands for greater
socioeconomic equality or to pursue (or
channel) such goals.
This typology deemphasizes as well
the depoliticization
and demobilization which are central
concerns of regimes of
the "reactionary," "conservative" or
"counterrevolutionary"
type such as Spain; it deflects one's
attention from the ideological apparatus of social control necessary
to such demobilization and leads one instead to concentrate
on surface similarities of form over differences in substance
.

would like to present therefore an alternative
conceptualization of Spain, based primarily on Blondel's
typology
of authoritarian-conservative systems.
First, I would like
I

to lay out the general conditions which Blondel
sees as

60mu
^ T
The following
is taken from Chapter 13 of Blondel,
Comparing Political Systems
^

.

:

'
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supportive o. an authoritarian
conservative re.i.e. t.en
tne
spec... roaas to power
„hic. .a. .e taKen
.roups reacting
to these conditions
and, finallv +h=
.
structures
or attributes
that are characteristic
of such
4.

systems.

is

5'or(wh|thl?'t'hrs'^,?5
servltiv:':\^i*b^?af^d%';^ScJIt

f'L'd\°S
authoritarian, or povulUfV^^r^
f decreasing
fairly rapidlv who^ +k ^

^

ential but their role in thrJ^'^-''-^^
aecision-makini=TO aIZZ
?ondil!ons con??ibu?f'to"' f"" socioeconomic
Drocpcjc

.

^

emctivenesTo^rt'he'^^s^tL'al^en^L^ff!?!"^

pr^hab^illtr or:''la^.^!o^e?°f3"^^y--ai
In addition to the evolving
breakdown of the status quo
described above by Biondel there
are new demands for development
and change

Authoritarian conservative systems
tend
to appear when demands for
socioeconomic de(and indeed for participation
or
Tffc^-^
liberalization) begin to be fairly
lar^e
and
constitute a challenge of some
magnitude,
'^^^^ challenge is so string
«nd so r^.""^^^
and
buttressed by an extensive party and
groups, or when change has become
so widely
that the legitimacy of the tradi?ion^l^^A
effectively
S""^^
.

.

dw?ndLd

Blondel a specific meaning
5^"^?
as set o,.? ?n PH r''''?^ Of
his
book.
Briefly stated communal
^?ouDs exnrpS.^^''^^^^ ^
relationships while association.!
f?0UDs have
groups
havP a
rr.Lf?^\^'^"
particular aim or set of aims. Communal groups,
,

^3

One can see here then the view of
such regimes as

being reactive to a rising lower class
consciousness described
earlier in reference to Mayer and Germani.
Blondel sees three ways in which the movements
reacting
to such conditions can come to power:
(1) directly
from a

traditional conservative system in which a challenge
to the
leadership is developing and a greater degree of

"imposition"

or repression is required than heretofore;

(2)

by a "pre-emptive

strike" to prevent an alleged leftist take-over
by a new rightwing elite which sees the traditional system then
in power as
incapable of preserving important traditional values;
(3)

in

reaction to an existing liberal democratic, populist
or radical
authoritarian system which is seen as pursuing dangerous
radical goals but which has not yet gained sufficient le^-itiraacy.

Regardless of the way such a regime has come to power
it will seek to return to the values of the past and to
a con-

figuration of structures that characterized previous (in some
cases even mythical) political systems.

However, the attempted

return to the past encounters two immediate problems.

First

of all, to the degree that the traditional social structure

the more traditional types, are further divided into customary
groups, such as tribes, families or ethnic groups, and institu tional groups, such as military or bureaucratic organizations.
Associational groups can be characterized as protective such
as trade unions, or promotional such as peace movements or consumer groups
Communal groups when challenged by the more modern
associational groups may at times form dependent associations
which move into the political arena in ways not amicable to the
communal groups themselves. An example of this would be the
Christian Democratic parties fostered by the Church to counter
the electoral power of threatening secular associations.
.

.

.

^

based on ethnic, regional
or religious groups
has been undermined demands .ay be ™ade
through new groups of a
™ore associational nature such as parties
or unions
unions,
Thu=.
iftus, »
a great deal
Of imposition .ay he
required. Secondly,
opposition .ay arise
«ithan the ruling coalition
of co..unal groups fro.
loyalty to
a deposed king or leader
or due to uneasiness with
the degree
of imposition required to
maintain rule.
,

One solution to these
problems would be the creation
Of a party. Yet the
authoritarian conservative
regi.e, oligarchical in nature, is loath
to i.plant a party which
has
extensive roots in the population.
It prefers a desendent
party, one superimposed on the
social structure fro. above.
Only where the challenge to
its rule comes primarily
fro.
associational groups (as in more
-developed" polities where
the threat of socialist
revolution see.s real) will true
mass
parties be developed.
In the absence of support from
a party, the military
and possibly the bureaucracy will
become important props to the
regime. Yet here the regime must
meet two important conditions,
the military must remain tied to
the traditional values of the
communal groups while at the same time
its nationalistic aspirations for the country must not be
frustrated by a lack of
development.
In this delicate balance of. at times,
contra-

dictory tensions, a popular^^ leader
embodying a pattern of

^^o^b^edly means "popular" in the sense of his
«oonr^+
acceptance
by the important members of the ruling
coalition and
groups rather than mass or charismatic
appeal.

•^5

hxerarcMcal an. aiscipUnea
aut.orU. consistent
„Uh t.e
The importance of
leadership is. in fact,
for Blondel
a .e. feature of
authoritarian-conservative re.i.es.
Because
the.r ol.,archic nature,
hierarchy and discipline
are at a
Pre^xu.. The unquestioning
acceptance of the fa.ily or
tri.al
head Which prevailed in
the traditional polity
has heen hro.en
<^own and
restoration or maintenance
.
of oligarchical
values is the practical
proof that a leader can
he the guide
that the society requires
to save it fro. -chaos
and subversion.
indeed, in the absence of
constitutional structures,
which
dependence on the leader
discourages in these systems,
the head
Of an authoritarian-conservative
regime becomes all important
and the maintenance of
the system after his
death depends in
large part on the ability
of the social structure
to control
a large part of the
population.
.

"Official" Political Socialization,

Traditional Social Norms and Social
Control
The above description and
analysis of the dynamics of
an authoritarian-conservative
regime goes far toward providing
an adequate conceptualization of
Franco Spain. In contrast to
Linz-s discussion of "authoritarian"
regimes, Blondel emphasizes
the reactionary or counterrevolutionary
(and. one may infer,
the class) nature of the dictatorship
installed in I939.

•

.

^16

Moreover, one can see that
along with whatever
prag^atis. is
necessary to promote economic
growth. Franco Spain was
also
marked by a cohesive view or
theory of society which
sought a
return to a glorified (and
probably non-existent) past
and tc
a traditional social
structure which had

^-^.nxtuU^

lion.

Even given the -success" of
the Nationalist cause in
destroying those opposed to this

-vision" during and after the

Civil War. there still remained
to the Franco regime the
task
of reinstating traditional norms
and values.
The remainder of this thesis will
attempt to explore
this effort through an analysis
of the "official" political
socialization adopted by the regime to
promote those areas
Where traditional social norms
prevailed, to reestablish traditional authority where it had been
rejected and to eliminate
or repress what it could not control
through less blatant
means

There remains one last question to resolve:

which side

of the debate shall we favor—authoritarian
or fascist Spain?
It is clear to me that Franco Spain was not,
fortunately, Nazi
Germany.
The conservatives and reactionaries in Spain
seem to
have succeeded in doing what their counterparts
in Germany never
didt
they used the counterrevolutionaries— the

fascists— to

defeat a threatening social revolution and then "domesticated"
them as no one ever domesticated Hitler.

collaboration with fascism was a success

The Spanish right's
i

it paid them well.

ret to ignore the reality
of this collaboration
is to
misunderstand Franoo Spain.
If the Soviet Union of
1920 1940
and 1970 is Co™,unist.
if china, Cuba and North
Vietnam are
Coinmunist, then surely
Franco Snflin
t+ t
bpain, Italy
y rranco
and Germany, in
their essential nature, were
weifcj Fascic^t
rir.^ may
rascist.
One
add modifiers
if desired,
"... a clerical-military semi-fascism. ... -63
My point here has been only
to set the stage for
a more careful
analysis of this regime's
ideology and of its remarkably
effective methods Of social
control.
Perhaps the debate is best
resolved in the reading of
what follows.
I

^3

"^"^""^ Sociological Considerations on
o^^^A/^^^^n^^^',
Ppc.^o^ and
Fascism
Class,"
Woolf, Nature of Fnsnic^ni pp. 97-103.

m

,

•
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CHAPTER

II

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN AN
HISPANIC
REGIME

Whenever I try to sustain what is
«
for
«^ a
me
fascinating hypothesis that the
authoritarianism of the political system is
actually a
consequence of the authoritarianism
of the
social system, especially at the
level of the
school. I find very few in favor of
this LnJJ^
proposition. It usually bothers the
rightists because it supports a criticism
of
the sacrosanct and institutionalized
bourdispleasing to the
PSif^.^^^^^y-,
leftists
to think that the political factor
can have less importance than is ordinarily
believed. And nevertheless everything
brinss
one to think that in the early socialization
or Spaniards there have been planted
some
authoritarian ingredients which are quite
strong and correspond to what one then sees
exercised in the political system.^
^

This chapter begins with the precisely stated
dilemma

posed above by Amando de Miguel

i

is Spanish society more

authoritarian than the government itself?

It will require

more than one chapter to address this suggestive
query.

How-

ever, the response must build on the outlines of political

socialization in an Hispanic culture which this chapter
attempts
The Imperial Family
Sl)ain as a nation, like conservative and religious

^Amando de Miguel, Espana. Marca Registrada
,
Kairos, 1971), pp. 119-120.

(

Barcelona

3

.

i

^9

elements in other societies, talks about
the "crisis" of the
family. As the authors of a Foessa
Foundation study argue,
however, the question is not-at least
for Spain-whether the
family will disappear but if the traditional
family, characteristic of Spain, will be transf om.ed
For the family unit
is in Franco Spain not only an agent
of primary socialization
but the pattern upon which other social
experiences are based.

Social change is at least made more dif-ricult
—in present circumstances— when the family
environment rests on a rigid nonr, of an authoritarian type. Especially when familial relations
are converted into the model and archetype
of
other relations (industrial, political, etc.)
which are not familial. Paternal
jc, then
the result, a form of living together v/hich
is not exactly the most apt and legitimate
in
a modem industrial society.
It v/ould be
acceptable to us to speak of the crisis of the
family if at the same time the imperialism of
the family is recognized.
The consequences of this imperial family in
the process of

political socialization is the area to which

I

would like to

turn next.
The Family as Socialization Agent

There is little agreement among political scientists

over v/hich of several agential factors is the most important
in the process of political socialization.

Part of this lack

^
^
Fundaci^on Foessa^, Informe Sooiolop-ico sobre la situacion
social de Esmna (Eurame'rica 1970), p. 473,
2

,

^ Ibid

.

p. k9k.
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Of

.,re„

is no

debt attributable

to the fact that
there
is little in the way
of theory to explain
or relate

aspeots Of the socialisation
process.
that is done is of a

different

Much of the theori.in,

,,,,t^

,,,,
speculation is .ade
in an attempt to explain
findings in which see
agents are
-re Closely correlated with
various operational
definitions
Of politics. Thus, for
example, political
scientists find a
high correlation between
a person's own party
identification
and his recollection of
his parents party
identification.
Fro. this finding a nheory
of the importance for
political
socialisation (defined as party
identification) of the family
or early socialization
experiences is constructed.
Yet it
seems doubtful that such a
piece-meal approach to theory
will
have much success in explaining
the complicated picture of
socialization presented briefly in
the last chapter and in
giving an over-arching theory
to relate early socialization
to
late, the influence of social
events on individual attitudes
and behavior or the self-selection
of external events and
experiences to constitute an internal
construction of political
reality.

Although theoretical conceptualizations
that define
these relationships are generally
lacking, it

is not the case

that there are none at all.

One of the more comprehensive of

such theories and one which is concerned
with the richness and
complexity of the person as a social being is
that by Berger
and Luokmann, The Social Construy tlrin of RsalltY -'^
J-

Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckraann, The Social
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Berger and Luckmann view
society as existing in
an
Objective and subjective
reality understood in
ter.s of an
ongoing dialectical process
composed of the three
.o.ents of
extemalization, objectivation
and internalization.
The

beginning of this process is
the internalization of
an external
world as the person constructs
the objects of an external
real-

ity into a subjective reality.

The process which forms this

comprehensive and consistent
induction of an individual into
the objective world of a
society or a sector of it is
defined
as socialization.5 In this
framework.

£rifflar^.^ocialization
is defined as "the first
socialization an individual undergoes

in childhood, through which he
becomes a member of society.
Secondary socialization is any
subsequent process that inducts
an already socialized individual
into new sectors of the objective world of his society. "6 i„
^his view, then, primary
socialization is usually (though not always)
the most important
one for an individual since the
basic structure of subsequent
secondary socialization will resemble
that of primary socialization.
In Berger and Luckmann's view, the
"significant others"
(those in charge of socialization) for the
child will normally

and naturally be his or her parents and the
generalized family.

Conptruc t.1on of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of
^^^-^^f^V 9T
(Garden City, New York. Doubleday, 1966).
^Ibid

.

p. 130.

^Ibid.

.

p. 130.

R
nowio^^^
tSnoy/lfdgft

Obviously, then, the family
takes on extreme importance
as
socialization agent
P^f"^ary socialization there is no

r.r>r.y.i

^5^^
regaled one with
tmJ
f
inherent in Se situatforS k ^^^^^^^J^ge
Obvious cS;seqL"^L'^?ha1.
'al?f oSgh^\\'^e
P^^^e^' Of
Ms socia??L?io^'^-r?^'^^
"^^^^ ^^^l^s who
set
^^1^^ of the game.
the rules
The child can plav
^^J\^"^!?^^iasm or with sSuen resistfnce
game
ared This
around.
Thff);/^^'^'.^^"^"
has an important
Since the child has no choice corrollar?
in tJe selection
^^^"^
identification
with ?hP^^f
them IS quasi-automatic. For
the same
theif^ar^Tcuiar reality is quasi-inevitable.
Sarrea^Uv'?.'""""'^^?''^^
The child
o^
his
si^i^^^^^
ficLroth^^.'^^'^'"
^^^""^
^'^^y possible worlds.
^o^ld, the only
Pv^^?^^^^^^^^^^
existent and only conceivable world,
the world
t out c o urt.
It is for this reason that
the
world internalized in primary
socialization
4-^^^ '"''f? ^i"""^^^ entrenched in consciousnLa ^^^^^Vorlds
internalized in secondary
o^!?
socializations. However much the orie-inal
sense of inevitability may be weakened
in
subsequent disenchantments the recollection
01 a never-to-be-repeated certainty— the
certainty of the first dawn of reality—
adheres to the first world of childhood. still
mary socialization thus accomplishes what Prinindsight, of course) may be seen as the (in
most
important confidence trick that society
plays
on the individual— to make appear
as necessity
what is
fact a bundle of contingencies, and
thus to make meaningful the accident of
his
Dirth

^

.

,

m

(

Jbig,

,

pp. 13^-135
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This is not to argue, of
course, for the primacy of
the
family or that the family is some
ultimate predictor variabl..e
that "explains" all later life
attitudes or behavior. It is
a
theory which attempts to order
the process by which an individual enters the swirl of realities
called society and to
place the family as the first agent
which filters or reflects
this greater reality for the child.

An important question also is whether
the family as an
institution is more or less authoritarian
than other socialization agents. ^The earliest systematic
response to this question
was that of Marxism which saw the nuclear
family as being
tied

intimately to capitalism and its reactionary
property relations.
Others have also seen a correspondence between
modern, indus-

trialized society and the nuclear family and either
condemned
it as vitally implicated in the oppression of
women,

or

asserted its functional role in maintaining the stability
of
modern social arrangements ."'•^ Another condemnation of the
Q

I am referring here to "authoritarianism" in a general
sense as an emphasis on uncritical acceptance of authority, the
use of manipulation as opposed to persuasion in human relations
and the reaching of decisions through arbitrary means which do
not and should not involve those who are affected by the
decisions

9

-^Frederick Engels, The Origin of the Family. Private
Property and the State (New Yorki International Publishers.
1972).

'^Among those who have argued for the abolition of the
(nuclear) family as a key necessity for female liberation are
Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex. The Case for Feminist
Revolution (New Yorkt Bantam Books, 1972) and Gerraaine Greer,
The Female Eunuch (New Yorki McGraw Hill, 1970).

5^

(nuclea.)

.a»Uy has

oo.e rro„ t.e schooX
or anti-ps.cMatry
w OH in U3 exploration
o. tHe .ooial an..
espeoialX.. .a.iXiaX
aspects Of psychosis and
schizophrenia has co„e to
see the
(nuclear) family as an
unheal thv influence.
unnealthy
infi.
Here the family's
role as a primary
socialization
«oxun agent
a^ent in hni^^
holding a monopoly
over "si^ificant others"
(in Berger and Luck.ann's
tern,s)

viewed as prejudicing the
necessary experience of
positive
isolation, that is. of
autonomy.^^

is

Although these conceptions
of the fa.ily help
™ake the
case for its authoritarian
influence on the socialization
process, they do not withstand
searching criticis^.^S
both the Marxist and
Feminist critiques of the
family ste.
from What appears to be an
erroneous historical view
of the
nuclear family as the modem
capitalist version of the ™ore
traditional extended family.
Evidence indicates, however,
that both the nuclear and
extended family forms have
persisted

:Mch L-in-it- ?
authoritarian nature S^ toe flmily!
PantheorBooks.°l°9?S):

g^P^°th

"

^

°^

of th. F.mily. (New York.

|rom.e;n\lhL%^L\?^^^^

^»tt.ifAn"f l?bo"rr^I^h'l£Z^^'

^^^''^^'^

""^^y
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throu^^hout a great deal of
history.
^^y'
one .i.ht ™ake of Parson's

Apart from
fro. -.h
the criticisms
functionalist, his attribution
•

•

•

of
a key role for the nuclear
family in "modern" society
is
equally undermined by Lasletfs
findings on the persistence
of
nuclear and extended family
fon^s.
Although this is not the
Place to propose a detailed
analysis of Cooper's condemnation
Of the family as a poor
psychic environment, it appears
that
the real enemy of the
personal autonomy seen as
important by
Cooper is not the family
aiiixxy itseii
itself hnt
out "o«,r,+v,
smother-mother," female-

dominated child-rearing that
isolates and pauperi.es the roles
Of father and mother as equal
partners in the socialisation
process "^^
.

However, neither the historical
persistence of the
nuclear family nor the future
possibilities for its restructuring, mitigate af^ainst the
"inherent conservatism"^^ of the
family as an institution or what
Berger and Luckmann called the
••confidence trick" played by the family,
parents, for better
14

Laslett, The World W e Have Lo^t (New York,
Further supporting evidence
1965).
studies of Spain will be discussed subse-

PKov,!
o^®^^^
frn^^ oth^^'''^'^!^^
quently!'''''^''^^

^? interesting that Cooper illustrates his own view
+h«
the M^"^*
imperialism" of the family almost exclusively with
examples of mother-child and especially mother-son
A revolution in Western conceptions of parenthood relations.
combined with
lemaie liberation may be the answer to the real problems of
lamily-caused trauma documented by Laing and Cooper rather than
the "death" of the family.
n-r
Of

''^Elshtain, Women and Politics

,

p.

218,
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or worse, constitute the
significant others who first struct
iure
reality for the child. This
acceptance of an arbitrary
arrangement as the only one possible,
of a particular social
arranKeraent as the way such
arrangements must be, is the first
and possibly the most profound
conservative message of a new
human's social life.

However, there is reason to believe
that it is the
mttern of this family arrangement and the
relationship between
the family and the larger society
which has the greatest influence on the relatively democratic or
authoritarian socialization
of the child. For example. Inga Findl,
in a review
of much of

the theoretical literature on the role
of the peer-group and
family in the process of socialization,
formulated a model of
the family's authority structure and its
influence on personality structure.
she discusses four areas in which the authority

structure of the family can vary and in turn have
variable
effects on children's socialization.
(1) value-orientations
of the

parents— whether values such

as obedience are more highly

regarded than those like curiosity; (2) the family's structure

—the

locus of power in the family as being exclusively in the

parents and, likewise, unequally distributed between father and
mother, male and female, versus a less rigid distribution;
(3) parents' attitudes toward children--in8trumental versus

17
'Findl, "Family vs. Peer-Group."
It is well to keep in
mind Marsh's criticisms of this personality approach to the study
of political socialization. See Chapter I,
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person-re^ardin^ attitudes, and

W

..ethods of sanctions-

psychological (permissive) versus
power-oriented (punitive)
forms
In contrast to the ascriptive
and particularistic family
the peer-group in Findl-s
review is seen as relatively
universalistic and achievement-oriented
wixengea,
Tm the peer-group,
^
in
^lierarchical family structure
is
^^--^Principle-egalitarian
one,
because the
th^ members are of the
same a^^e and
development stage. FromihS it
results^'h^? authoritarian demands
consequences are less seldom here, and their
(sic)
Principle all members participate
X"
collectively
in process of decision-making.
rnembership in a peer-group is
changeable /tnd/ this contrasts
^?r^k?^''^
strikingly xo the ascriptive
membership in
relations of the members are
S^J^^Iii^^'
based primarily on mutuality.
r>^r.T

^^i^

J

The interesting (and highly
debatable) aspect of this
model is in the relationship between
the family's authority
patterns and the larger society, not
surprisingly, middle-class
families are found to fall in the more
"democratic" range of
all four areas while lower or working-class
families predominate
in the more "authoritarian" range.
^^^^^ ^^^^^ differences
18-, 'J
-Ibid

19

.

.

p.

11.

A central problem throughout this thesis has been
that
in presenting a theoretical background of
political socialization literature to the case of Franco Spain I am
forced
upon studies which I find highly suspect on conceptual to rely
and
methodological grounds. My point is only to suggest theoretical
views or conceptualizations which seem to capture a dimension
of reality which is applicable to Spain.
For example, Findl's
model IS important only to set forth a concern with intra-family
relations and the family-society nexus vital to an understanding
of Spanish political socialization.
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are seen as affectin, or
interacting with familiar
authority
patterns

Another interesting discussion
of the child-familysociety interaction is that by
James C.

Davies in the special

issue Of the Annals cited earlier.^O

would liRe to quote an
extensive passage from the
conclusion to his article.
Tribal and feudal societies
generally contain
"^ich
^P?
th^ chUd
regarded less as a potential
regard^d^Ts/:'^"""^
equal
i

L

in t.hrh^^''"'"K^°

l^L^

t^^''''^^

than as a person
^° ^i^^ onl; slowly
"«ver expect to live
subordinate' relatioi-

shiDs
snips witn
wlt.^ o?h'"''^"°'"
others,
=,„+v,^v,J^^'^^^'^^'^f"^ influence of autocratic and
Bocial relationships, within and
wUhCut ?hf ?family, is usually accompanied
by
oWn^^+
endemic physical deprivation
dnr?n
h-''!^?^
durin^r which the ^rowin^^ child
how to provide physically for must quick] y learn
himself, ?hen his'
children.
Without the
no^^l^^'
potential
levelmfr, antihierarchizin^r influence
integrated and industrialized society,
^L'^M^n;?
the
child is likely to move from authoritarian
dependency to authoritarian support of
those
^^^^^^
adequately
1^^^^
fnvthinf other^^T:
anything
than authoritarian ways of actin^r
and reacting and therefore unable to
achieve
any facility the transition from dependency with
to
autonomy. So he uneasily remains authoritarian
Within the family and in his political relationships .
As he starts the transition from tribal
or feudal to modern society, he shifts his
dependency on parents to a dependency on a new national
movement and new political father figure. There
IS, perhaps, more often than not, some net
gain,
because the authority influence of the political
father cannot, over a prolonged period, be so
strong as the proximal familial influence. In
consequence, when the transition has progressed
somewhat, he is less likely to be as dependent
James C. Davies, "The Family's Role in Political
Socialization," in Annals pp. 10-19.
,
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achieved the be^inniA^a
In turn, he is likely
autonomy,
?o
i^
^^^^
authoritarian toward his own
his father was and ^^^J^^^^^ children than
broad sociaftransi^Ln'' ^^i^^^?^^
transition Of the
"^-^ internal
.^^^''^"S individual.
The tr«n^?^^
anxiety chJon^c In ?hrr.°?
^^^^^ ^'^^^
in the society but «^ in'^^I^'^i^^^
endemic
^^^^^^
develops and stabilizes
lhp'?i°^":-°^ to
family become re-establlc^^.H
i^^^^^-^^^
^
^^^is
and new ties to othl^
includin' oLftfpartv
^^^^ership, nation
and the socisl in.,??^
increasingly
pluralL?ic societfIs'?h
universal,
resldual social unir th^ f^^n^

L

M

swL
^

^

a superior
whirh tho

^? ^ subordinate or
bu^.nn^^-^
totalitarian functions

i'V^.

in

From Davies one could, then,
posit a relationship
between fa.ily and society in
which the nature of tne fa.iiys
authority structure and. perhaps,
its in,portance as a socialization agent would be related
to the "stage'' or "level"
of the

society's relative "modernization."

In a more traditional

society, the family would play
a major and relatively authoritarian role in the political
socialization of the child. A
"modernizing" or "transitional"
society might find the role of
the family diminished as surogate
parents play an
increasin;^

part in socialization with a
greater possibility of providing

Jbid.

.

p. 19.

'
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"democraticizin^' experiences.

In a .ore ...odernsociety

the family has a.ain become
a dominant a.ent but
in the role of
providing the nurturance
necessary to fuller human
autonomy. ^2

Spanish Political Culture

«

Normas

Institucionales (Institutional
Norms)
This brief review of certain
aspects of the socialization
literature has attempted to sketch
those theoretical conceptions
Which argue for a
child-family-society-state connection.
At its
most sophisticated level this
literature can only
point to

vague associations of different
kinds of state and social
systems with more or less democratic
or authoritarian familychild interactions.
It does not attempt to establish-as
a
theoretical position-the manipulation
of the socialization
matrix by the state to promote the
development of certain kinds
of citizen attitudes and behavior.
Irregardless of the intrinsic merits of these
theoretical positions, the case of Franco
Spain represents
a clear

example of the child-family-society-state
connections which
these theories seek to define. One of the
arguments of this
thesis is that authoritarian-conservative regimes
in their
reaction to change come to cultivate certain variations
of

traditional social norms as one mechanism of social control.
22

The caveat of note 18 is repeated here in regard to
words such as "modern," "traditional," "developed," etc. and
the unilinear, developmental paradigm to which they refer and
about which I have many reservations.
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Chief a.on, these traditional
nor.s is the fa.ily which
beco.es
a generalized metaphor
for political arrangements
and attitudes
desired by officials. The
Franco regime was marked by
a consistent and coherent ideology
of which the family formed
a key
conceptual element. Our
examination of Spain under Franco
suggests that the traditionally
"private" arenas of the family
and particularly the position
of women in the family
and in

society become highly politicized.

This line of argument will

be elaborated and given
support in the Chapters that follow.
It begins here, however, with
a model of political culture
and

political socialization for Spain
opaxii bacjed
r.^^
oasea on tho
the pioneering
work
of Amando de Miguel,
In the beginning of the
1960's a large national survey,
inspired by the Almond and Verba Civic
Culture study, was con-

ducted among Spanish youth.

De Miguel, a Spanish sociologist

who was one of the leaders of the
survey team, reported on the
results in a series of articles in the
Revista del Institute de
la Juventud .^3
^ variety of reasons^^ I will not be
dealing

Wi^uel. "Estructura Social y Juventud Espanola,
P^rt^r^llnTn^^''en la renta
Participacion
y en el consumo," Revista d el Institute

Espanola
Normas institucionales " RIJ, 1
I I ^ ^^y^^^"^
(October
1965), pp. 113-1^8;
"Es^tructura SoclalT"Juventud
Espanola. El modelo de la cultura politica," RIJ,
3 (February
"Estructura Social y Juventud Espanola
IZth
T
Impacto Politico e Interes por la Politica," RLJ,
5 (June 1966),
pp. bj''ii^t
"Estructura Social y Juventud Espanola
Participacion Politica," RLJ, 6 (August 1966), pp. 15-38.
,

I

«

The youth survey, being based on the Civic Culture
study, is subject to the problems associated with the earlier
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here with the statistical
findings of the survey but
rather
with de Miguel's introductory
"model" of political culture.
Adopting Parsonian terminology,
de Miguel finds Spanish
political culture to be marked by
particularism. However,
in

contrast to other particularistic
countries. Spain seems to be
characterized not by localism or familism
but by ami^uismo
("friendism" or a system of friendship
relations). De Miguel
bases his rejection of the family
as an important institutional
norm (nonmU^ stitucional ) for Spain
primarily on certain

ethno-

graphic studies, particularly that of
Pitt-Rivers.^^

work as well a3 some internal problems of its
own.
For a
basic criticism of the C ivic Culture approach, to
politica]
inquiry see Alasdair Maclntyre, Against t he Self-Tn^pgpp nr\y^.
'
Ap (iNew York.^ Schocken
Books, 197177 especiaTlT" theT:;^
chapter. As with all operational definitions of political
concepts one can never be sure of the relationship between the
indicator" measured and the "concept" of political culture or
whatever being studied. On the myth of operationalism see
William Alson, Phjlo s ophy of Languag e (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.j
Prentice-Hall, 1964), last chapter, Max Black "Reasoning with
Loose Concepts," in his The Margrins of Precision (Ithaca, N.Y.t
Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 1-13; George Schlesinrer,
Operationalism." Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol, 5 (I967),
pp. 5^3-5^71 and Friedrich Weismann, "Verif lability " in Logic
and Language, First Series ed. Anthony Flew (Oxford:
Basil
Blackwell, 1951), PP. 115-1-^5.
Even within this quantitative paradigm there are problems,
for at this early stage of quantitative analysis in Spain no
statistical tests such as chi square or margin of error of percentage differences were applied.
Finally, as de Miguel himself stresses, the Spanish
survey was conducted only among Spanish youth and therefore has
only questionable application to Spanish society as a whole.
,

25

-'Julian A. Pitt-Rivers, The People of the Sier ra. 2nd
University of Chicago Press, 1971).

edition (Chicagoi
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A curious aspect of these ethnographic
studies is that
among the several which have followed
Pitt-Rivers only one has
found the extended family to be
characteristic of their study
site, and this was in an urban barrio
of Madrid.
Others,
all in rural areas, found the nuclear
family to be the basic
social unit.^^

This is interesting for several reasons.
it is another finding to support

First of all,

Lasletfs thesis, presented

earlier in the chapter, that the nuclear family
is not a byproduct of the modern age.
In Andalucia-perhaps
the most

"backward" area of Spain-the nuclear family
has persisted
through time while the extended family, supposedly
characteristic of traditional society, is found only in
modern, urban
Madrid. More importantly, though, the fact that the
nuclear
and not the extended family characterizes much of
rural Spain

does not logically preclude the importance of the family-

contrary to de Miguel's conclusion:
The lack of mutual rights and obligations
outside of the elemental /nuclear/ family,
the lack as well of occasions on which the
26

Michael Kenny, A Spanish Tapestry. Town and Country in
Castile (Bloomingtoni
Indiana University Press, I962).
27

Joseph Aceves, Social Chanp:e in a Spanish Villa ge (Cambridge, Mass.j
Schenkman, 1971). Substantially the same description of the nuclear family pattern, first described by PittRivers, where marriage is delayed until a new household can be
established, is given by Aceves and the "country" portion of
Kenny.
The rural studies were all conducted in different geographic regions: Aceves, northern Spain near the French border}
Kenny, Old Castile on the central plateau; and Pitt-Rivers,

Andalucia
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arily invited

-

the

?f a

wed°w'^' ^l'

.....L,^

^^^^^^^^ ^^^^
family constitutes
a key social unit.
The major social \ir,^+
,

i

,

^"^"""al

belongs' is the'nuc5:ear'?a2!;':

Person^haf

othel^'''°^^^*

association a

great social meaning

family squabblec, ar-r„^

has
^^oj-ated and

intra-

prope?ty\nd inheriLnrr°";.'^P^"^^^y "hen
Howeverf in good
^
'tl,^:s"nd'bad''\f ?
family
that the individual
must

*

raHyj9

The importance of the
family as a unique
socialisation
agent in Spanish culture
has also been the starting
point for
Francisco Murillo ^errol
Ferrol'c!
s viou,
view of *.u
the process of "undersocialization" in Spain.
^ provisional assumption,

I

would

"^^"^^
Country
ar^ ^ela%!ve1v\''"''°"
^-^y scarce. Therefore, it
+ho+
u
not
'^'"^'^ culture 'to'inter-'
iorLrbur?ha%"?H'
is delicienf Pv»^tr°K^'" °^ intericrization
^'^^^^^^ few
instances Of 'socSuzation\"r
touciaxization at an
authentic

U

.

de Miguel. Rlj, i,
p. 127.

29

^^^^^3' Social gh»npo,
pp, 66-67.
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The important empirical
question which Murillo's
assumptinn does not go
xrn far
-fo,
answering is whether
Spain is
characterized by a peculiar
neculiarlo^i,
^
lack of secondary or
y
non-familial
socialization agents. One measure
of this contention
might be
^'^^ ^-el Of
associative life) or the
degree to which Spaniards
participate in the voluntary
associations both more and less
political which are thought
to characterize modern liberal
society. Although
information about
this type Of social
participation is hard to come
by. some
findings are available
dixaoie.
tr.
In
the suppressed Chapter
5 of the
1970 Loessa study cited pm-ii.:iv.
earlier, +u
y
the investigative team
had
this to sayt

m
^

l^^od^^^^i^

f^obably there 1r n o pthpr
S£anish_social true- ±^7^^^
.

pI

or.^>.-f-

of

Francisco Murillo Fpr-roi
"To ^„
proceso de
socializacion." in Centro de ?^?nH^o q^'^'"?-^^ ^
La_familia
espanola (Madrid: ^^^'^i-^es
Anales ae
de Toral
Moral, Social
LotT^%'
y Economia, no. 4,
I96?), p. i/f8.

—

^
.uan I.inh^d*
rde"Mf^Se\'^S%h'^ e\^?l1
early
iTS-f
1960's.
See Juan
Linz and Amando de iv^irm^i jlt

(Madrid
.

lLlltuto'df"lstutl§rffftgi?

Z'VlT'rr" "^ifferencel^'ndlimpa'rt
ISSiJhe!iLe Of SuanlS^?/"^ f ^f"
tpalnT"

ons
eds.

J.

^
"^hlS^^

T.LTS,'^
.

^

'

^"

cLnaging
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only to political life,
which is at th«
lowest level of all
an r.f>
a
of Spanish
contemporary
historv hnt
nj-sxory,
but ?^
to social life
1t<?Pi-r
t
^
-^-^-^
-"-^-self
Indeed,
not onlv are nnii + i^^i
^
-

.

~,

.

.

during so many years,
barely exists

lh.v»

Pressures /^h^
iSajori?y of fhl^f™'';'?"'
legally formed associations
1
Ipiri =
that td '^^^'t'^ i^^^ "'^^'^h indicates to us
°^ associative spirit has
sunk tc tt"^

''^P*'^^some
Catalonia, the Basque country
vff^
and
Valencia) do associations
with
great
weight
in collective life exist
and pefhlps in 111
it is (only) the spor?
LsSciat,^
Pes^i^^ltic
«
^Slffc^tlon!!^^^^^^

re2o^^?

Of course, as will be seen
in later chapters, the concept of "organic democracy
upon which the Franco regime
was
supposedly constructed intended
that "artificial" organizations
such as political parties and
other "factional" groups would
be
replaced by more "natural" associations
such as heads
of fam-

ilies,

cooperatives, local or civic associations,
etc.
However,
as the Foessa study comments, except
in the realm of sports,
this does not seem to have occurred. 33
Instead, as one Spanish
critic has observed,

Fundacion Foessa, Informe, I970, p. 5.8. The fifth
titlid-^a FolriiJa
^.TJ\''\^''H
banned by the Franco government. Multicopied y Asociativa" was
drafts of it are.
outside Spain and it is from such a copy that
ihTrnnAK^'^t^^^^i^
this quote is taken. Emphasis in
the original.

^^Ibid^, p. 5.9.

6?

... (VV)e are seeing occur the
opposite Of what the conqufrors
of Uberal
When
they
thou^ht'"\^wnf
^^^^ correctly we
+h^,^^K^"~l
^i^^
thouf^ht--that on doinp- away
with
Ideological or party procedures, electoral"
"na?SrS
groupings, founded on the
concerns of dally
"^°st
In"" would take on aprofound necessities
of man,
special force of
and on the contrary we note
the lowest index
in the vigor (tono), never
very high l^^''''^''
Spam, of the spirit of association. 3^
Thus, if the lack of voluntary
associations can be taken
as some rou^h measure of the
strength of secondary agents of
socialization, one would be inclined
to agree with Murillo that
the "imperialism" of the family
expresses itself in an "undersocialization" of the child.

Another way of placing the family in
perspective relative
to other types of agents is to compare
Franco Spain with an
idealized "socialization community "35
y/ithin this community
one can identify ten clusters of
agents with a vested
.

interest

in socialization.

Each of tne following clusters has a program
of
socialization, more or less planned, and more
or less formally presented as a program
to
influence the growth and development of information, attitudes, values, and behavior of the
younger members of the community.
(1) The formal education system, public and
private.
^(2) The Churches with their programs for
children and youths.

Dionisio Ridruejo, Escrito en Espana (Buenos Aires
Lasada, 1962), p. 132.
35 John A.
Clausen, ed
Little, Brown, I968),

.

,

Socialization and Society (Bostons
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(3) The leisure-time af^encies with their

prS^rams?""^^'

cultural, and character education

^''''^^^ control and protection agencies
c„oh\^^5^
such
as the police, courts, traffic-safety
agents,

(5) The therapeutic, special correction,
resocialization services such as counselors, and
remedial clinics, and programs for the
handicapped
(6) Employment offices and work supervisors
Who hire the young and supervise them
on their
paid
,

iobs.

Political leaders who have an interest
J"^^
involving
the young in political activities

m
.

•

•

•

In addition to these seven personnel clusters
which have more or less articulated programs
and
professionalized socialization agents, there are
the following two additional populations of
agents
(8) The subculture of parents.
(9) The subculture of like-age and older
peers.
And in addition to these populations of
"direct agents" there is the copulation of a^-ents
who control and distribute the socialization^
interventions of (10) the mass media--the T.V.
programs, the radio programs, newspaper stories,
and newsstand materials. 36
t

Anyone familiar with Franco Spain will be impressed by
the high degree of State control present to a greater or lesser

extent in all institutions of this "socialization community."
Of the first seven socialization segments nearly all have

significant or total State or State-Church influence.
qualifications might be made about (3), (5) and (6),

Some
However,

many leisure-time agencies, especially in the case of sports
such as soccer, have been politicized by the regime.

^^IbMx.

pp. 33^-335.

And, as
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was mentioned in the quotation from the
Foessa study, cultural
associations are restricted or supervised by the
government

through fear of their possible political development.

Clinical,

particularly therapeutic, agencies have their special
political
aspect which has been pointed out by the followers of
antipsychiatry both internationally and within Spain.

And in

the field of employment while there is little regulation
of

management level employment (perhaps because it is not needed),
the Sindicatos (syndicates) play an important part in the poli-

tical supervision of most workers.

As for the subcultures of parents and peers, the politi-

cization of the first has already been discussed.

Although on

more shaky grounds, one could speculate that the institutional

norm of amiguismo

.

as expressed in the particularistic patterns

of the political culture, also tends to politicize peer-group

interactions in a way that is supportive of the kind of sta-

bility an authoritarian-conservative regime requires.
Since the elimination of prior censorship in Spain,
the mass media has become more pluralistic in regard to

"official" political socialization.

The television and radio

are acknowledged to be completely "government line."

Newspapers

have in the past shown some independence although the most

adventurous are quickly silenced as in the case of the evening

-^^Amando de Miguel, "Psiquiatria y Sociedad,';, in Papers
Universidad Autonoma, 1973)
Traba.jos de Sociolopia (Barcelonai
11-36.
pp.
.

i
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dally Madrid which was
shut-down Ifor
or political
Dol1ti..T reasons in
I971
The incredibly low
circulation of Spanish
newspapers (aside
perhaps fro.
3,„,,,,,^
^^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^
are. in fact, an elite
rather than a mass .nedium.^S

P^,

Thus, within this
"socialization community the
influence
Of agents outside the
fa.ily can he said to he
either ™ini,„al.
based on a familial or paternal
+
^ 4.^
paternalistic
pattern,
or reinforcing
of such a pattern.

However, it is important to
note that arguing for the
special dominance of the
Spanish family as a primary
socialization agent does not contradict
de Miguel's institutional
norm
Of ami^.^. The child's
first introduction to social
reality
comes through Lhe family and,
if we are to follow

Murillo,
there are relatively few secondary
experiences to modify this
early construction of reality.
But de Miguel speaks of later
social interactions (universal
relations in Parsons' terms),
such as the adult relationships of
professor to student, manager
to employer, bureaucrat to citizen,
and argues that these are
marked by patterns of friendship rather
than kinship.

Of course, Watergate events in the
United States are
only the latest testimony to the fact
that the concept of political friends (and enemies) is certainly
not unique to Spain.
Yet. it is evident from de Miguel's
choice of language-insti38

^
Jose L. Aranguren, Human Communication trans, by
World University Library, I967),
^ ^^'^ (^o^doni
,

VV^Vk\^^2
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i^^ii^

norms-that anii^uT^

is an institutionalized
process

not merely a description of
quite com.on patterns of
human
interaction. Dionisio Ridruejo
has put the argument this
way.
Our system of living together
is reduoPd
to private relations,
in the end either e^og^^^^^uf* and in order
tf in
It
would be sufficient to cite to prove i?
the excessive
importance which family nepotism,
on ?he one
friendship
and'favo^^
°f
on the
o?hf;
other, have acquired
among us.
"He
whi
doesn't
have a god-father isn't
baptized." goes a
refrain sufficiently old to
verify fha? vices
favoritism are already "anciln?
vLes"'?^o^
vices among us. But now this
vice—
contaminated to a greater or lesser which
decree the
old systems of personal
power-has becoml
custom and even an all-inclusive
Today everything in Spain-access system !
to empio;m;nt
the concession for a business,
the leasing"'
installation of a telephone, the
resolution of the most common
bureaucratic
requirement-is obtained because
one has a
iriend.
Of course, the immense major-itv
of
people don't have those friends who
iake care
of things, but they can ask to
borrow some
from those who have mountains of
them.
With
this a veritable traffic in favors
has been
unleashed upon us, a new and curious form
of
mendicancy, the mendicancy of influence,
which
throws us back to the most vicious epochs
of
courtly miracle-peddling and brings, to those
well endowed with contacts, a large clientele
of hopeful or grateful supplicants 39

T

^

.

39
XbMj., pp. 13^-135.

The bureaucratic "interveners"
who expedite administrative details for a
fee are
anyone who has spent time in Spain or other Latin familiar to
countries.
1 cannot resist, however, the tale of the F^adrileno
who peddled
technique was to sip a cocktail in the lounges of
iu^^u^:^
the better restaurants frequented by important
government functionaries.^ In casual conversation he would always present himwaiting for a luncheon appointment while he made contacts
^^if these
with
important figures. Shuttling from restaurant to
restaurant during the long Madrid lunch he soon became known
to many officials and made his living by offering
his influence
to interested bidders.

72

Although concentrating on
different aspects of the
socialisation process and
hu.an interaction, there
is substantial agreement by de
Miguel and Murillo on the
nor.s or
values Which prevail i„
the political culture,
whether the
patterns of behavior
avior are familial
famfn^i or
amigables they will still
be Characterized by personal
rather than impersonal
relationships. Loyalty, for example,
will be exercised
toward people

rather than principles.

hasta 10

.in1 u.to

.

n

As the Spanish refrain
goes.

l_^nemi^o.nl..io_ju^

the friend even
what is unjust and to the
enemy not even what is
Just."
Moreover, it is particularly
appropriate that de .v.iguel
BPeaks of the institutional
norms of Spanish political
culture.
Within the institution of the
traditional family the child will
be taught values of hierarchy,
unquestioning loyalty and obedience to those who represent
authority. As
the child grows up

he or she will fi„d fe„
associations or organizations outside
Of the family. As has been
mentioned, political associations

(except those of an officially-approved
sort) are forbidden by
law and few other groups even of
a cultural nature are allowed
for fear of their possibilities of
developing political taints.
Those organizations or institutions
which are legally permitted
(such as Syndicates or professional
societies) perpetuate the
values and patterns of behavior described
by
ami^^ufsmo and the

exclusiveness of the family in two ways.

First, within the

structures, leadership and authority are
legitimized and
exercised in a traditional manner. Then, the
structure or
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or.ani.ation as a who.e
„u.t con.o™ to an

erne™

0. ..natural representation.-

..organic.,

state

Xn t.is reine.
poXitioal

theory upon which the
Franco regime was foun^ea.
the Syndicates, the ra.ily ana
the
Uoo., governmental unit)
are the "natural organs.,
of the -.o,, politic.-,
subordinated
to the state authority
rity and
anrt r-oi=+t.^
related to one another
as a hand is
to an arm and the arm
to the human head.'^O

^ni^

indeed, to both its critics
and supporters the
Franco5st
state appears as an attempt
to govern the country
as a large
"family."

^0

authorities continue

P^evan'Sr'

Therefore, in order to
order Which the world longs reconauer thaifor? ?here
^"4" •
^0 thr.i?d°dle
iTel- lTllM^t\T accepting
the
^°
social and
Mlftir»/L^
^ natural orderi to return
f^ i

uL

•

^1ap-^---crtirL^LL^j^

•

?rj^^:r\°s
'

doS?ror^ler^L%fr;;t'J:©'

'

There emerges, then, the following
view of the Spanish
socialization process. The Spanish
child due to the exolusiveness of the family as a socializing
agent will be characterized
40
Franooic^t'^nr:!^^""'^'""''^^

treat'm^nJ

41

^'"^J''''

Kaptervi'^''^^
de Miguel, Espana

.

p.

°^
"corporatist model', of
supplemented by a more complete

263.

42,

Carlos Mo^a, "Fainilia e ideolo^fa polrtica."
.^^^^^^i
T
in Las_ideolp^ias
e n la Espa^a de hov ( Coloquio
fwad^id,
viidariai
Seminarios y Ediciones, 1972), p. 101.

—

)

7^

by the particularistic and ascriptive
norms of the family.
Isolated from significant contact with
other socializing
experiences, he or she will share common
values with others
only to the degree that his or her
family is representative of
or similar to the wide variety of
subcultures found in Spain.
The socialization process will be
heterogeneous in regard to
class, region, etc. and leave the child
perplexed before types
of behavior or situations not experienced
by the family.
'

q^^.

side of the family, the State will attempt to
restrict experience to those institutions or associations based
on the family
and to regulate the relations between these institutions
and

the State to conform to a system of "organic," "natural"
repre-

sentations.

This is the model of Spanish society documented in

the textbooks.

"Official" Political Socialization and

Social Control
The Francoist State intervened in this process of

socialization on several levels.

One of these levels was the

blatant restriction of the possibilities for establishing various types of social,

cultural and class groupings or associa-

tions for fear that they might acquire some political significance.

On another level what organizations did exist conformed

to the Francoist view of "organic democracy," a corporatist

-^Murillo Ferrol, La familia

>

pp. I6O-I61.
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syste. based on the privacy
of what Blondel calls
"co^unal
6roups"-such as organisations of
heads of

families. Church
societies, village associations,
etc.-whose co™on bond is
the ties Of tradition, of
icinship. birth or religion.'*'*
An
authoritarian conservative regime
such as Franco Spain, in
attempting to return or preserve
traditional values of the
past, must rely on communal
institutions like the Family, the
Church and. especially, the
Military as the primary basis
of
its power.

However.

would like to introduce the
argument here
(for subsequent elaboration in
later chapters) that
I

this

dependence on communal groups is not
just a reliance on already
existing centers of traditional power
and authority but that
the regime had to foster the
development and/or strengthening
of such groups and thereby promote
an ideology which gave an
explanation for and justification of the
importance of these
communal groups and the political
system
built upon them.

It was from this perspective that
the Francoist State

proceeded when it "intervened" to restrict
certain types of
groupings while permitting and encouraf-ln^
others.

It was from

this perspective that a process of socialization
was seen as
political and politicized by the regime to form
"official"

political socialization.
The activities which

I

4^
See note 62, Chapter

find to be characteristic of this

I,
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m

perspective ana
and wnich,
whirh
in -^0/%+
fact,

^

^

toward approximating Francoist ideology were often
viewed as curiosities
(lo_cur:sl) by
r.o

Observers (particularly liberal
observers) of Spain. Thus,
Spain's annual cash award to the
family head who has sired the
most children, presented by
the caudmo himself, is,
for me.
a profoundly political event
whose symbolism is far from
amusing
Nor can the family allowances
which begin with the

second child
and increase with each successive
birth be seen as merely
expressions of magnanimity when one
learns that they began on
the anniversary of the "Glorious
Uprising" in 1938 when the
first payment was presented by Franco
himself. A man and wom.an
can start out married life with a
State loan if they are both
practising Catholics and the woman agrees
to give up any gainful employment.
No interest is charged and the loan
can
be

repaid at the rate of 1% a month.

With the birth of each child

part of the loan is waived and. with the
fourth, entirely
cancelled.
Apparently, the encouragement of numerous

children tended by full-time mothers was the regime's
idea of
"family planning."
This was, then, the final level of intervention by the

State in the socialization process.

In a multitude of subtle

and not so subtle ways the State attempted to reinforce the

most traditional and conservative values of the society.
it did not merely reinforce but in fact created and shaped

^5

-^Kenny,

Tapestrv

.

p. 183

And
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these values.

For it was not just any family which was

stressed; it was the father-dominated,
authoritarian, traditional family set out as the ideal family.
Within the "socialization community" this distortion of the family
was

granted-

in classic corporatist fashion— a veritable
monopoly over

socialization.

And this "imperial" family was then made the

model of social and political interaction in the
paternalistic,
corporatist State. Thus, the particular view of the family
promoted "officially" through formal and informal mechanisms
of socialization became a metaphor for politics under
Franco,

As will be seen in the textbooks, direct connections were
drawn

between patterns of behavior and interaction in the authoritarian family ideal and the patterns of participation (and nonparticipation) to be encouraged and enforced in the political
sphere.
The analysis of how this strategy of social control

worked and its implications is best left for Chapter VI after
the official images of the textbooks is presented.

For now this

"intervention" of the State to fashion a process of "official"

political socialization should be taken as a tentative view of
the vast complexity of factors and forces which go to make (or

unmake) the Spaniard as political person.
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CHAPTER

III

IMAGES OF THE STATE

The materials in this chapter and those which follow

constitute the primary original contribution of this
thesis.
In these chapters we will be looking at the messages or

images

of reality which "official" Spain wished to convey to
its

emerging citizens.

These images may be divided, albeit some-

what arbitrarily, into three main parts

j

the Image of the

State, the Image of the Individual, and the Image of the Citizen.

The distinctions are based primarily on degrees of

emphasis rather than any sharp demarcations drawn by the

Spaniards themselves or anyone else.

In fact,

the historical,

philosophical, theological and ideological traditions of Spain
argue against such tidy categorizations.

The distinctions are

intended, however, to provide a basis for analyzing and com-

paring that concentration or collection of political power
called the state with the view of human nature implicit in the

textbooks (and the political and social system they promote)
and, finally, to view the interaction of state and individual

when human nature is in a sense politicized to form the political actor or citizen,*

*Before beginning with the textbooks themselves a few
words might be added as to how access was gained to them. They
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Organic Corpora ti sm

corporatism as an approach
to the governing and
study
Of political syste,„s is
becoming a growing concern
in

political

in^bott n^°v7:^d Tel'lol]£Z''^'.'\i:t -f^f
be purchased
however, I was fortunate
be permitted to use
to
an ext^n^f;;;
had been compiled by
°^
textbooks
\^^?''\°':'
which
Amando de
search offices. The collection
^-A. re^^Pk^ ^?
^''^ '?""''reds and
represented books from the
with the heaviest emphasis Ia?e 19fMT\^"
present
peruse this collection over on the Franco years, I was able to
° ""''^ ?^ several months as
well as a hup-e card ?ile
i

m

pI""^

'^^'^
by associates of Pro?eslo?
^°'"Pil«d
dH?^;i:? ''H^''
of over 130 "ideolo-ill"
^^''^'^ 5^?" ^^^^ consisted
|h"eriA
with excerpts or passlLs 111^^?^+?
textbooks
"ideology" which
the researchers had^elected
thJnf'"f,
reaSln. of nearly all
the textbooks in the coUec?ion
f v,^"'
research in a
rather random way sleMn^ a
for"?he"^
general nature of
the texts and their virietv "^ek"
ult

L

aXrfnX--d-ffL^

~

t'd^^o'"^ ^
?^ --""Plioftionf^r^^^
content^
?extboJks cove?in?mi°? orif^lT''^'' ^'^^^^ °^ ^'^^"^ ^"^i'
^ore^recent text^Sf oks^^fL^^^S^h-a^^efLl

^^^^

^t^^

books is"nor^s"cie^^tui^!^^
Tte^^^fs^"^^*?:
°^
collection or Of m; '™ selectfo^?ro^?^^'"*?"^
'"^ ^^'^'t judgment based on a year's
stav in Snain
5^
r Tu^*:
"
"^^^^
represLt
a
"j^Y^
c^osS
section of%hoL"'°?^?.^
the political formation courses,
For tb2 1
^ decade or so 1"
a
publication
of the Klnister of
f^?.
J'*''*

ro^

r

K..%'.JL °L-...
of
those
textbooks
approved for use
i
in elementary
and secondary schools, was available
and ooniirmea
confirmed
the general representativeness of my
selections.
less chance that I can speak
shout +:;*'^°?'^4.*''i? ^^^'^^
passages I^^quote
appear in the
?he ^fviK^^^^'^r^'^^
textbooks, A more rigorous content analysis
was
and ultimately rejected. What impressed
J°"fidered
^nft about the textbooks was
me most
the consistency of their
Philosophy, the meaning conveyed by their tone,
the illustrative
is

I-ibr os y l-laterial de

aroff?c5af
publication
^ n'b^-^'^?:

r
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scienoe.l

While one may debate the
prediction that this
century will be the "century
of corporatism" fo'r the
Western
world it has certainly been
an accurate prediction for
Spain.
The Franco regime was quite
self-conscious about its corporatism
and. for a one-time suitor of
the Axis powers, not overly
embarassed about it. It touted
its "organic democracy"
as an

alternative to "outdated- Liberalism
which plagued the "socalled" Western democracies and
also to atheistic Communism
Which in its predictably cynical
(and Godless) way had mistaken
the possibility of class warfare
in modem society as a necessity
to be exploited.
In opposition to these two great
"isms"?

Snts'
wnnirt

"^^^^^
the table of
as
an
unbiased
observer
nor
i
investigators
necessarily
see
the
same
things
in the
^»viS i
"^^5 ""^ interpret them the same way or dra^ the
same conclusions from the interpretations.
I believe I have
e degree that I have suc^ ^^^"^ presentation of the textbooks'
contPnt
?ho following pages,
then, should be viewed as an
-^flogical construction,
I will be building an argument
t^«rih!
that the images of the textbooks form the outlines
ideology and that this ideology will help to explainSf a Spanish
and critique
the ongoing Spanish political system,

TdifLr'''".""!"^
-lid not read them

r

^See Frederick B. Pike and Thomas Stritch, eds., The New
corporatism (Notre Damei University of Notre Dame Press.
1974).
especially the article by Philippe Schmitter, "Still the Century
Of Corporatism," for extensive bibliography on the topic,

Mihail Manoilesco, Le Siecle" du Corporatisme

.

/r,
(Paris,
1936),

3

.

rev, ed.

Howard Wiarda, Corporatism and Development! The
Portuguese Experience (Amherst
University of Massachusetts
Press, 1977).
1
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Franco Spain purported to offer
peace, harmony, cohesion and
continuity. Let us begin our
discussion of Spanish corporatism with the ^'official- images of
the State.
Patria. Nacion and Estado
Much has been made of the contrasting
political and
philosophical histories of the
Anglo-Saxon-American-Common

Law-tradition as opposed to the Med
iterranean-Lat in-Roman Lawtradition.^ This difference is made very
clear by a comparison
of the three-tiered conception of the
Motherland. Nation and
State of the Spanish textbooks, with the
nation-state concept
of the Anglo-American tradition.
La Patria (the Motherla nd!.

La Patria is the highest

level of the three-tiered structure of Spanish
political

philosophy both in the sense that it subsumes the other
two
divisions and also that it is the purest, ideal form of
Spain.
We know that patria as applied to the whole of a national

territory is a relatively recent development in European political thought.

-5

Indeed, Spain still retains the earliest

meaning of patria as the local community of one's birth in the
expression, patria chica

.

or "little motherland."

However,

within the current regime, the Motherland has a very specific

Howard Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of
Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Traditioni The Corporative
Model," World Politics XXV (January 1973), pp. 206-235.
.

^Ernst H. Kantorowicz, " Pro Patria Mori in Medieval
Political Thought," American Historical Review LVI. 3 (1951)
pp. 472-493.
.
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meaning ta.en primarily fro.
the words of Falangist
founder
Jose Antonio Pri.o de
Rivera,

•Miaumid^d^_De^y3o_^

IMversal"

("A unit of Destiny in
the Universal").

Early versions of political
education textbooks contained a notion of ]a
nn+yio ,.,u-!
la^tria
whichu was closer to the
medieval
meaning of patria at,
one roots
roofcj of
nf +h«
„ as the
the local community in
the
land
t

t

Motherland is the country in
^^^^ °f our
parents' ^h^
ancestors,
the labor
wui-cn xne livingwMcf^he
n^rnfrfi
realize continuin;^ thp xxi or>
Which w^la^'^hf
first^??:h?:6^^^
wh.-.K

-

Yet the words of Jose" Antonio
(poet-revolutionary that
he considered himself) seemed
to have a lofty and more
abstract
meanin- which latter textbooks
emphasized:
"^^""^ ^^^^ believed that
thP
y/;^''''^^''T^^*
the Motnerland
was "the land in which we have
been born, where our parents were
born and
where our ancestors repose."
This concepSpaniards had an attachment,
l
a I'lJ^^^^'l,^^?:'^
great attachment to the land; this
is, to
the place where we were born, and
that Spaniards believed service to the
Nation
consist of defending the tombs of our would
grandparents and of intoning emotional canticles
to that land where they reposed,
which is
the national territory.
All this is very
well {but It is necessary to elevate
one's
thought and see that the motherland is something more than territory and superior to
the men who have peopled it or will live
on

it

What is the Motherland?
/The/
characteristic of Spain and that which
.

6

.

.

mina Cortiles, Enciclopedia c^m <( ]^^r^rai
Elzeviriana y Libreria Cami; 194l), p. 266.

T
^ "'"Sf®
Imprenta

nr^c.
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distinfcuishes it from other
has not been the possession Motherlands
of a terrUorv
or a population.
The essence of Spain is
Its havm^x fulfilled and
continuing to fulfill an undertaking or mission
which,
videntially, God has bestowed upon it proin
the world (
In fact, the significance of
la patria for the Spaniard,
and that which marks it as distinct
from the Anglo-Saxon

"nation." is to be found in this undertaking,
or mission, with
which all Spain is bestowed. Part of
the origin of this

"mission" can be seen in the "spiritual" view
of humanity
expressed in the textbooks.

Man needs to live in an order higher than
the natural.
It is sufficient to look with attention
at the human person in his complete reality
to realize the insufficiency of the natural
ways
which people live together, ivian, in
fact, isn't satisfied with the exploitation
of natural resources and the food, clothing,
housing and comfort which they provide him....
Man needs for the full development of his
personality, to attain to projects that are
much more wide and ambitious.

m

Corporatism, in its reified metaphor of the State as

an organic individual, takes this view of the human person as
the basis for the distinct "mission" which Spain must pursue in

order to reach its full development.

The Spanish "mission"

while similar to that of other nations in its role as a

1

/

JDelegacion Nacional del Frente de Juventudes, Formacion
del Espiritu Nacional (I'V^adridi
Ediciones del Frente de Juventudes, 19^7), p. 135.
^ ^Seccion Femonina. Form acion Politico-Social (Madrid
Seccion Femenina, 1964), p. 4l,

8^

transcendent unifvinpic,
i^xyxiiir^ iorce
y^r^^^+u^^
forrp IS,
,
nonetheless, uniquely
Spanish
Nations, like individuals, act in
life.
^""^'.^"^ History, in accordance with
.

J

^^''^

^«

i

the individualtV""'
has a true vocation to be a warrior,
or
a musician or a military, when
these are his
inclinations, also we can say of nations
that
they have a commercial vocation, like
England;
or a military one, like Germany; or
artistic,
like Italy.
Spain has its own vocation which is that
of
defending its spiritual values,
s^^y

"that

'

For anyone familiar with Spanish history it
should come
as no surprise that the meaning of these
"spiritual values" is

concretized in the dogma of the Roman Catholic faith.

In many

ways Spain became a nation in the modern sense for
the first
time during the recon riiji.sta of the Koors under the
banner of

Catholicism.

But what may be surprising is the stridency and

absoluteness of the identity between patria and Catholicism
made in the following passage, particularly in books meant for
children.

For here as elsewhere throughout these next chapters

it is not important that "official" Spain selects carefully

from its historical past but rather the pattern of selection
and the persistence of that pattern throughout the textbooks.

Each people justify their presence in the
world through a mission which it carries out.
History tells us that Spain not only has such
a mission but that it is the most noble, by
being spiritual, and that she has fulfilled it
amply, because she has been the defender and
propagator of Catholicism, has exercised the
spiritual imperialism among other peoples, has

^

Formacion del Espiritu Nacional (194?),

p.

123
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^h^^ai^h
nothinfr has swayed
f^L carrying to and
her from
the world her culturp
^^'^^
^^^^"^-^^ without equal!'
un^.Tth''
until
the point of exhaustion,
her religion
her^language, ^>^er^laws^a^.g eustoo..

her^S^^'

The importance of this
Catholic mission is "proven" by
the past and the requirements
necessary to maintain it are not
ignored by the textbooks.

Motherland was chosen by God to
fnT-pn?'"''
fulfill
one of the most decisive
destinies
^^^^"^^
propagation of

ctrLlL^ly.'^^

This destiny is manifested in the
deeds
of every group:
religious, cultural, poliand military.
In its fulfillment Spain
It^'^l
reached
the most glorious days of her history
and only when she turns her back on
her vocation aoes she loose her pre-eminent
position
the concert of nations.

m

Here you have the objective of our policy,
agreement with our vocation, to defend
religion through all the means at our disposal, in councils when heresy attacks dogma,
by arms when it might be necessary, against
the enemies of Christianity on our land or
Europe, where a danger to the faith presents itself there wili be a Spaniard to
defend it. For this mission, interior
spiritual unity is absolutely necessary,
conversion of invading peoples, missions or
expulsion of religious minorities like the

m

m

Jew,

is,

•^^

Ibid.

etcetera.-'-'^

The Catholic interpretation of life
in the first place, the true one, and

.

p.

98.

^^Manuel Alvarez Lastra y Eleuterio de Orte Martinez,
Pormacion del Espiritu Nacional (Madrid. Delegacion Nacional
del Frente de Juventudes, 1955), p. 6.
•^^

Ibid.

.

p.

10.
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besides, historically, the
Spanish one. It
IS a noble pride to
continually make this
affirmation with words and,
above an w?th
works, since all the acts
of your lik have
to be consistent with
your ideas^lS
The good works which the
patria is required to perform
are not, of course, limited
to the national territory.
Spain

views its mission as Catholic
in the wider sense as well,
that
is. a universal mission
with a message

that must be brought to

a waiting world.
5n
m

°^ 2pain
civilizing peoples who still remainconsists
in
error,
carrying European culture to all
the corners of the world and in
maintaining
a spiritual unity with all the
peoples that
she discovered and colonized.
This is, that
which is known by the name of Pan-Hispanism.l^

m

But what exactly is the nature of
the spiritual em.pire

which Spain pursues as her mission?

Some insight can be gained

about the paternalistic realities of such
an arrangement
the following anecdote

frc
:'0m

Countries Dependent on Others
Perhaps you don't have well in mind
the characteristics of and differences there
are among dominions, protectorates, colonies,
mandates and empires; you will understand
better with this example:
You have an older brother, already
married, who lives from his profession in his
own house, with his wife and children. He
lives independently of his parents up to a
certain point but there is a tie of affection,
fondness and even economic dependency which

pManuel Alvarez Lastra y Eleuterio de Orte Martinez,
formacion del Espiritu Naclonal (Madridi Editorial Nos, 1955).
p. 39.
•^

^Ibid.

.

p.

23.

8?

keeps him united and with a certain
ation to the judfrment of his parents.subordinThis
^""^^^
Po"^inion
with
respect
to
J?^.?"
the Mother
Nation.
You have also a unmarried sister who
finished her training, has her employment
and salary, and can live fairly independently.
But she lives
your parents house, she obeys
them, is directed, protected and helped
by
thems
this is an image of a Protectorate
You and your little sister depend completely on your parents and are subject to
them
everything, they order you and indicate everything that you have to do.
They
watch out for you and you don't have to
bother yourself about anything. Your situation is similar to that of the Colo nies.
Your parents also have as boarder in
a private high school a child who they received when he was left alone by the death
of his parents, and who they are educating
and instructing until they make of him a
useful man v/ho can provide for himself and
open up a road in life. That boy represents
a country under Manda te (Fideicomiso
And finally, your paternal grandfather,
with all your uncles and cousins, are owners
of important factories and businesses with a
great number of employees and workers. All
these have relations among themselves and
work under the supreme direction of the ^^randfatherj such is the image of an Empire. ^3
^

m

.

m

)

The designation of Spain's mission as a spiritual one

has implications for the relations that obtain between herself
and those nations who "still remain in error."

For just as

corporatism reifies the relations between the individual and
the State, so too are relations between states seen in

strangely religious and personal terms.
Perhaps the most curious manifestation of this reification

-^Antonio Maria Zubia, Geof:rafia Universal (Madrid
Editorial S.M., 1964), p. I25.
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Of interstate relations which
corporatism entails is Spain's
view of herself as the "World's
Priest.
As ^the above quotations have shown. Spain is seen
in the textbooks as playing
an "imperial" role in the world,
but this "imperialism"
is

"spiritual" in nature.

It consists in propagating
the "eternal

values" (in Jose Antonio's phrase)
of anti-materialism, Catholicism, etc. of which Spain is
privileged possessor. If one
were to diagram this relationship
it would probably look something like the following
Diagram A

spiritual mission
/

/

r

I

\

\

WORLD

Spain as a nation, then, sees herself presented with
the ethical dilemma familiar to Catholics and Catholic priests
in particular

I

how does a person (or nation) who is "right"

Labor Escolart
1955), p. 587.

Junior (Madrid

i

Dalmau Carles, Pla,
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deal egalitarianly with another who is in "error"; how does
one who is "saved" deal with one

v/ho

is not?

The solution

for Spain (as for the priest) is to try to act as if one were
not superior even when one knows this to be the case

The

.

following passage illustrates this point as well as sounding
several of the themes set forth in this section:
Patriotic Orthodoxy

Patriotism should be maintained in
the strictest orthodoxy, as close as possible
to the true Doctrine, and vices should be
discarded that could get one to decline into
jingoism. These vices are, besides egotistic
racism and materialism.
rationalism .
Racism would have us believe in a
superiority of our race, which would be opposed
to the equality of men before God which our
Holy Religion recognizes. Besides, we Spaniards, who to so many people have given our
religion, language and culture, know that we
have always considered all men as brothers
and equals and have united our blood with all;
the ideal of a people who have a universal
mission is not to consider oneself superior
but to work in order to elevate everyone to
its level .
Materialism shouldn't influence patriotism
either, since we have repeatedly indicated
that it is of a spiritual order. Material
motivations aren't despicable but they can
never play a role in influencing the great
universal task of the salvation of the country,
which is the foundation of patriotism.-"-'
.

,

La Nacion (The Nation)

.

We need not spend too much time

on the Spanish concept of nation as it does not differ substan-

tially from that of the Anglo-Saxon tradition and can be thought
ethnocentric
of in the terms of this tradition without significant

•^"^

Ibid.

.

p.

587.

Emphasis added.
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distortion..

One of the More
straightforward definitions
is
that contained in the
quotation below,
is oompoled^of^tte"^?^?"'

^f^"^^*^ "=^tio„

other definitions, however,
inject a .ore metaphysical
note such as that seen
earlier in the definitions
of

1,.^^

^^"si^t^^ Of a plurality of
f^mU^L'^^'^'^u
families,
with a common origin, territorv
and possesses a certain
cultural a^fl^itv
produces'fspeiial
'
""'^^
way
wL'of'n?^
of life /more precisely,
form of bein-7.19

A

On
an historical formation
which ^^n u-l^''''
appeared in its
definitivP^L^''^r''^
definitive form about f'^'^'''
the 15th century, and
which means fundamentally the
gathering o?
diverse human communities in an
undertaking of superior category.historic
^0
The definitions seem to agree,
in general, on the cultu2zal nature of the concept of
nation and its link with a
living, breathing people.
It stands in contrast to the
abstract
ideal of la_j2atri^ and the juridical
formality of el estado
(the State).
El Estado (the State)

.

This discussion of the Spanish

concept of the State begins with the
distinctions drawn between
18
^
/M
(Madrid

.

CiV-T-ca

—

'

«

—

Alfredo GosSlbez Celdran, Educaciol'i civico-socipl
Doncel, 1970), p. 130.

^^Alfonso Ferrer Guillen, Formacio^n Politico-Soci.n1 v
~
(Madrid:
Almena, I968), p. 30.

c>eccion Femenma, Formacion PoliTtico-Socin l (Madridi
Seccion Femenina, 1964), p.T^8^
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l^naoion

and el_esta1o by .the textbooks.

In typical cateohi sm

fashion a textbook asks. What
relation exists between the State
and the Nation?
^^^^
constitutes
the K
base and l^^
foundation of the State. The
nation is an unorganized society,
the organization which the State which needs
confers on
^^^^^ lesser societies.
-XuT^^^^^
withm the State, are articulated functionally
in a species of social organism,
with
entiation of organs and functions, withdiffera
iruitful division of labor and with
a better
arrangement and utilization of the efforts
of Its people.
State by means of the Law or political Power, grants and confers unity to
the
people and directs the will of all towards
the common good,"--*,

But, although the State seems so
important for the

Nation, the two are not that vitally linked.

For the State may

change while leaving the Nation intact:

... The Nation is an element anterior
to the State.
It arrives, like a living social
current, through time, and the State represents
a mere canalization of this current in order
that it may circulate better and that its energy
be more useful.
The State can end, giving way"
to another form of social organization, or to
another State of different political content,
and, nevertheless, the Nation continues being
the same.
The Nation is the living element
of the State, that gives it feeling and transcendency.
It is the people, with their forms
of life, their customs and idiosyncrasies, v/ho
through a necessity for order look for the
instrumental help of the State to structure
themselves according to norms and general laws.^^
^^Ferrer Guillen, Forma c ion
2?

Ibid.

.

p.

30.

,

p.

30.
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This provisional nature of the
State may seem at first
glance out of character with a dictatorship
of the Spanish
variety where things would hardly be
expected to be provisional
or temporary. 23 This view of the
State is, however, one of
the main justifications or rationalizations
of the regime.
For in the three-tiered conceptual
framework of Spanish corporatism, the first two tiers of la mtria
and la nacion are
immutable and probably infallible. Thus, if
Spain has ••problems"
they stem from the "inappropriateness" of the
existing estado
for the "real" Spain as defined by the concepts
of patria and

nacion

.

El estado, the juridical form that organizes
and

coordinates la nacion and la patria

must have a proper "fit"

.

with these two higher and anterior concepts.

In I936 it was

Franco's and the Falange's task to demonstrate that republicanism-~the existing form of estado

— was

not appropriate to the

"true" Spain of la patria and la nacion
in the Civil War they had,

in turn,

.

After their victory

the task of proving the

appropriateness of their own version of el estado
effort Franco had new tools to work with:

.

In this

defensively, the

power of coercion in the form of dictatorship; offensively,
the ideology of falan?ismo which proved pliable enough to have

23

There was, of course, the legal provisionality of
Spain's being a monarchy without a kin^. In the late 1940 's
the regime had reasons for presenting itself as an interrep:num
after forty years of interrer^num this whole cloth had worn
quite thin. The regime's true perception of itself is found
in the fact that Juan Carlos when he became king swore fidelity
to the principles of the Movement (that is, of Franco) like
other political underlings and functionaries.
»
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been retained in one form or another
for nearly forty years.
Chapter VI will discuss in detail the
use made of these tools;
here, let us continue with the
definitions of el estado contained in the textbooks.
The Spanish definition of el es tado
has two essential
elements:
corporatism and the special Spanish version
or

expression of corporatism, national syndicalism.
Here, we need
not enter into a long discussion of
Spanish corporatism, which
has been treated systematically elsewhere.

Rather, let us

get a feel for the content of the textbooks
and learn what the
Spanish child learns about el estado
.

Corporatism unlike Liberalism has a social view of
humanity.

Each individual fits into and is defined by an

ascending hierarchy of social organizations.
Man doesn't live alone. He plays, studies,
works with other men.
He is united to woman and creates the
family.
Families are joined together, they elect
a single territory to live and construct a town.
The towns situated on neighboring lands,
with similar customs and geography, the same
language, etc., are joined together also and
form a region.
And the regions, joined by cultural, historic, geographical ties, but, above all, by an
undertaking, by a common task, form, united,
that great union of men and lands that we call
nation, and which, in our case is Spain, our
Motherland. -^3

2k

See footnote

//I,

"-^Joaquin Navarro, Todos Juntos (Madrid
p. '5.

i

Doncel, 1965)^

9^

This apparently simple hierarchy is
basic to all Spanish
corporate philosophy and is constantly
repeated.
It is the
basis along which almost all the textbooks
are organized and,
most importantly, the philosophical
justification for nearly
every kind of human relationship imaginable,
public or private.
Man (and it is the male of the species being
referred to) is
a social being who has no meaning outside
of a social situation

and, hence, has no individual rights but only
those social

rights granted by society.

Man comes first, woman second.

She

is subservient to him and is joined to him for
a social purpose,

the procreation, of children.

The family, then,

is the basic

unit of society and just as individuals are joined
together

under the authority of the father, so too families are joined

together under the authority of the municipio

.

nunicipios

the province, provinces under a region and I'egions under

ur;der
t/ie

authority of the father of all Spaniards, the Head of State.
The hierarchy is paternalistic and authoritarian; rights flow

from the top down, obligation and obedience from the bottom up.
And beyond all this, the hierarchy is more than the sum
of its parts,

it is a living organism:

Society is composed of alD the living,
of all the dead and of those even yet to be
born. Each one has his place.
The position
of the individual in the community doesn't
depend, then, on a contract, but on the fact
of birth.
Individuals differ in sex, in age, in
health, in physiological and mental aptitudes
All form, together, an association of
•
•
.
heterogeneous but complementary elements.
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Thus, such an organization is similar
to
that of the organs in living organisms.
It
IS called organization or
organismic p-roup.
Its most simple form is that of the
community formed by the father, the mother
and
the children
agricultural exploitation.
Or by the inhabitants of an isolated
vi]lap;e.
There also exist associations of homogeneous but not complementary elements.
They
can be compared to associations of
similar
organs.
For example:
of brains, of stomachs
or of hands.
These are called organic associations or groups. This type is represented
by a class of children, a medical or
law
society, by a workers syndicate.
Organic
groups are beneficial only when they cooperate
with all the other organic groups to form
a
harmonious organism. Every organic group
that egoistically develops for'itself plays
the same role in society that cancer plays
the human body.
The inequality of individual aptitudes
and of social functions shouldn't cause a
class inequality.
The stomach and the rectum
are as indispensable as the brain to the eyes.
Every organ depends on the heart, and the
heart depends on it. The boss is at the
service of the worker as the worker is at the
service of the boss.
In an organismic community, the most modest work is not less than
the most elevated.
Society should lock up or cut out
those who sow discord or hate. 26

m
^

.

m

.

.

.

This quotation like many other similar ones occurring

throughout the textbooks makes a subtle shift from description
to prescription.

What begins as a description of how society

originates and is organized soon becomes a prescription for
the way society should be seen.

What is supposed to be natural,

self-evident and organic is apparently not so for all members

26

.

^

Ferrer Guillen, Formacion^ pp. 11-12,
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Of society.

Por as the shift fro.
description to prescription
occurs the reader can see
the exhortations of the
author to
believe and accept what is,
in fact, .erely one_theor^
of
society. The reader is warned
that (for
c"

so.e -inor^an.'
reason) there will always be
those who sow discord Ind
hate
Who fail to see what is (that
is, should be) self-evident,
.ot
surprisingly, the institution
chosen to do the "locking up"
and "cutting out" is el_estado:
''^^""^ definitely constitutes
con^.+h^r"*"
some
thing p ermanent is thpt. c^nn^.i
i

i-resently, the State
f^^tical society and permits

ord^Frj^Ti:~

it,

through this
organization, to be able to iarry
oSt its
essential ends of well-being,
security, 'eace,
public order and physical and
moral perfectioA
let^Lxon
of persons.
We could compare the State
with an
enormous organism, endowed with a
series of
organs perfectly disposed in a
vital unity.
form that our body possesses
^rms,
^Ll \tT^
eyes,
stomachs, lungs, etc., and all
these
orderly way, permit us to
1
n'-''^
"-^u^"
live,
so also,
the State, is made
of a
number of ordered organs, of hierarchical
functions, of coordinated activities,
etcetera,
which are directed toward the com.mon good
of
the society.
On the temporal plane, the State is
a
perfect society. By this we mean that it
contains all the ends that are proper and
that, besides, it has available all the means
necessary to carry them out.^?

W^^S

This notion of the "perfection" of the State
was a phrase

often repeated by "official" Spain.

The promulgation of any

new law or measure seen as important by the
authorities was

Jbid.,

,

p.

36.

Emphasis in original.
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usually proclaimed as on. .ore
way in which the Spanish
state
was perfecting itself.
Obviously the phrase was a kind
of
solace to the adherents of the
regime.

But, as we can see from

the quotation above, it was
also a warning to any potential
opposition,
the State already is directed
toward all the Broper
ends and has available all means
necessary to pursue them, any
"social cancer" which pursues
"improper" ends will find the
State possessed of all necessary
means to "lock them up" or
"cut them out,"

The Spanish definition of the
State, we have said, contains elements of corporatism and
National -S ynd icalism. The
following quotation makes clear how the
two are related in
"official" thought
I

The New National-Syndicalist State
In adopting the doctrine of the
FalMi£:e_JLspanola Tradicion»lista v de_Ji^
-J 0 N S^ we arrive
at the politics not of
thejTiost, as until now, but of the best:
we
arrive at the direction of the country by
most capable and not by the most numerous. the
Hierarchy, mission, work as an honor, justice
as a norm . . . National-Syndicalism gives to
the ^Spaniards bread, peace and work; a digni1

.

.

fied life, without economic preoccupations,
prosperity and love.
Falangism, an idea suited to present
times, is not a product imported in this new
hour to the old Spain. Corporatism was already
implanted some hundreds of years ago, when
Spaniards grouped themselves by offices, having
their neighborhood, their street, their saintly
patron, their standard, their seal and their
statutes. Spanish Falangism was prevailing in
the Middle Ages, when all of Europe was clutched
between the claws of feudalism. /Notet Spain
is not considered a part of Europe herejj
National-Syndicalism, which does not
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^^^i^^'
The new Spanish Stale
U.Lns^^r.l'f ?f
'^^^ the'^orc^^^^^o^LnS^^
ina?es''

Mo?herSnd!'

'"^^

''''

Falan^e protects the P-lorious leprnrv
'""^'^^ into'thff
trad???on\h'r'^'''"'
^^^g^^^ies of the present
hour^2j
^-P

-

National-Syndicalism is defined as well
by the attempt
to set itself apart from the
other "-isms"
it sees as the

greatest threat to its conception
of the State,
and collectivism. Again in
catechism

Liberalism

fashion, a textbook asks:

How^does the Falan^^e conceive of the
^
otate It is creatin/y?
As a totalitarian instrument at the
service of the Destiny of the motherland.
How will the Falann;e have arrived
at
the construction of this new State?
By means of political revolution.
Of what will the political revolution
consist?
Of the substitution for the liberal
State servant of the doctrines of Rousseau
lor a National-Syndicalist state, servant
of
permanent truths,-^"
^

^

On
There remains a third political point
of view between these two extremes /anarchism
or the^ complete freedom of the individual and
a statism that considers society as the only
entity/:
the State at the service of the
common p-ood
The common ^^ood demands an
intervention of the State^ in order to plan,
coordinate, prepare for the future, guarantee
^

.

^^

Ibid.

.

p.

^13.

Seccion Femenma, Forma c ion Politica (Fjadridj
Femenina Zl95V}. p. 111.

Seccion
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pnr.^^r.+

4^:.

-

I.^^^f^l problems as the

Lih^r^c,!

The following long
quotation illustrates again
this
attempt by National-Syndicalism
to distinguish itself not
so
-Oh by What it is for as by what
it is against,
.y Spanish
colleagues at DATA, S.A. suitably
called this the "ideology
of
rejection"

Political parties.

The

realitv o-r ^r^^ir^
IS one reality alone,
and our lult^de towards
it as clear as that of
the child

towards hif
liberal\ta?e was
n^^^?^;-""^"^'^"^"^^'
permitting every Spaniard a different
and mis%--^^--land
and'ff
the
paths
Pa^hs that
?hat"ft''r
it ought to follow:
some were of
^^^."^ "P^'^
^^^^ ^^^^^-r worshinT'^ro?
ship
to God; others, that the
national territory
'^^^ ^^^"^^^
^L^''^capital
^-.^f and even the (separatists);
that
motherland wiuld disSpaniards
hTfdif^e^rt''^'-^^^'^^^
all
these
matters.
^^^'^V^
Those who on?^-?^^''^'^^
coincided
opinion formed a political party.
There were elections. Votes were
were cast for some or for others.
The many
gained to the disadvantage of the few.
liberal State was the cold spectator of The
this
battel of slips of paper, without keepin;in^mmd. Those who won took advantage of Spain
their
triumph to secure more votes in new elections.
In this activity the energies of the governin/?
were wasted. While all this was going on, Spain
collapsed victim of this liberal politics.
Class Struggle.
The battle of parties
caused one of classes.
In order to win votes
politicians fomented hate among Spaniards.

f

Ss^

^

m

^

«
1 1
Ferrer Guillen,
Formacion

30r>

1

.

.

p.

55. Emphasis in original.
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•

Social classes were united in order to
destroy
each other, political discord fr^oinp
so far as
to bring rum even in the very bosom
of the
family.
The ground of the cities and villages
was bloodied with this fraticidal battle.
^jocial injustice.
Political parties
exploited^ the masses to grow rich on
their discontent, Dut they did not bother with
their
social or economic betterment.
This class felt
oppressed and without aid from anyone;
i
iu
therefore
it cannot be surprising that they
sought a quick recovery of class alon^- the
tortuous paths of Marxism. 31

Corporatism and its Spanish expression in NationalSyndicalism compose the Spanish definition of el Estado
.

Yet

there still remains one twist to National-Syndicalism
that should
not be overlooked: what my Spanish colleagues have
referred to

la aloui mia nolitina

.

political alchemy.

more^than a concrete regime, Spain is
today, politically, an open form, an^ ongoing
process. Each one of the fundamental laws is
a milestone in the unfoldin^^ of History.
Its
essence is not a Constitution in the rationalist
and all-predicting fashion of Liberalism; but
it is an architectural framework of a unanimous
^

spirit

Some have seen the ideas contained in the quotation

above as an expression of Spanish pragmatism, of the nonideological character of the Franco regime.
like alchemy

I

Rather, it is more

the trial and error search for the touchstone

that will transform a common and base dictatorship into some

glittering edifice worthy of poet-revolutionaries.

It is only

the rulers who know what they seek to produce; and only they who

are entitled to experiment.
-^•^

32

Formacion del Espiritu Nacional (19^7), p. 86,
/

Jose Antonio Ma, de Villarreal, Encilopedia (Madrid
iviagisterio Espanol /l95^)t P- 5^5*

101

CHAPTER

IV

IMAGES OF THE INDIVIDUAL

^"""^ the
chairs or othfr easL v
! ^v'?''
order that tho\,,
i,^ ""^^"^ objects in
can'be'sle'n'^h'erefh'a^tln'?'
'^l^'^'
the ground and deUvef
^ft^thf

L^e'rfr"

This quotation summarizes
and symbolizes the main
teaching Of the textbooks
about the individual:
a lac. of confid encG
xn the goodwill,
trustworthiness or integrity
of the human
being. Whether in the
cirea
area oi
of "soo-i^i
social pessimism," from
which
this quotation was taken,
or sex or sex
sey roles
mi oc or comportment or
other topics covered in
the textbooks, the
dominant message
communicated to the child is
ne,ative. The child is tau.ht
to
be distrustful of others
and also of himself, of
his body, his
mind and his nature.
•

•

In this chapter, then, we
will be locking at several
message areas in the textbooks
which are important for an

understanding of the "official- view
of the individual.
these areas are the definitions

Among

of male and female social
roles

(particularly in the context of the
family), the general area
Of sexuality and comportment,
authoritarianism and paternalism,

Kspanolaf Wslh^prsJ-Sl.'^^^^'
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and the area of social pessimism.
La Mujer Espanola (The Spanish
Woman)
The role of women in Spanish
society is fundamental to
an understanding of the -official"
view of the individual. As
elsewhere women make up about half of
the individuals in Spain.
But aside from this biolo.;.ical
fact the position of the women
in Spanish society is. I believe,
a key concept for an understanding of this society as a whole. 1
will be outlining the

arguments to support this contention in
Chapter VI. For now.
I would like to turn to the
textbooks themselves while keepin.^
in mind that these passa.^es on sex
rolec^ and the family will be
looked at later in the wider context of a
strater^y for social

control
L a mu ieri

pi erna quebrada.

en ca^n

(The woman:

in the

house with a broken lerj is a famous Spanish dicho. or

sayin/r,

.

which usually brin^rs a smile to the lips of more emancipated
Westerners.

It is. however,

one sayinp; which is practised as

well as preached, for despite the impact of "modern" influences
on Spain during; the late 1950

's

and 1960's, the ideal woman for

most Spanish men is one who is literally immobilized by her

home and her familyj
Thus is the Spanish woman. Refuge of her
husband, teacher of her children,' comforter
of the poor.
Pious in her devotions, active
inher labors, long-suf f erinx^ in adversities.
How many thinrs a Spanish woman knows how to
do.
She knits for her family, and if there

103

is time for the' poor.

She washes and irons
^l^^^^ing o? her hus-

^^^^^^^^

banS and ^Mi'h
are
Glean like the smile of her soul.
She
mends with careful attention,
cooks wi^h
laborious art and understands how
to make
brighten the table on family
holid^vf
holidays. ^•a'*'^^^
And how good a rosauilla (type
of
pastry) tastes made by mother's
hands.
J

Spain is a country in which ever
larger numbers of women
are entering the work force and,
undoubtedly,
this in itself is

having and will have an effect on society's
and women's selfdetermination.
But look at what children of

the late 1950's and

early 1960's-the "take-off" point for
women's employmentlearned about women in the workplace:
But even if work in itself is always a P-ood,
a laudable fact, also it is a punishment for Zoriginal/ sin. And if woman
already received her own punishment for her
first sin, why throw upon her shoulders another
additional punishment? Precisely that which
seems to be the special punishment of men?
a merit,
_

I believe that we only ouf^ht to accept this
situation of the professional training- of the
woman with certain reservations, making it
understood that it is necessary that the woman
does not denv her collaboration /with her hust>and/ and is capable of contributinr- to it
Keep in mind that the best part of a journey
is always the return trip.
And the return
trip in this specific case to which we are
aluding is precisely the return from whatever
journey to the home; to the hearth
r/:aternitv
the governing of the house, decoration, the
education of children, friendship and intellectual companionship with the husband, etc.
^

.

^

.

.

This is for the woman the glorious return
from her trip through the field of professional
9
"

^

El Libro de Espana (Madrid:

Bruno, 19^3), p. 81.

10k

pSsfuofiii??
3'^'
ou^'paradisf

ronouncinp this
have lost

''"^""^^

Another, perhaps more mundane,
view of the woman's
place is given in the following
passage where she is compared
to a brood-henj
time there was a hen who had
children.
Only three little
This IS not much for a mama-hen.

?h^:L^^?^^?

cMoL
chicks.

But the three little chicks
were
They were never quiet. Therefore "terrors."
they pave
more work to their mother than
if she^ad
nad a dozen,
The qualities which a Spanish
woman ought to possess in
order to fulfill her divine mission
as mother and wife were
certainly not likely to promote protest
against her assigned
role.
The Spanish woman has to be generous,
submissive and happy at every moment.^

Her required "contentment" is not, however,
designed to
prevent displeasure with her role as much
as to help fulfill

it.

Carmen Werner Bolin, Convivencia Social (Formacion F.grn(iviadrid:
Seccion Femenina, 195b). pp. l60-lblemphasis in original. The class nature of this
passage is obvlreference to professional work for'women. It
?o
o.^f^'^^i-^^^"
Is. evident throughout the textbooks
that they are aimed at the
ypper class and especially the clase media
The poor are referred
^^^ally 1^ an exhortation to be kind to them or, as we
-11
f
'^^ point out the proper way to
distribute alms to them,
fil!?!!
unx.ii very recently the authors were,
however, quite correct in
supposing that only the "hi^rher" classes would be reading such
i;ext books.
Spanish education, particularly on the secondary
j.<>vei
remains very elitist. See Foessa, Informe Sociold^ico
<i iov.
jU
J^^ x y boc3Rl

)

.

v.h

*

.

1^

Lecturas.

Cuentos (Madrid:

^Escuela Espanola,

f'

Adelante

S.M., I969), p. 50.
!

,

p.

I98.
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For she is to be the moral and social
pillar upon which the
family is to rest:

Tranquility is a virtue without which woman
IS not that which she has to be:
the soothin/?,
comfortable, serene element of the home.
It is she who produces the resultin/^ "hearth."
Somethmf^ always fixed, immutable, solid, that
is at the center of the family as a bond
of
union, as security.^

Of course, the woman is compensated for the rather
con

fining role she must play in a manner that is certainly not
unique to Spanish sexism.

While she may not do man's work,

entertain man's ideas or have man's freedom, she is still
superior to him in a most important

virtue.

v/ayi

The wom.an is by nature better than the man,
and constitutes many times the true virtue
in the marriage,
And, besides, she receives that special reverence from

men which is due her:
Respecting Women
You also, young boy, ought to accustom yourself from now on to see in every woman an
image of the most excellent woman, ^:ary.

Treat your sisters with delicacy, being
obsequious and agreeable with them, correct
and educated,

Werner Bolin, Convivencia Social
7

,

p.

159,

.

'Seccion Femenma, Forma c ion Familiar v Social (Madrid
'Seccion Femenina, 19^9)
p. 254.
.

^

i

^Antonio Herrero Antolin, Lecturas educativas (Madrid:
Hernando, 1959), p. 32.
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indeed, the devotion paid
to the woman as mother
is
boundless-as witness this .odel
oration of a daughter.
To rny Mother

Loving mother, let me love
Beloved mother, let me kiss youl
Permit me, holy mother, to youi
express my
Caressinf; your hands

I

Kissing your facel

l-e"i<5l/°n
TosoJlMlV?"''
bosom that invites ray lovel you^Liernal
•

Source of songs and tenderness.
And quench this thirst of
affection that suffocate^
ine
your sweet and pure waters!

m

affection that you offer me
^nd i"^nh%^° ^""5^^
'^^^^ ^^^^^ ^'-^^ t)ind me.
T?at IT cry
o.^^-?^'^?"''
That
with happiness when you kiss me
And groan with enthusiasm wher.
you embrace me.
La Familip

(The Family)

While the Spanish woman is supposed
to be possessed of
certain qualities by nature, one cannot
really define woman
outside of her "proper" context-the
family.
I have spoken
earlier (Chapter II) of the special role
the family
plays in

Spanish society and in the "official"
Spanish ideology. In the
textbooks one can view the essentially
authoritarian nature of
the ideal Spanish family and the hierarchical
roles assigned
husband, wife and children.
One must begin to discuss the family in proper
corporate

9
',r.^^^

•

/

Edelvives, Qramatica (Zaragoza:

1963), p. 59.
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fashion by demonstrating
its organic origins.

-""^-^ of mankind
nol toll^; alone
together
with otherbeIn"s f or^ui.^^l
assistance. The
most simple anri =+
for. ofTi^an^gatherlng
"^T^

L

ITV.T
:^fkiti^n!-i-tXi J >

F

JJa^LLl.JS^

^"""^-^ K2t\^i^or:^

fif-

Ihe textbook family is
an incredibly happy place
where
all work and live and keep
their place in harmony,
I saw first light
in a simple home, where
the peace and love of God
where each morning I would reif^ned! Thome
see in my parents
the noble eagerness to
undertake the dailv
task under the blessing of
the Lord!
My father honorably earned
a wa^^e hour after
hour to take care of the family'l
necessUies
self-denying? soJi
o?^K^ T'""'''' dili^^nt,
""^'^
children provided
a touch o^'le'f
tenderness so great, that, though
in
oiiThumbleness,
K?-"
all
a sensation of tranquil well-

^

'

at the end of the day agreeable
and happy. 11
This model family is close-knit and
the special affection
which prevails there is not meant
for everyone.

Being agreeable with visitors, with
friends.
13 all very wells but our affection, our
most
courteous manners, our attention ought
to be
for our own.l^

10_

,

.

-

^ Delegacion Nacional del Frente de Juventudes, Forrraci^n
del u
Espirjtu Nanon^l (Madrid.
Frente de Juventudes? 1 94?)? P?'l38.

11
12

~

Escuela Espanola,
/

i

Adelante

Formacion (19^9), p. 11,

l

.

p.

49,
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As I have already mentioned,
roles within the family
are carefully defined:

^^^^1^

--^ool
comes the importance
of the family and
ILI tuTr'^^l organization
^5'^'' represents in it the si^n of
autho^i?v
^°ther,
lo^e sac^i?^.^''^'^^children, respect, obedience
and subordination.
The man is the head, but the
woman is the heart
-nd she,
he isTollll
adornment
and consolation!l5
oi
and for civilization/
o\^"for^civi^^%'.'^5

'

.

sentW,

'

These roles are not only decreed
by God, Nature and the
rest but by law as wellt
The husband has the obli/ration to
protect,
defend and represent his wife. The
woman
obliged to obey her husband and to follow is
wherever he establishes residence, except him
when
he goes to another country.
The goods that the husband brings to the
marriage find themselves in an entirely free
situation. Those of the wife find themselves
subject to certain restrictions, because the
husband is the head of the family.
The father is the head of the family.
.
All the individuals which form it are subject
to his authority.
.

.

The power and authority that the father has
over his children, which has been recognized
by the laws of Spain, is called patria
potestad .1^

•^

Ibid.

.

pp. 191, 192.

^
Jose Udma Cortiles. Enciclopedia Cami/ (Barcelona:
Imprenta Elzeviriana y Libreria Cami, 19^1), pp. 202-283. The
exception noted in the first paragraph— that a wife need not
follow her husband outside the country is interesting given
the fact that several hundred thousand Spanish workers are
14

.

—
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In the family's chain of command
the father supposedly

wields supreme authority with the mother
and children subservient to him.
The female child is, then, the last run^
on this

hierarchical ladder:
1. What is the best quality that can adorn a
little ^irl:

Docility and obedience.
2.

To whom do we owe obedience and respect?

To all those who are our superior in a^e,
or dignity or in the office that they hold.
3.

Whom do we most particularly have to obey?

Our parents and teachers, because it is a
very sacred obligation corresponding to their
rights
4. Why is the obligation sacred?

Because it is ordered by the Fourth Commandment of the law of God, v/hich says
'Honor thy
father and mother*.
«

5. What must one think of a little girl who is
ungovernable and disobedient?

That if she doesn't work to correct such a
serious defect, she will be a very bad Christian
and very disgraced during all her life, as
experience proves. -^5

Although the female child is placed at a special disadvantage, strict obedience is set forth as a norm for children
in general.

They are admonished that when dealing with parents

employed in other West European countries and that the money
they return to their families in Spain is a very important contribution to Spain's balance of payments. See Chapter VII.
''^Edelvives
Cantilla moderna de Urbanidad (Zaragozat
Editorial Luis Vives, 195^). P.
,

110

•Nover dispute the., nor
answer back, nor lie to
the., nor
raise your voice.-l^
^^.^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ .^^
^^^^^^^^^
are limited

Never respond with a simple
-yes' or 'no'
according tS the^'situa^ion?
'Yes^
Yes, r>L:^^
papa'
'no, mamma'.
'As you wish
mama
'Order me, mama,' 'as you
desir^

'

I

'

Si'

re?r^^'

P-Pa.'

'as^y-wlsh.

Also very nice is the reverential
title which
^
^^^^-i^^ the SpaniS'
Tradition:
tradiuSn
'Yes, sir' or 'No, sir'.
'Yes
madam' or 'No, madam'. All
these firms ol'
^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^

D^^^^^fji^^^r
""^""^

'nPv^^J'l

i?'-

chiid S?

^^"^^

J"^'

^°"'t ^^^1 like
^
^^^^ a well-born

The following story from one of
the Spanish readers gives
some insight into Spanish child-rearing
practices. We are told
under the heading, "The punishment of
children," that a mother
loves her child too much and when he
comes home one day from
school crying she goes to see his teacher.
He tells
her:

"Madam," said the teacher with dignity and
rectitude, /'your son failed to give me respect
on
occasions, and I have punished him as his
reward and a warning to the rest? if you don't
want him to be punished, take hirn home, spoil
him, pamper him, that he may laugh and be amused;
but understand that the more he laughs now as
a
child, the more he will have to cryas a man."

The questions for discussion which follow this story

^^Emi]5D Alonso Burgos, Cortesia Juvenil (Madrid:
Bosco Z1962/), p. 30.
•'•'

^Ibid.

.

p.

31.

Don

Ill

illustrate

the connections the authorities
want to make between

a relatively harmless anecdote
of authoritarian child-rearing
and the exercising of state authority
a^rainst "bad" men.

Why had the teacher punished the child?
our parents bad because they punish us? Are
The
authorities punish transgressors of the laws.
What would happen if vicious men were not
punished?io
Here the analof^ies implied by corporatism are more
obviously in evidence than in other of the passages
in this section;
but of course the State is vitally interested in the
way that

the concept of the family is developed and in the
definitions
of the male and female roles within the family.

The importance

of this should be as clear to students of Spain as it was
to

Jose Antonio;
Jose Antonio, in his longinp; to give unity
to our nation, sees in the family the
cornerstone upon which to place national
unity, and therefore our doctrine respects,
supports and assists the family, and
therefore he cannot be a Falangist who does
not love his parents and brothers and sisters
as he ought.lv
Or»

This eagerness for the emancipation of youth
that kills the life of the family, is the
cause of many of the maladies of present
times.
Those of us who are comrades, have
to remember the enthusiasm of our National
Delegation for the rebirth of family life,/
He has said in one of his discourses:
Jose

^^zequiel Solana, Lecturas de Pro (Madridt
Escuela Espanbla, I966),

p.

101.

•^^Formacion (19^7), p. 139.

Editorial

112

Antonio saysj

"One must place man's feet
on the frround: for the woman the
frround is
the family "'^^
'

.

X^o

humcino,

lo moral, lo Rpynpl

(Humanity, Morality,

Sexuality)
In this section I would like to examine
some of the con-

trasts between the "official" views of human
nature and of moral
and sexual propriety.
From a highly spiritual and mystical
view of man, the texts descend to a concentration on
a Puritanical sexual ethic and a Victorian concern for
appearances that

convey a profoundly negative impression of human potential.
A discussion of the "official" concept of human nature
beg:ins with the definition of man as the bearer of eternal

values

(

portador de valores eternos

){

Spain, defender of the spiritual values
which enclosed the Middle Apes, in the midst
of the iViodern Age wished to order human cohabitation convivencia according- to the
Catholic understanding of man, in opposition
to Protestantism.
Our defeat in this engagement was the triumph of a despiritualized
humanism, which, in our days, has led to
modern materialism; and in the economic field
has bred the division of men into classes and
the Liberal and Marxist social organizations;
the former founded on the following equality
one man = one vote
and the latter, in which man is the essential
factor of production. Such absurd ideas came
to seize the Spanish people, hastening our
national decline towards catastrophe. Against
them the Falange raised its human assertion-man is the bearer of eternal values
which
we already know is not new, but is extraordinarily revolutionary. It is a Catholic
(

)

—

,

^ ^^Seccion Femenina, Formacion Familiar v Social (Madrid
Seccion Femenina, 19^9) pp. 142-1^3. Emphasis in original.
i
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postulate upon which we seek
to mount a
^P^^i^^ motherland^
Tn?or>:r%^^"i
inioimis oij-j.
all uj.
of our
ro-irr>T
^
uur revolutionary
Droceq<?i
institutions /r?,htir
etcet^rl:

U

^

"^^^
affirmation
''i^^
^^^^^y
universal destiny,
pvp
?ho\
are the two p-reat pillars upon
which the
Falanrist doctrine is firmly
planted. 2?

of Ina?^

.

Another textbook makes it clear
that the definition of
the individual follows from the
definition
of the Patria:

Why do we say that man is the
bearer of
eternal values?
Because after defining the Motherland
as
Destiny
the Universal, we have to value
the man who has to fulfill this
destiny.

m

Perhaps the most striking contra^-t with
the elegant
picture of man painted in the abstract
is the discussion of
sexuality. Messages about the taboos
of sexuality are conveyed
in many ways-from the definition of the
human body as dirty by
nature (hence the need for good hygiene) to
the unspoken dangers
of coeducation. Anyone who has the least
familiarity with Spain
would expect to see passages such as the following:

What undignified fashions, so injurious to
modesty!
Legs bare to the muscle, arms
uncovered until near the armpit, low necklines on the chest and the back, dresses
fitted to the body in a shameless manner.
It is almost worse than being nudel^-^

21

/

Formacion (19^7),
/

p.

l4l.

y
Seccion Femenina, Formacion Politica
(Madrid:
Femenina Zl95i7) p. 92.
22

/
Seccion

.

23

Angel Ayala, S.J., Conse.ios a las .iovenes (Madrid:

Ilk
It is not only the
hu.an body which io so
offensive to
public .o-ality but
certain activities in
which thi« boay

engages

One condemns the attitude

they be ln^a^ed)

live gestures?

iLf^P"^?*'^''^^

s

?

f---

^''^^

though

^"^

"'"'^

armfon^iL"^.*,^!
OP

°"

-

"th^Lles^'^^n,^-

the throwing of

--a?

e^xS^.

Neither parents, nor relatives,
ought to permit the contaminationnor authorities
af toe

circulftiorduriA/mryear inlp^in!'^'

"

commercial

Today they leave out the collar,
the cuffs
thousand details that
^e?^n^^'$!'^demands, and
refinement
therefore men and
women present themselves in any
ever showing all parts of the form whatsobody, which
^^PVSnant thing one can imagine.
1 '^nL??
A
sport' neckline or no neckline
showing the arms up to the armpit, at all.
with all
the hairiness so disagreeable to
the sense
Of smell, and this in formal
gatherings.
And it IS when there is no virtue,
that the
man-savage with all his instincts appears.
—from Daniel Vega, CM., El anti-Cristo a la
Xis^ (Madrid, 1972), p. 32, quoted in Amando
de Miguel, "Los estudiantes cambian de
valores."
Informacionecj, March 1?, I973.
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The concern with
giving ocandal and with
public and
especially neighborhood
opinion
Pinion Is
i^ a
« common
phenomenon in the
testbooKs and, from my
experience, in contemporary
Spain as
and embracing is the
outward o-iiipression
impression th..
they create. Appearances are important to
Spaniards
panxaras and it is assumed
that public
intimacy is just the tip
of the iceberg.

grades do not mix
(customary
evenin^^r ^^V"'^'^
^^^^^^
^^^^^ ^as
to Ce ?he end^;
^ Paseo; such can only be an
ohl?L+^
^as to ..0 ?o the
Mtv^^
^"^^"^
cathedral,
^he^Uza'^a ?h
etc., one must also ^o
bv^^rad^^
groups and even in file accordlL^+S
ing
to the custom of each
Center, but alwav^
--^^ Sr!^c
aeineanor
dLeanor'ff
f^""^; to be
IS tne least
expected, since

wUh^othr^'/^?^'^

^^"^^

^

yourself from the group,
yours2lTtrV^^

or enter anyplace
^^^^i^g
persons or'
?hin'r'H-f^"'^"^'^'
continues ahead, or
fi^ht wT^h^'/°^^
companions or change your
plfce

A concern for appearance leads
Spaniards to place a
heavy emphasis on manners,
comportment and courtesy.
One author
in the preface to his book
makes clear the origins of this concern and the great value placed
upon '•proper" conduct. He begins
the preface with a Spanish
refrain-C^uien a^rada. m.nd. (He who

Emilio Alonso Burgos. Cortesia

IMlx,

p.

7O1

emphasis added.

.

pp. 6^-66.
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pleases, commands)

— and

goes on to add:

Each day I am more convinced that the major
part of the lacks of comprehension, of the
displeasures and sufferinp;s that we mortals
bear, and even a great part of the offenses
that are committed against our God are
through a L acI^ of Education
~~ and Excess of
Discourtesy .'^
The maintenance of appearances often seems to involve
the negation of spontaneity in the child, of what most adults

would probably see as the natural energy of childhood:

Every pupil in his juvenile age has to live
always with a happy face and play with optimism in the patios and recreation areas. He
has to prefer the games that put the entire
person into motion.
Your games have to be elegant and proper,
avoiding games from the lov/er class neighborhoods and of children "of the street," which
consisting in striking one another, grabbing
hold of each other and rolling on the ground.
Avoid, then, putting your hands on others,
feeling anyone and the throwing of your companions on the ground, 2?

Following

is a

"good self-analysis of general character"

presented in a reader for thirteen-year olds:
1.

In order that I might fulfill my obligations,
possess perfect health?

do

I

2.

When

I

3.

Do

make myself a daily plan, without resortimprovisations?

ing
^,

t)

I

work, do

I

do so with a fixed purpose?

raanentary

In my studies, do

Ibid

.

p.

I

Ibid,

.

p.

48.

J

I

devote maximum attention?

emphasis in original.
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^ "^^^^ advantap^e of time?
on unnecessary things?

V^ll-dressed,
DiltShp/^'^'^^w
polished and hair combed?

Do

grossness or

?reatment of^'th'e?!
cha^acte??""^

waste
wasxe it

clean, with ^^nueb
shoes

LpertinLcer^'
•

I

r^^''^

^^"^^^^^^

^

impression of seriousness of

10 Do I know how to control myself when
what
others say disgusts me?
11. Do

I reject sugpjestions that
can incline mv
spirit alpn/T the bad path?
etcetera.

These preoccupations with appear^.nces

manners and urban

,

ity are not, however, mere quirks of
Spanish character nor are
they anachronistic vestiges of traditional
Spain. These con-

cerns flow from a social theory and they are
just one of many

mechanisms of social control
Keep in mind that an agreeable presentation
of your person predisposes you to be always
esteemed, treated civilly and considerately
by others. A good presentation will make us
pleasing one to the other, an essential condition that God has established among men in
order that they live in society. It makes
happy living together among the different
social classes, not scorning anyone.
A presentation full of courtesy and elegance
maintains in its place the necessary hierarchy
among all the elements that form society,
without friction or violence. ^9

Emilio Ortiga, Estimulos
1959). p. 19.
29
.

.

'^Emilio Alonso Burgos,

(

Barcelona

»

/

Cortes la

.

p.

23.
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Lest

socal

see

be .oved to dispute
this

life,

interpretation of

there are regulations
that prohibit certain
activit.es such as pla.in,
cards, throwing stones
and speaKin, about

politics

t

tp:a\°?;/^fliii??,P^^J!"e for .oney and
Social Pessimism
This Chapter on the Images
of the Individual be^an
with
instructions on how to retrieve
fallen .onoy while avoiding

the

suspicion that the retriever would
pocket so^e of the coins
himself.
This presumption of the worst
about others is a
fairly constant theme of the
texts and
,

I

will try to argue

later, an important component
in the "myth of incapacity"
perpetuated by "Official" Spain. I
would like to conclude the
chapter, then, with the theme of
mistrust of others or social
pessimism.

Early on in my perusal of the texts
in a reader that gave me pause.

I

came across a story

The reader was in use in the

middle sixties and was designed as a
practice text for 8 to 10
year olds. The story concerns two Moslem
boys who supposedly
practice Mohammedanism " en secreto " in Malaga,
a resort city

30

Ibid.

p.

49.
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on Spain's southern coast,

m

the story these two Moslem
boys

verbally abuse and then physically
beat a Christian boy for
practising his faith. Although
the Moslems are painted as

despicable characters, the story
ends happily with their conversion-by the angelic example of
their victim-to Catholicism
and their baptism. ^-^
The reader may wonder as

I

did about how many "secret-

Moslems there still are in Spain after
the Reconquest. centuries of inquisition and religious
persecution and the present
forms of discrimination against religions
other than Catholicism.

One might also wonder about the wisdom
of practicioners

of such an unfavored sect who practice
in secret but beat up
in public.
Of course,

it is

just a story but it only seems to make

sense not as reality but as allegory.

If one were to substitute

"Communist," or foreigner (or foreign idea) or non-Catholic,
for "Moslem" the story would make more sense.

sense also in a more generalized way:
of Spanish society into an

But it makes

the fundamental division

"us— them" dichotomy.

"We" well-

born, right-thinking, obedient, reverent Spaniards are always

threatened by "them"i

Spain."

the atheist, the subverter, the "anti-

It could perhaps be argued that Spain has a history

which gives some support to such a view.

Solana, Lecturas de Pro

,

Spain seems to have

pp. 92-93
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always been characterized
by the division of its
people into
"water-ti,ht compartments
"-in Ortega's phrase. The Romans
found Spain one of their
most difficult conquests
because each
small city-state would defend
itself to the death. There
were
no alliances, no regional
chiefs and so the Romans had
to
pro-

ceed literally mile by mile
in their conquest.

This lack of

cooperation among the cities meant
that the Romans would take
decades to subdue the country
but it also meant that no
matter
how long it took they would
ultimately
succeed.

That such

domestic isolationism has persisted
is evidenced by the "invention" of guerrilla warfare in
Spain and the anarchist tradition
that lives on to this day in some
areas.
But it is not so significant that
the textbooks refer
to the past but that they refer so
selectively.
I cannot say

whether it was true in the past but for
Franco Spain this
"domestic isolationism" of which social
pessimism

is one part

served the needs of the status quo.

If Franco Spain

we^s

not a

totalitarian dictatorship in that it did not maintain
total
control of all aspects of political, social and
economic

'

life

but allowed a "limited pluralism"— in Linz's phrase—
to exist,
it did not need to be totalitarian; for this "limited
pluralism,

in an atmosphere of "domestic isolationism" and social
pessimism, can insure that no broad-based, organized threat to
the

status quo can be mounted.

Thus, the Spanish opposition-

embroiled in its sectarian feuds

effectively oppose Franco.

— could

barely unite to

It was in "official" Spain's
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interest, then, to promote
promo'tp ideas
iriooo of
social, pessimism, "domestic
isolationism" and a general
"myth of incapacity."
A good example of how such
a climate of ideas was
maintained on the individual
-p^t t
level IS the following
passage
Living is like trading
•

Life is like a great market.
We are all
buyers and sellers in the
bazaar ^existence

then, that we be alwayfa^e^^
nn/? ""l^^^^^ry.
operations
that we see ourselves
nMS
Obliged.^^^
to brin^ about in

'

order to ^ive let
us carry on with the
necessary precautions
^"^^
unLrupSloL
^'""It
people, even
though many times they appear
honorable, who live at the
of ^^^""^^
?hose
who are overly careless. 32 expense
^

IIT.V'

A reference has already been
made in an earlier section
to the emphasis on appearances,
on outward forms.
In the area
of social pessimism the reverse
side of this coin is
exposed:

now appearances are used to hide
the base instincts that are
supposed to characterize humans.
The proper person hides his animal life
(his fear, his cold, his heat), hides
his
intimate concerns (his excessive happiness,
his excessive sorrow) for the benefit
of
the general well-being, and he hides,
as well,
his preferences and antipathies. He is
the
person who in all things has equilibriujr
discretion and serenity, joined with a proper,
tranquil and affable appearance 33
.

A more cynical version of this same message and
one

which seems to me to correspond to the real
social ethic is

Ortiga, Estimulos
33

/

.

p.

II3.

Eorjnacion (19^9). p. 9.
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round in another texti
life are judged by appearances.
Ana
And''he^!hf
fte who h.'^
has cunning need never want. 3^

The negative presumption about
others begins with childhood temptations- but extends to
adult life and the workplace
in this curious definition of
independence:

Remember what satisfaction you felt
instead of accepting the invitation when
boy who wanted to bring you to pick of that
you said no and went on to school? fruit
Thus you should always do when someone
wishes to prompt you to commit undesirable
acts:
knowing how to affirm with pride
your personality before the suggestion of
those who would incite you to evil.
Yest-;rday it was that young thief who wanted
xo^ trick you; tomorrow it will be an evil
friend who will wish to teach you how to do
something disgusting; later it will be a companion from work who will propose that you
be as wicked as he. 35

One aspect of social pessimism is the way in
which

social ills are explained.

As might be expected all kinds of

misfortune are seen as the result of personal failure on
the
part of the individual involved or, as in this definition

of

responsibility, on the part of the unfortunate parents:
Perhaps sometime you have seen deformed
children who can not go to School or play
v/ith others, or have the normal life that
you have. Well then: almost always these
children are paying for the faults or vices
of their parents, who were drunkards, or

3Z4.

^

Ortiga, Estimulos

.

p.

3^.

'^-'Herrero Antolin, Lecturas

.

p. 15.
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^^^^^

the necessary
charartfr?^
"^"-^
1
^naracter to ?
know how
to frpp
nnoo^i-P Z
oneself
fro™

unhealthy, foreign inflSencel!36
A similar message is
conveyed in the following
anecdote
about two kinds of alms-giving.

Actually, there will alwav<;

h<-

+h» „„

What an admirable thingi

The wise man
^ ai^flcuirbis'iness,
and a village "''^'''t
priest would have seen it solvpd

lZTni,l°

savs
says Jiffn^"-,
his formula,,,.

poverty !"charit1l"
'

Of course, there is charity
and then there is charity.
In the big city house, for
example, all the charity cases line
up on the street outside the
house and

They begin to whisper- -which is a
—about everyone; but especially ofblessinpthe
and the servants who take care of them. family
They
grumble, discuss, dispute, get excited,
quarrel, insult each other and make an infernal racket at times, hurling improprieties

at one or the other,

each.

A servant of the house emerges to distribute
a coin to
Some, according to the author, go around the
block to

try to get a second coin and most of the rest
waste their money
on vices such as cigarettes, wine, aguardiente,
sweets and

chocolate

^^

Ibid.

.

p. 21.

12^

On the other
xner hanri
^v,
+u
hand, in
the country the
mistress of the
house comes out with
loaves Of
n-r bread
hr>^ ^
and. gives them out
herself
asking after the sick and
^ivini. religious
giving
r^i ^
instruction where
^„
.

^

•

appropriate,-^'^

social pessimism is. in
fact, based on individual
T>essi.is.-on the deprecation
of self and hu.an nature
in
general, .he textbooks
urge each individual to
wrestle his
base instincts into
submission while assuming
that few if any
others will be successful.
And the atte.pt to gain
control of
oneself is indeed a strugg-le.

limifof^^^"
a

Sif J'r-

""^^^

A

^" economic limit (money),

.abandoning oneself to diversions
is a
lack o^ edP'?? ^" ^^^'^
because it is a lack of
oon?r.nf
control over our nature and
our
which are entirely savage (when appetites 38
not tamed).

No better summary of the general
thrust of the Images
of the Individual presented
in the texts could be found
than
the following:
Be resolved

powers nor in the
^""""l^
I!^^r
protection
of men but only in God. 39

im) Z

Editorial Luis
Vives,
i8V '^I'i^^^^
passage
itself
actually
^iJ^^^S^
comes from a 'book
^^""^^ ^^^^'^
^^^d
as a
selection
sej-ection in ^h?i
^J^^ published in 1948.
this textbook

m

T

38.,

Werner Bolin. Convivencia,

39Agustin

p.

12?.

Emphasis in original.

Serrano de Haro, Cada Vez Meiore
1
r?r.
Escuela
Espanola, 196?), p. 14.

c,

(Madrid
vicLorui
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Certainly this is nothing more than any
Catholic child
learns who is taught the central teachinf^s
of Roman Catholicism.

But the quote must be taken in context,

God was literally "official" business

f

it was

which decided what God is and what God wants.

in Franco Spain.

"official" Spain
In the case of

Franco Spain, then, the quote might just as well
be, "Wever
trust in yourself or your fellow humans but only
in

the State."

To the degree this admonition was accepted there could
be no

democracy in Spain nor even an effective opposition; to the
degree it was rejected, the dictatorship itself was rejected.
However, let us leave further speculation on the implications of the Images of the State and the Images of the Individua

for Spanish politics for a subsequent chapter and proceed now
to an examination of the nexus of the State and the Individual,

the Images of the Citizen.
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CHAPTER

V

IMAGES OF THE CITIZEN
In this chapter we turn to
what are probably the most
important images conveyed by the
textbooks,
the images of the
citizen.
In it we will be looking at
passages which deal with
the rights and duties of the Spaniard,
the means for participation in the governmental system set out
by "official" Spain,
the special definition of participation
in terms of obedience
and discipline, the connections drawn
between the family and the
state and, finally, the concept of patriotism.

Although there is some overlap with earlier selections,
the passages chosen for this Chapter emphasize
more than others
the connections between the views of the individual
and the

state presented earlier.

Here seemingly abstract discussions

of the nature of humanity and the ends and purposes of the
state
are operationalized

,

as it were, in the expectations of

"official" Spain about how the Spanish citizen should and will

behave
V/e

begin, with the most fundamental aspect of citizen-

ship, the notion of rights and duties.

Derechos v Deberes (Rights and Duties)
It v/ill

come as no surprise to students of Spain or

dictatorship that in the texts much more of an emphasis

is put

on duties than on xxgnxs.
richts.-

th^cihis

IS +^
to v
be

the corporatist nature of
Franco Spain.

partly explained by
In such a corporatist

system with its so-called "organic"
view of the person, rights
are not seen in the abstract,
individualist, absolutist way
which is more common to a liberal,
Anglo-Saxon tradition. We
have already seen that the individual
is made subservient or
secondary to the needs of society
as a whole,

that-as one of

the textbooks argued-man does not
exist outside of society.
From this philosophical tradition,
individual rights (derechj103
in Spanish) are seen as relatively
unimportant or as luxuries3S

that may be easily dispensed with for
the "good of society" as
a whole.
For example, in the case of Spain, group
rights or
fueros such as those extended to the Church and
military of

their own schools or separate legal systems have
a tradition
that stretches from feudal through colonial to
present times.

Individual rights (derechos) have a far shorter and weaker

tradition being really a nineteenth and twentieth century

appendix and which existed in Franco Spain— some would argueonly to placate international opinion and the human rights

amendment to the United Nations charter.
Yet while there is this lack of a philosophical tradition
in Spain to support individual rights it should not be forgotten

that the de-emphasis of individual rights served the needs of
the dictatorship and is an important message of the textbooks.
One passage discusses the relation between rights and duties
in this wayt
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Duties
As soon as wa ay-c.
surrounded by obli^«?Tn
ourselves
tions that we
have to fulfiirif
men and useful to Knm!
^® honorable
children we
have the duty to obev n^^*
'''' Parents
and our
teachers. As
orders of our superior^
^^^P^^^ ^he
the obligation Of creatinga
fam!iv of""^"'
supporting it,
of fulfilling ourselve^
thv.^
of respecting m?ive tL.n?-''^^
^^^y
traditions,
the duty of
defending thf ^l^l
^hi^h we have been
born?

J

^

And in smaller type:

Rights

respected by other persons
P,,+ ^
But
one must earn ri/rht=?
tk^ worker,
for example, has a
perfect H^ht
ptr
etc.

'

i

individuals cannot speak of ri^ht<^

ntl

or as another text more
succinctly put it.
"The quality
and right of the Spanish
citizen is called citizenship
and it
Obliges us to the fulfillment of
many duties and to the exercise
of some rights

There is as well a philosophical
and religious argument

19'tO),

5^395!'°
2

Enclclopedia ^ctiv. (fedrid

Hernando,

y

Jose Udina Cortiles, Enciclopedia
Camf rRaropl ona
Imprenta Elzeviriana y Librer ia Cam 1
^941
7

7^/272?
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for the priority of duties
If rights and duties are considered
in
relation with the universal order, we can
prove that the ripht is anterior to the duty
God, Creator and Legislator, does not
....
nave any duty, and does have every right.
The Divine Right is the fundamental law, from
which issue all human duties. But, considering duty and right in the relative order, it
is easily understood that, within each individual conscience, the duty is anterior to the
right, because man, destined, for an end by
God, has to complete the obligations which are
imposed on him with an obligatory character,
although for the completion of this end he
is given some rights, like free-will, the
exercise of reason and others.

But perhaps the best argument for the priority of duties
and one which comes closest to the real reason for the emphasis
on obligations is pragmatict
The last duty, the most sacred of all,
is to defend the Motherland against its enemies.

Who are the enemies of the Motherland?
are interior and exterior ones.

There

The interior enemies are our countrymen
who, with negligence and cov/ardice, consent to
the name of Spain being denigrated.
They are
those who are not sorry for their disgraces,
those who don't contribute to impeding them and
those who don't make haste to correct them.
They are those who, in the name of a false human
solidarity, try to detract from the permanent
essences of religion, race and language. And
they are those who, to conclude, conspire to
tear /ppain/ apart, which is the same as tearing
out a piece of her entails. Exterior enemies
are those who, secretly, or with arms in hand
attack our national independence,^

-^Torres, Enciclopedia Activa

,

p.

398.

Emphasis in

original

Vntonio
Rodriguez, 1951)

J.
»

Onieva, Heroes (Burgos: Hi jos de Santiago
p.

11.
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A pragmatic approach to the
definition of duties and
ri^^hts is followed as well
in the case of the ri^ht
of liberty
AS can be seen below a rather
™ild philosophical discussion
of
the nature of liberty in the
Catholic tradition is followed
imnediately in the textbook by
an exhortation to
the child to

leave such niceties as rights
to those in authority and
concen
trate on duties
It has been said many times
that libertv
doinrwhat
P^^^^^
he""
^^^^
wL'h.r' Liberty
r'T^^f consists
wishes.
in the faculty that
we have for electing among all
the
means that which we consider most possible
effective
to advance an end.

In this election, man is free,
he rejects those means which he does because
not see
as conducive to said end, and even
among those
which are, he employs the most adequate.

Child:
Don't be bothered about your
rights, which the State already has in mindj
learn the chapter of your duties and fulfill
them without avoiding effort.
^

The chapter of your duties is the

f ollowingt

a) Love God above all things and, in his
name, all your peers.
b) Honor your parents showing in each
moment that you are a good child.
c) Obey your superiors and especially
your teacher, who only desires your perfection.

d) Serve your motherland in what it demands
of you and make for it, if it be necessary, the
sacrifice of your life.

Within these duties your liberty must move.
Outside of them don't support any tyranny.
^ Ibid

.

.

pp. 10/1-106.
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Participation

When Carrero Blanco was appointed
Presidente HpT r.ny.'..^^.
by Franco
the Spring of 1973 there was
a great deal of discussion in the foreign press about
an expected liberalization
of the regime. With the assassination
of Carrero

m

Blanco and

his replacement by former security
chief Arias Kavarro there
were again press reports about the
impending apertura or opening
of the regime.^ Part of this speculation
was based on the
rhetoric of both new Presidents and of
Franco himself which
emphasized that new and better participation of
Spaniards in
the work of government would be a goal of the
regime.
No such "liberalization" did, in fact, take
place under

Arias Navarro and, for reasons to be explored in the
next
chapter,

increased repression came to be characteristic of the

last Franco government.

This would not have been so surprising

to the foreign correspondents if they had taken the time to
read
a child's textbook to see the way in which "official" Spain

conceives of participation.
The formal means of participation in Spain's "organic"

system are set out fairly clearlyi

.

We all have, then, a right to participate
construction of the law, contributing our
points of view, our opinions about the most just.
in^ the

making

But, as it would be impossible that before
a law one v/ould have to consult the opinion

^See especially the reporting of Henry Giniger, New York
Times correspondent in Spain.
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°^
tions that are the
obieo? o?
^^"^ ^he
community, through thi
^^"'ilies,
municipalities? fJecte
in order that! amonr?hI
^^""^ capable persons
agreement
•

on^neft'^^S'mJ^r^us^f ^or^n!^

thrcueh'lL\P:r°a"?tlS^at^
i-J-tipate
of the law.?

.^"^
in
I^l^h':""*^^
the construction
'

•

On
representation^'^"^'-"^"" possible forms of

eli;^fL?efrep;eseS?lor?hro"K""''^

through political
parties
Poll+f^fi
ished lA the coin?ry''^''^hr'-"'~'-'.'''^^"^

^tr^:^

-thri^Saf "unlts^'^^r"^^-

"f^^? '"^^ ^" or-anism
with a
a''Sur??ft"'^
f""
plur<ility of
societies in which the
^ed, such as'?he
fa'ilv "?h/^
tne municipality and the
syndicate
"^^^ these'^channeL
In'^olTer
directions and
!° ^^"'^^
force of ^ho
lorce
the society.
Therefore "^^P"^^-^^^^^
tion adopts the "organic- formj representa-

llT

What is most important to consider,
however, are not the
mere forms of participation but
the quality or content of it.
From previous sections on the
Individual
and the State, for

example, we already know the hierarchical,
authoritarian relationship which exists among "channels"
such as the family,
the

PP

31-32^^^^^^ Navarro, Todos Juntoc, (Madrid:
g

gJVJ^ca,

(Madrid

»

Doncel, I965),

Ferrer Guillen, Formacion Pol^'tico-Soo^ p 1
Almena, I968), p. 52.
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municipality and the State.

The next section on
Obeaience will

contribute further to an
understanding of the context in
which
these "Channels" of
participation exist. But the
textbooks
also provide so.e direct
examples of the approved
.anner of
participation. For instance,
the syndicate,
^? *° contribute something,
it is to ?of?=h^;''^^
collaborate with other producers
and

^° -"trfbute to%he''
wtjij. oemg of the
weU-be[nrof'?he°"'"^community,

^^^P^f^i^ipate? One participates lIuhT ^yndical spirit
in the following
cases:
^^^'^
affairs^o?^hf
aiiairs
oi the syndicate.
best perlonf

are held^^'^^^"^

influencing the
elections to the

functions and meetings that

Going to syndicate residences, lodgings,
excursions, or to cultural or sports events.

Following the directions of the syndicate.
Taking advantage of the trainin/^ and
improvement courses.
Or,

in the school

Participation
school center, the director organizes
A+
its
life the professors put themselves out to
teach the best possible and the students with
their work and study learn their lessons. All
participate in the work of the centen some
directing and teaching, others obeying and
J

studying.

^

(Madrid!

Alfredo Gosalbez Celdran, Educacion civic o-sor.ial
Doncel, 1970), pp. 90-91";

~

13^

To participate is to
contribute with
one's personal effort to
the task t)i^t th^
community is realizing.

authorities are charged with
^^r^.r^J^^
directing civic life, but all
have to participate in it by the rest of us
their orders and discharging carrying out
du?v with
an elevated spirit of servile.our
10

^

We begin to see here the
"organic" form of participati on
society is a unity, a whole whose
different parts fit together
in a pre-determined order.
Naturally, there are those who
command, direct and order and there
must exist a counterpart
Who follow and obey. To participate
"organically is to know
one's position in the hierarchy of
life and fulfill it as energetically as possible. That "participation"
in the Spanish
sense is something other than democracy
is made clear by the

following anecdote:
Social Reform
Two men were discussing the manner of
arranging society. A general aspiration of
loaf ersl
Both agreed that the world is very bad;
that one must correct abuses and reform customs} that, finally, if remedy is not taken
soon, this path will lead us to a dreadful
cataclysm.
But they did not agree on the means of
carrying out the reform; each one upheld his
own opinion, without conceding one point to
the other; they were carried away by passion,
reached no conclusion and finished up insulting one another without any consideration.

Ibid

.

p.

20.
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directing :Lh'severi?f
beverity

'° ^""''^ ^^outs,

these words at

therai

first '^lr^nTinP'Ul°stl^llr
without
"°rality.
religion, you see JeS
^hl remedy,
"''V
to reform societv h! ?
in order
reforming yourselves,
you are individuals!^
"

^

the reforms? "each^one^rLf'^J''?'"^"* *° decree
evils of the .iTa

:mre%lJlTs',lil,r

we discuss at a later
time the consequences
of the CathoUc sentiment expressed in
this passage that
social .etter.ent
oomes only through
individual improvement,
here it is important
to note the way in
which discussion (and
argument)
of

surely a prerequisite of
meaningful participation
particinati nn
as the Obviously fruitless
occupation of

— is
i

issues-

presented

loafers.

Participar es nhoH^^^P
(To participate is to
obey)

If every student of Spain
kept this three word
definition
Of participation in mind
when reading speeches or
declarations
Of Franco or other government
officials, they would have met
with fewer surprises and written
less sanguinely about an
'

impending liberalization of the
regime.
For as we have already
indicated, when "official" Spain
spoke of participation it had
in mind a series of concepts
intimately linked to this idea,
concepts such as obedience,
discipline and order. It is when

Espa?iola^f;^6)fp!°M?^'

("^""d,

Escuela
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discussing these concepts that
the "organic" view of
participation becomes more clean
'^^ every organized
some men who command and society there exist
others who obey^the
former are the authorities,
and the J-^ui-er,
latter
the subordinatpc?
ait ^-p iu
^-^-^
them,
some commandinfr
anri o+h^v.^ t!?
contribute to social per-^
fection
p ^^^i''^'
^^"'"^^ ^^^^ functions are
f^n^i? % '."^^^
^i?^
is "i"ch more so; since
-'^ authority is not r^cognUed
or in wMch^f
""^^^ ^"^"^
degenerates into
anarchy!!

10^+^"^^^^ of discipline engenders chaos,
thp+
that is to say, disorder. Only
discipline makes
which
P^^P^^
everyone
^
fulffn^^^^'^^i??fulfills
his obligation
is an ideal people.
How does one fulfill his duty? Respecting
the
orders of one's superiors and meekly
carrying
&
thera out.

*'

For this it is necessary to subordinate
oneself to authority. If everyone dedicated
ordering, there would be none to

obly^l^"^^^

The following illustrations from one of
the textbooks

present this variety of personal, social and
legal relationships
graphically -"-^
8

Common
Good

12

Onieva, Heroes

13Evelio

.

p.

39.

Yusta, Lecciones Preparadas
Santiago Rodriguez, I96I), pp. 821, 823.

(

Burgos

i

Hijos de
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The model relationships upon which the
relation between
the authorities and the subordinates
is based are, not surprisingly, those of the individual with
God and the individual with
the family. And the obedience required by
such relationships

is— again,

not surprisingly— blind and absolutet

Obligations of the subjects. Obligations of the governors. --Every man has a
Motherland, which as its name indicates, is
the land of his parents.
From the Motherland
he has received his language, and many other
benefits. Without Motherland there is neither
school, nor civilization.
God has wished it so. The rulers of a
Motherland represent God, within their charge.
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?"bjeot owes to the rulers

his rJllt^f"^^'

^.ivj.c collaboration.
He who speaks badlv n-p
the country, who grumbles
aboufthe government
etc., does not fulfill
this obligation!

'

^'^^^

rood, seekw'''no?''fI;^-'°
^^^^^ personal advantage.
1?^^
b,,t Ih!
^^11-being
of their subjects and the
^1 cry and prestige of the Motherland prescribe
oust laws, which respect the
sacred rights of
,

^fn^LS^
As

^'^^^^^J^^^

^>^e

armed defense of the

have said the philosophical basis
of the relationship between ruler and subject
requires a strict kind
I

of

obedience:
^^^^ ^^^^ "^^^"s absolute obediof the collectivity, of the
family and of the individual. Obedience
to the
action of those who direct.
«r>n.
ence to the tasks

What do we Spaniards have to do with
regard to the action of the rulers? Purely
and
simply, to help. Each one in his place,
helping;
even though we may think in some instance
that
things are not going well, help. Here is
the
practical consequence of discipline. That no
one be ambitious for command and all obey.
That each one apply himself to his job and his
work and leave the government a clear road
without obstacles. That we speak of our own
business and little of politics, 15

14

Juan Forquets, La doctrina de Jesucristo (Barcelona!
Lumen, 1939), p. 93.
^^Emilio Ortiga (revised and augmented by Alberto Montana),
^
Egtimulos (Barcelona! Pedagogia Activa, 1959), p. 66.
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Tho dinciplino though
otrict will be moot effective
if
the oubjects accept their
subordinate position,
the follow.
In^ two pa.sa^oo. tho text,
outline in rou..h tonnn the
oocialization Btratery to be employed

m

neceaaary quality for
undortnkinr worthy of men
^^^^^^^^ "^'^
imponed by
?o^.o
"f^^'^^^"
^-or it to be eflectlve^
i? h^' ^^S^^^
^^\^V^^«d «n ^-nith in the commaAd.
i^ the rnen ^^^
in
who direct tho de^tinieB of
the
Motherland or of the captains who
direct
the
armieo.
Only when the nubordlnate
rccornizes
the nuperiority of ho who
commando him and
the ^;uperior does not become
ootentatioua
^t, does true affection arise,
which
incline.'! the firnt to the
f^reatent obedience
and Bubminrjion and the oecond to the
most
heroic oacrificGQ for their own. 16
r^n.i
WM^"^^^-'-^"*^
roaHzinr:
every

r

i« exactly thin which we intend
*
4.U ^"^,f"t
in
the political formation of youth.
To
Inculcate in them all thooo ethical and civic
principles, from whose exercise arine the best
norinn of living tor;ether ( convive nc n )
and of
well-beinp;.
And one is not simply trying to
teach them a doctrine, but to create certain
habits which make them live under this ideal.
It flowH from this that In our activities, in
our tcachin^rs, in our orders, wo always seek
the way^to Fjtimulato virtues that favor unity
and living to<»;o thnr ( convivrencia) and to
reduce or eliminate those vices that are
opposed to it or make it difficult. ^
1

.

In this effort "official- Spain can rely on help of

institutions which have been important influences on the youn^
16
,

Manuel Alvarez Lastra y Eleuterio do Orte Martfnez,
ICnplritu Nacionn l (Madrid
Fronto de Juventudes,

£l>ri!i.Qclon._d el

1?

i

"

"

Dolef:aci()n Nacional del Frente de Juventudes, For-m- iclor)
(Waclridi
Fronto del Juventudes, Iv^r/)
dl'lJiai>:U:jJaL.J^iiLC..L^^
Tho LJpanish word conv ivonei
p. VI.
translated here an "llvinf^
to^iether" and elsewhere an "cohabita tion"— has no En^tlinh

—

oquivalent.

1^0

such as religion, the school
and the family.
Thus, you have to consider
your Dro-

between Him and your
vlrlnU
f^^"""-^^
^"""^"^ "^^^^ requirement,
as a
mtur^f'.n
^°I^?e^^ence. the respect
love,

which you have t^ih^thi^^s and
?he
delegates of your parents.
,

God is not accustomed to
command us
^^-^^^^^^ he delegates Ms authorttlT.X''''
ity to those who command by
his
consequently, you have to Low order and
which your professors order is that ^ha?
that ^^^^^
which
"""^^^
was ordered by God. 18

The analogy drawn so many times
between the family and
the state is used again to lend
legitimacy to the need for
obedience
^^^^
^^^"t all the members
family collaborate with their personal
fL^^!
effort in order to bring about the
greater
well-being of the community, so too the Motherland requires that each one of us
collaborate
with his work to gain national well-being.
^

It is, then, a fundamental duty this
concern with serving the Motherland in the
best
way possible, in whatever moment and with the
greatest enthusiasm. How does one demonstrate
throughout life this concern with service to
the Motherland? In diverse ways, according to
the moment:

—During youth
.

i

By study and learning.

—-During adolescence:

seirvice.

By work and military

—Always
By obedience to authority and the
By the desire of collaborating effectively
with its greatness in every moment.
i

law.

18
79.

Fl nino bien educado (Madrid:
Emphasis in original.

Ediciones Bruno, 1953),

1^1

Obedience' to authority is
centered
constituted as Held of
S^atnrhl'^'f

w:^ras^L^^Lre^^^a?^s^^'^^^^'^^°^^'

m

-

The family analogy is also
a way to promote "voluntary'
acceptance of the need for discipline
and obedience.
•

In any activity of life, in
order to
know how to command well one
must pi-«vxuubj.y
previously
have learned how to obey.

cannot justly give an order if one
hoc not previously
has
come to experience the
disposition
which those who have to obey
find themselves, and what tone and
manner of
commanding will be able to facilitate
the
lulfillment of orders.

m

In the convents, brothers m.ake a
tary promise of obedience in the altars volunof
elevated love, since no great love exists an
without the renunciation of somethino- of
our
^
being.

You also have an institution for cultivating your obedience: the family.

With the help of your parents you will
observe that obedience makes you each time
more free. Thus, learning now to obey with
happiness, you will know some day how to
command properly, since you will be able to
put yourself in the place of those who ought
to obey and you will know how to command
with gentleness, without wounding anyone or
establishing hateful divisions or frustrating
anyone's personality.
^

He who does not know how to obey, is not
worth much as a leader. ^0

'

.

(Madrid

''"^Alfredo Gosalbez Celdran,
t

Educacion civico-soc ial
Doncel, I968), pp. I57-158T

Antonio Herrero Antolin, ~"
Lecturas educatlvas (Madrid
Hernando, 1959), p. 4?.

1^2

At times it seems 'as though
obedience is the key to
happiness
t

^^^^
proverb.
^^j^ys himself in givsuperior, and this satilfaot?nn of pleasing another
is a way of liking
-^'^-i-iig
Mm of loving
n
nim,
him.
In

fart'f'' h«^^v.^^
^^"^ ""^^^^

easier to obey than to command. He
who nh^L''^
obeys, makes no mistakes; he who
commands,
think
whether
i??'fn?^n?''
^r-^
Its
fulfillm.ent
is possible; on the other
hand,
he who obeys is free of such a
preoccupation?2l
Of course, after learning what
a loving, liberating

experience obedience can be we come to
the real point of it all
--order
Obedience is the indispensable base of
our very liberty and of all social life.
Why
do we have to obey? Because we are not
independent. And on v/hom do we depend? First
and
principally, on God; then, on our Motherland
and our parents.
*

^

Hr

And do not think that this blind obedience to
the Motherland is an exclusive obligation of
soldiers
We should never comment on or censure
another's acts; if the person who does them
is subordinate to us, a sincere and opportune
admonition issues, and if the person is not,
silence; never a commentary.
It is not for us
to judge our superiors. Let us respect the Law
of God without possible discussion, and he is
ignorant who makes efforts to arrive with his
knowledge at unraveling the divine mysteries.
In like manner should we treat the will of

Onieva, Heroes

«

p. 3?.

1^3

our parents, without a right to
believe ourselves to be like them or to discuss
their
orders,

Notice in the following discussion of
public order the
way in which authority-enforced order is
expanded

from common

sense notions such as preventing disturbance
of the peace to
wider and wider areas of belief and political
and

social life.

Public order is the most important,
because it refers to the totality of the
inhabitants of a State. All persons, be they
nationals or f oreig-ners, ought to respect thn
Public Order. Therefore, the laws and dispositions of the authorities that refer to the
Public Order, ought to be obeyed by all those
who inhabit a State, and not only by nationals
of the country.
If a person, or a group, begins to sing
late at night, when all are resting with the'
object of being able to work or study on the
following day, the Public Order
disturbed.
When a person goes onto the street with an
immoral dress, which scandalizes people, she
is attacking the Public Order.
The laws and
the authorities punish these acts v/hich offend
or molest everyone. Also, when activities are
carried out such as unauthorized public demonstrations, secret meetings, etc., that might
wish to attack the order of the State,
is-:

Public Order if- that which shows itself
to be indispensable for making possible the
total proper functioning: of the society
It
expresses the most important conditions of the
community's life which refer to its general
organization.
.

Every political society establishes a
series of norms of special interest, based on
beliefs, traditions, moral convictions, necessities, etc., which, as a whole, constitute

Seccion Femenina, Formacion Familiar
/
Seccion Femenina, 194^), pp. 1 67-169.

v Social

'

(Madrid.

1^^

the Public Order.
The State acts as defender
these norms, punishing persons who do not
respect them.
01

The effects which Public Order produces
tranquility, security
social health. Therefore, it ou^ht to be and
accepted by all. since its benefits redound
to all persons.^
in a community are.

As in many other areas of the textbooks which

v/e

have

already covered, simple, common-sense models or examples
of
the need for order are expanded as paradigir.s for
broader

areas

of social relations.

For example, the following passage con-

cerns the need for order in the school.

The true message con-

veyed, however, is to be found in the structure and sequence
of the chapters which move from family norms, to the school,

province, nation, world, etc, building concepts such as order,

loyalty and obedience.

Keep in mind, then, when reading the

following passage that the need for order in the school is
meant to prove the need for such order in other areas of social
lif'e

which are not always or necessarily analogous

t

What would happen if there was no order
in school?

Order helps to make things go well between
teachers and pupils.
Order, in the school, is called organization.

Organization serves to allow all to be able
to learn without bothering each other.
We have hours for coming and going, a place
in class, in games, in recreation.

•^Ferrer Guillen, Forma c ion

original.

,

pp. 57~58»

Emphasis in
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We cannot all learn
at one time,

gradesr^"^"''"
year yll

^""^

°^dered in

Ur^nltVoXl

h^^h^^^Si^^:

life ofl?! ent!re°schoo\"!^'°"

have

^"^^

cS^Lirj;^ l^ojr p-^aSlifSf -

useful'?rott:r^!

^''^ '° '° ^

"^^^

^

"^^^

-"'l

be

Observe wellj

—Who

has the best arranged books?

—Who

has the cleanest notebook?

—Who

has the most neatly covered
books?^^

Perhaps the following passage
will serve to convince the
reader that too sinister an
interpretation is not being read
into the texts
Info,

from Childhood get used to ordering your
^'^^
^^-^'^^

anf^tJongf'

From the social point of view,
prepare
yourself to be a person of order, since/as
such. Spam has to be in need of
you.
For
Purpose you ought to respect the school
l^il
norms established by your teacher.
Any
turbance you produce is a disorder, with diswhich
you will have prejudiced all your
school work.

24
T

-.'^ ^

Gabinete de Educacion Politico-Social
y cfvica del

1^6

o=„,^

s,treet always proceed
in the

"""^

^? Oxygen of society,
wxunoux it,
it
^ without
society perishes, 25
There is one final aspect
to the discussion of order
Which n^ust be mentioned, the
celebrated liberty-licence

(l^hertM^U^^rt^

debate.

I

say "celebrated" for. as any-

one Who spent time in Franco
Spain knows, the words were the
terms of discourse for the
discussion of where the limits of
social and political acceptability
will be drawn. The debate
was almost always a right-left
one in which action seen as the
exercise of liberty by the left was
seen as the abuse of liberty
or licence by the ri,jht. As we
shall see, the debate was also
the material for typically Spanish
political humor.
But, let us begin by setting out
the debate-as contained in the textbooks-from the point
of view of "official"

Spaini
Thus, then, having proved that, in the
extremes, an excess of liberty leads to
licence and anarchy, and an excess of social
pov/er destroys the person, "massifying"
and
denying his highest values, we have to consider
that the .iust disposition of libertv and nf
^.ociety represents the effective solution.
Society and liberty are complementary terms,
though they are in tension and care should be
taken, in every moment, that their equilibrium
never fails
neither social order at the cost
of the sacrifice of individual liberty, nor
1

^^Onieva, Heroes

,

p.

II6.

liberty which is wild and without feeling
which destroys itself in destroying the
order
necessary for its existence. 25
Of course, the problem with such a formulation
is who
decides what is the "just disposition" of liberty
and licence;

under Franco the question had usually been decided
in favor of
the right.

An illustration of the debate and "just distribution"
is provided in a cartoon by the Spanish humorist,
Mingote,

which appeared in the press during my year in Spain (I972-1973).
In it two Spaniards are contemplating a road which stretches

off into the distance and leads, significantly, to Europe, ^"^
The road is crossed by two lines, that closest to the men bears
the signpcst, "Liberty"; and but a few short feet beyond, the

second crossing is marked by the signpost, "Licence."

One

Spaniard comments to the other, "Don't you think they've drawn
the lines awfully close together?"

The significance of the cartoon is that in the real

world of the Franco regime the need for order always took precedence over the exercise of liberty.

26

^
Ferrer Guillen, Formacion

.

What

p. ^0.

I

have called the

Emphasis in original,

27
'Humor is perhaps the most ethnocentric form of language
and not easily accessible to the outsider. My belaboring of the
meaning of the cartoon will hopefully be excused by those
familiar v/ith Spain.

The reference to Europe is to the eventual joining of
Spain to the Common ivlarket. For Spain, this implies social and
political modernization especially since the original Treaty of
Rome establishing the Market specified that Spain would have to
be a "democracy" before being admitted.

1^8

liberty-licence debate was,
^o, in
xn fact
nn+ +>,.hlact, not
that but^ rather a
device by which "official"
Smin k^ni- +
^pain

kept its opponents engaged
in

a wearying pseudo-debate
over whether the exercising
of what

were once called inalienable
rights such as freedom of
speech
assembly, etc. was liberty or
licence. The outside observer
can see that the exercising
of rights in a way which
threatens
'

the dictatorship would always
be examples of licence and
that
the exercising of rights which
serve no purpose other than to
salve the liberal consciences of
intellectuals would probably
be examples of the "proper
use" of liberty.
We will have .ore
to say about such devices in
the next chapter.
For now let us
turn again to the Images of the
Citizen as expressed in the

State-Family analogy.
The Family and the State

The use of the family as a metaphor for
the State has
been seen many times throughout these
chapters on the textbooks.
Forming as it does the key way in which
"official" Spain attempts
to conceive of a variety of social and
political relations
it

has appeared in all three sections on the
Images of the State,
the Individual and the Citizen.
For this section I have tried
to choose passages which illustrate "official"
Spain's view of

State authority as being directly derived from the father's
authority in the family.

In this view the authority of the

father (and, hence, of the State and its leader)

is

conferred

149

by God and exercised
in thp following,
foii
«
ways,
l)
..t»..
--there is no higher
authority
h»..
""^y and hence,
no appeal of its
decisions, 2) It is
paternalistic-it
iST^ic
3, »i
It IS
always intended to
serve the "best
interests" of the citi,»
citizens even though
at tiraes
it may "maure"
them or be in error.

n

•

.

"e begin with so.e
examples of the State-Fa.iiy
analogy.

mands anf a?? the^rest^Sbe?; ''^^
the children obey
toeir Profe^?.'" so f^^°°^
also the
village, the provincI
their authorities.2§ Ld ?hf nation have

What is the school?
the

.rl^'rt/^^^^^^^^^

anl-brothers and

^J^^^l

^""^

and
^^^^ mx_,earents

eats, lllyl'l^^^^^^^^^^
is

the'ci?yUeT:

wor.s.

Sfl\:e'.3'?^'

^-^^^

^^^-'^

As we have seen already
the Spanish State views
itself
as corporatist or organic
and it xs
ciiiu
to
is irom
from thi.
this conception that
the importance of the family
flows:
the family,
an inexhau^tlh?!
subject, because the
familv is like ^T^^
family
the sun. the water and so
many

L

28,

Textos

p.

48.

p.

37.

Es(

.^o\Tes^^sf^tf.^-es\-d%-.^lu's^r^f|^offt-i^O-----

'ESis^rffFlffe/"^"'^'^^''^
^"^^"^^"^"t^^

31

-Ibid.

.

p.

^""--^

Bruno, i960).

^e la Juventud, Educacio n crvico-socl.l
48.

.
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stop to think how great
p^oduce!^''^''

'"^^^

is their utility and
'^'^^ disappearance ^oSd

No one can doubt the
of societv
because this is a function necessity
of man's nature
So'
also,
order for societv to pvic.+
?
composed of the father:%'L'mother';nd'
hllSr^'
indissoluble ties, is indls-'

m

^nsable^

collection of individuals
who livp%n''^^H^
5''''^®' ^"^^^
authority of its
hoa^,
/?u^

head; and the forefathers, descendents,
relatives
or in-laws of a line. And better
stili:
the
elevated
by
the
Church
?n''^h''^^^^•^^^^i^^
a Sacrament, sacrificing for
^^^"-^^
Its o?P
offspring.
It IS the anchor of morality,
the safeguard of women's honor, the
check on
unbrialed corruption, the home-port of
the
"^^^ beacom which will
illuminate
their
path rf"'
through the stormy sea of life.
It is the
domestic hearth, the first and most important
school of character. There is where every
human
being receives his best, or his worst, moral
education because there is where he is instilled
with the principles of conduct which guide him
and which cease only with his life.
From this origin be it pure or impure come
the principles that govern society. The Law
Itself is not more than the reflexion of the
family, given that the ideas poured into children
the private life of the home display themselves in the world and are converted into public
opinion. Therefore Pilar tells us, in her discourse at Granada, that "our obligation, instead
of being in an office behind a desk, consists in
instilling in the hearts meter a nuestros hi.ios
hasta la entrana this Falange v/hich fills our

m

(

)

32

Seccion Femenina, Forma c ion

,

pp. I9O-I91.
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Because or its importance
tne State .ado
protection ana
perpetuation of the "approved"
f=.„ii
^''"'^'^

,

.

(authoritarian, patriarchal,

etc.), a ,
key part of its ideology.
The followin. passages
5
give
examples of the way
ay in whioh
+h«
+
Which the textbooks
link the family and
the State

m

I

parents'and*tt»

^^"4

base of society

root

cril;rio"4hich

is tte^:"°-''"'^'^"

°f the

•

i^""

"^^^

^"'^

eaudillo and 0? t^: new State™. ff'^K °'
°^ ins It^tlJ^s ^^i^^ ^ ^^o ^
your life from your birth,
yoirlffe^^?'^^
and contribute to
Of t^^^^^^^i!^

inlt!?:;??r!f

tpi/^^?jf p--- ^rei^Llg-?-el^^^^^^ ^o the most'
triviS%uHH-"^'f
trivial
juridical norms, recognize the
from

dltiL^^or^ocI^iy?^?^
1n<, + ^+?;+?

family
natural, ^authentic'^oui^:

^^"^^^y is considered as a moral

endowed with an inalienable right;
thf^
^^^'.^ha^
no one can suppress itf
.-^'^
«nf it IS
and
superior to all positive law. Principle
of the Fundamental Law of May
y
i?. 1958
Nation^llive^^nt)
Po1nt:'oJ$%h^i"?h'^'^%^'
^^^^
national community is
?^
founded »^
-on man ... and on the
familv
h...
1^

^-^^^Alf^^'

.Equally,

PrinciilFvflffiSf
that .the fam ily is a natural
entity, h^<^^ n-p
the national community 3-^

—

'

As in earlier sections on the Images
of the State it

•

^Ibid.

original.

.

p. 192.

Guillen, formacion.,. p. 10?.

Emphasis in

152
is important for us to keep
in mind what '.official"
Spain hopes
other Spaniards do not.
adherence to a '.natural,"
..organicState is Obtained by the same
means employed in other less

"natural" systems, persuasion,
manipulation, socialization and
--in the case of Franco Spain-a
good measure of repression.
This is why we can speak of a
Spanish ideology, why the discussions Of such widely varying
topics as covered in these
chapters on the textbooks seem to
fit together so

well.
One
of the textbooks in a note on
methodology intended for the

instructor makes this point clearlyj
There is continued in this third
secondary school (Mchillerato a methodyear of
of
program and text similar to previous
courses:
an inductive and experimental method.
It proceeds by ascending through the units
of living
together (conviyencia) that integrate
the reality
ol Spam.
Passing from the surroundinp-s of the
immediate, of the society of most natural
orip-in.
the provincial community, based on an administrative apparatus, appears. The ideas regarding
the province which ought to be ^iven to the
student, have to be, In the first place, general,
and after, concretized in the proper province.
The organic value of the province has to stand
out; the relations of service between the
capital
and the villages and the benefits which the
latter bring to the city; the relationships and
the personal and collective mission with respect
to the elevation of the social life of the vill)

ages, etc.

In the explanation of the region, after
establishing its physical-natural character, a
key^ concept is the transition from this unit of
living together ( convivencia to the unit of
historic living together convivencia v/hich is
the motherland.
One must explain this transition from the history of the Spanish regions
and its initiation in the reality of Spain as
a unit of historic destiny.
)

(

)

'
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"^^^ program and in the
text of^?hp''^i'^f
Diocese is justified
because
oecauoe in th^o^''^
the order of religious livinptogether (conxivencia it
^S^he
Province, as the Parish is is^similar
to the familv -inrt
above alirbecause
is'nr;"'''^"''^^'
ourselves on the
^^"^"S
value S? hn^r^-'^^^^g^i^yr not
to lose in poli^
on
tical-social
formation the order of the reli^""^
'"^-^^ the student aware
th«f .
social being he also lives united
?o
^he units
the
un!t? of religious living
together
x
(convivencia)35

U

r

By way of conclusion and summation
of this section I
would like to ask the reader to
follow along with this next
lengthy passage. Its unity of style
and thought requires that
it be translated in its entirety
and I could devise no better
integration of the themes considered until
this point

Society and its classes. Man lives
union and cohabitation convivenoi a with in
others
From this state of union are derived
obligations
or^duties. Society is the moral and permanent
union of various individuals who tend in their
acts toward some common, honest end.
(

)

^

Society is of three classes: the domestic
or family, the civil and the religious.
The family is the primary form of society
and its essential condition. V/ithin it the
authority of the father is recognized as the
participation of divine authority and among its
members mutual obligations exist.
^The civil society.
From the union of
families civil society arises.
Its conditions
to live in a single territory, under the regime
of a single authority, with the same laws, in
order to procure the common good. This is the
unity of territory, authority and ends.

^ -^Seccion Femenina, Formacion Politico-Social (Madrid
Seccion Femenina, 196^), pp. 9-10,

15^

Its origin and end.
The origin of civil
society was necessity and
defense.^ ?t was precisely an organization to
protect them. It
one -can find
^^^^
'hf pa^h'tfthe?' temporal and ^^^^
eternal happinels!
^

Necessity of a supreme authority.
In
order that society may exist it
is necessary
that command or authority is bestowed
individual. This will give unity and upon one
life to
^^^^^ ^^^^ '•^ ""^"^ ""^^^^
^"^s

end.

^^^.^fyfj^e origin of this authority.
God
^
is
the primitive and absolute individual
of

power; God does not exercise this
power directly
and immediately, but it is exercised
by elements
or supreme Governments.
These are the depositories of the power of God.
The right of command. Authority is based
on rights. A human right is absurd, as is
force?
therefore, m.an cannot find in him.self the right
of commanding or directing another m.anj
he will
have It as soon as he finds him.self invested
with
the majesty of the right that em.anates from
God
or as depository of his sovereignty.
The right
of command ought to emanate from absolute
reason
and justice, which are God himself. (Conversation
and comments with reference to our providential
Caudillp, Chief of State and Chief of the
Falange,;
^

Hierarchy, With command residing in the
supreme Chief or Government, these delegate the
exercising of it to persons of lesser grade or
power in a descending scale.
(Discuss the hierarchy of the military or ecclesiastical order.)
All these people constitute grades of authority
whose power is augmented to a greater or lesser
degree until arriving at the top.

Therefore hierarchy is the order or grading
of persons.
This concept can be extended to the
order of human values; thus, referring ourselves
to man, there also exists in him a hierarchy of
values, with spiritual values having preference
over those of the flesh, and among spiritual
values those which refer to Religion or the
Motherland are superior to those which are
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purely intellectual.
(Make a firm stand
this assessment, which is fundamental to on
the
doctrine of the Falange.)
Hierarchy engenders a duty, and it is
discipline, without which one cannot conceive
of hierarchy. This duty is translated into
obedience, congruity ( correspond encia ) and
submission of the acts of the inferior to
superior.
.

This means that the commands and orders
of the superior are fulfilled by the inferior.
This is the duty of obedience. 3©

Madre Espana (Mother Spain)

Perhaps the most important aspect of citizenship is

patriotism

— that

tie which binds the individual to the poli-

tical organization we call the nation-state.

In this section

we will be looking at the textbook definitions of patriotism

and the special "love" relationship between the individual and
the State embodied in the phrase, Madre Espana

.

The following passages were taken from a section titled,
"History of Patriotism"!
Patriotism is the sentiment which moves
us to love the Motherland.
Patriotism, therefore, is always love? love for one's neighbor,
for those born on our common land, those who
live according to our customs, submitted to
common laws, with a single ideal.

It is our duty to feel a true patriotism
to love the Motherland without mental reservations .

Frente de Juventudes, ;Formacion

.

pp. 1^5~1^6,
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heart, ^whc4her'?^:1.f 1°^'' "'^^
P^osperous
abject^ coLulL ^"^^ °^
loye our 'otT Ll^TVor^Z.
oxnr;±e
t^^.T/fiU^'ir
lact of
heing our mother.
*

and

mor/L^

iu

*

*

"^^^"^

elevated more

villa^^e, the region and its
sisters
1^ not
^h^t
that IS
pure, is not love for the
Llotherland

The fact o?'h^?^''J'

^^"^

^^^i^ birth.

^"^ deeply,
with the same
lovP
J "^""i"^
love thf^Y
that we have
for our parents.
which^we were born is our mother, The land
^his
command is raised to those of us
who have been
born in Spam:
"Love your Motherland
your heart and all your unders tandin.- Si?h an
and ^vou
will love, also, all that is
3panishV"37

m

,

The intensity of the patriotic love
to which Spanish
children are exhorted by the textbooks
is revealed in the follow-

ing "Decalogue of Love to Spain":
1. I love Spain with all my heart, with
all my soul and with all m.y intellect;
I love
my neighbor as myself and in a special
way if
he, as I, has been born on Spanish soil.

2, I will never take the name of Spain
in vain, nor will I speak badly of her,
and I
will exert myself as much as possible that all
love and respect her as she deserves.

3.1 will remember all the days of my
life the sacred flag of my Motherland, in whose
37 Udina

Cortiles, Enciclonedia Cam.f

.

pp.

267'-268,
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folds beats the soni
knew how to bear thp^^ ""'^ ancestors who
^^^""^ ^P^^^t throughout
the land.
I was
bir^/^^iolJe'r^oJ^Lrof^?^
soil, the province
national
£
or ^n?
and the ^roupin^of
'^^^"^ ^ ^^^^^^
Iiff^'^H-^
or regions, whifh
Province!
con^ti^u?o^iK?^'^i'^
'^^'-^ beautiful
land, for me the
most^ ov^i ''''
is my mother
^^^ich
Splin?

my
fellow^ci^i^ens ?he f.^'i -^^ "^^^^^
falling in i^ve with
^P^in,
o?h^^!^
i^^"
will avoid as much
^^i^J^^^^^s, and I
?

L

nwortny of calling
myself a Spaniard.
that ihulht'll Selioalf
military service; neUhlr to^tt,^°^
?^'
wi?!

"^V^d

Of the taxes o?
P^^"
which I ought to pay. i^lr^es of thf^if^
">ent

^

'"^^^

f»oi

^^overn Snain

lie about love
"^^^

t

T

do rot
"^^^^

^ho

rnyself to contri-

buir?o'?he^'w^lL°J|r'lulL'
^"^^^ver little my assistance
may

be worth.

^^-^^ never desire to live
as
f t
were -^.u*
the son of another land;
I will live as
^ ^^11 contribute to correclw
^^^'^^"^
^^^^-^
^r'^^^
M^oth^^L^d^!
u,«v,

i

cultug-oJ

S\=3^^^^S^L

^^^^^ ^^^^ beautiful
Tand irfhTh'^r'^
land
which I was^^S^
born is, so beloved so
' "^^^ take'clre that
like mvs^ef^
themselves to make of
the iS^nfi?'
^^^^^^ ^P^^"'
Creates? the most
greatest,
^^^T'
beautiful, the best of thp
countries of the world. 38

m

^T'

'

5

38

-Ibid

.

pp. 268-269.
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m

have already
^^^n in c-nmo
J seen
some n-r
of +v,^
the passa^^es quoted the
use Of the Phrase, "..other
Spain." The conceptual
origin of
this Phrase is the already
familiar family analogy seen
so
inany times throughout
these chapters on
V/e

the textbooks. And it
is this authoritarian family
analogy which explains the
intensity

or stridency of the -official"
view of patriotism. We have
already seen the attempt to link
notions of authority and
Obedience as exercised in the
model, authoritarian family to
analogous concepts of State power.
Kow the final loop in the
chain is closed as nationality,
the condition

of oeing Spanish,

is tied to support for the
regime.

With this final conceptionll

definition, opposition to Franco was
seen in the "official" view
and, as we shall see in the next
chapter, even
in the opposi-

tions view of itself as:

anti-God, anti-family, anti-re

and, ultimately, anti-Spain.

Let us turn, then, to the exposition of
the family

analogy as applied to patriotism:
All men are born members of a family
which they ought to respect and honor; which
they ought to love with all their might
because all that they are is due to it. Well
just as man has a family formed by his parents
and brothers and sisters, he has another great
family
which all Spaniards take part; one
must respect this great family just as that
other smaller one. That great family formed
by all Spaniards is that which we call Spain.
Spain is the Mother of this great family.
Spain is our Mother and we owe respect, help
and veneration to her just as to the mother of
each one of us.^"

m

39 Manuel

Alvarez Lastra y Eleuterio de Orte Martinez,
Formacjon del Espiritu Nacional (Madrid: Editorial Nos, 1955),

pp. 11-12.
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The connection between
patriotism and the family analogy
IS made clear in the
following passage.

familv?%f ^^^r^^"^ ...

is the enlarged

^i^^^^

^om^^t^{he^:;it?^r:i
a moral person who
has eSucatedr?ed and protected us and whom, therefore,
^e love likP
a mother; public things
^amgs are
kl the national
arp Ixke
1
patrimony.
that Datriotism is
hn+ the^^^^^^^^.^^'^erstands
extension and amplification of
familv
^
affections and that indeed one
can sav that
^^^^^^ love'f^r'onese±i and
self
fnd that
t'L^t'^'^r^"'
which one has for his chUdren
parents, relatives and friends. ^0

Not surprisingly, the family
analogy is used to define
the kind of loyalty which
Spaniards owe to the motherland.
V/hich of us would tolerate
anyone insulting our mother, damaging our
house or ou^
things.''
am sure that no one would be
capable
of allowing It; well then, if
Spain is our
Motner we cannot tolerate anyone
insulting her,
lacking in respect for those who
represent
her
or damaging capriciously things
which are hers.-^l

The notion of respecting the
representatives of Mother
Spain is, of course, the key issue to be
kept in mind.
For it
must be remembered that in the "official"
view all that is

Spain was represented by Francoist political
authority and even
personified in Franco himself. This Chapter concludes,
then,

with the patriotic words of and about an
important part of

"official" Spain, the Falange.

Ibid.
^1

.

p. 15.

.

p.

.

Ibid.

13.
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received a^honor tn fo^
^"^^^ ^^^^^
^^^^
cadets...! The voiL^?
^^^'^^^^ of
ought to be a modern?
^^^nt
duct. ConstantlC th? i?""^^^^ '"'"^ private condeeds wilTS^L'^J^^^^^^^^^^
S?h\'/^'"%^^^
greater service to the Motherland
?hl Falange,
and
v f
tion of the Natiom? Lf.
incarna5^
the Youth Front wni t^^^^^"!^^- The militant of
^i^^i^guish himself
by his spirK Of sibor.nn
happiness in
the fulfillment ol^riT^^^^^
to him. Nevef
^"^^^^^
commanders
are his friends wUl\%lSnrtha?'?h"'
and rL^^^
ested in makin' him f Sf i??';.?''''"^^^^^^ i^^^^^"
oraers and regulations.
but that thev are ?hp
charged by the
Caudillo with rlt^l.L J^''''^^
"'^^ ""^^^ necessary
for
the fulfillmpnr^?^ J:^"""
Postulates of the Glorious
Movement
In L^^^ moment the
conduct of the
;^XTV? +
i
^°^^\Front
will
be exempS?y;
but in^a'soeof ?
^^^^ '^'^^^
is
dressed
i""^
in
^.rl^
folm
lorm.
Every
Spaniard is obli^-ed to proceed uniin
an exemplary way with a
spirit of self-denial in
the^ effort reliLed by the
??ooD. of""'
i;rancoj but if
.

^

besides he belongs to
?
^h^Y^^^""
Front, ^his conduct ought to
be insup^^hi
erable,
sacrificial and if

necessary he?oic!^?

^

Our Lord and our God,

Jose Antonio is with you;
we wish to gain here
the difficult and erect Spain
which he aspired.
The Caudillo guides us.
Lord
protect his life
and inspire our efforts,
until we fulfill
this supreme watchword
Through the Empire to You. ^3

Why do we want to be useful men? What
goal does our life have, Spaniards?
purpose the vigilance of the rulers? For what
what
purpose the Youth Front? In order to For
lift up
bpam. All this is contained in our cry.
42
p.

782.

^3

Enciclopedia Escolar (iMadrid:
Frente de Juventudes, For mac ion

Afrodisio Aguado,

,

p.

II,

l^),
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every 'In^PrpS"?
cIudillS!55

^^^'^^^ ""^^ °°<5
'

^""^

^^"^^y -"S"

the

We end this Chapter on the
Images of the Citizen with
the call Of "Official" Spain
to support for the Caudillo.
Hop e

fully it is apparent by now that
this call was not just emotional exuberance but part of a
strategy to obtain, or coerce,
the loyalty of the Spanish citizen.
In these Chapters

we have

looked at "official" Spain and seen
an "official" view of
reality. Now we turn to the everyday
reality of Franco Spain
and the pattern of social control with
which it was interwoven
and of which the Images of the State,
the Individual and the
Citizen form one part.

Ibid,

,

p.

32.
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CHAPTER

VI

A STRATEGY OF SOCIAL
CONTKOL
This chapter sets forth
the nature of the
elaborate
ana effective app.ratu.
of social control
evolved
Prancolst
•political authority to
maintain dictatorial rule.
Fro„ a^ong
".any areas or topics
that could have been
discussed, those
have been selected for
discussion here which relate
directly
to the i^a^^es Of the
textbooks or follow logically
fro™ the

analysis of the texts.

The role of political
socialization

In this apparatus of
control can be seen in two
general areas,
one. the .ore formal,
is that which we have
looked at empirically in the last three
chapters, the "official" images
of the
State, the Individual and
the Citizen conveyed in
children's
textbooi^s.
The other is the informal
area of the everyday ongoing life Of Spaniards and
the subtle but effective
influence
"official" Spain had on it.

These two areas were not really
separate but interwoven
so that ,,hat -Official- Spain
wanted or approved
of in the

texts was enforced or encouraged
in everyday life. This is not
to say that Spanish reality exactly
mirrored the ideal images
of the texts—Spain was not such
a depressing place.
But in
aiecuBsinc an apparatus of social control
one is talking about
Ideology in practice, about an attempt
to make one version of
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reality the dominant
one with wH^.k
^^^^
.
^
contend.
For better
bf»t+or» ^«
textbooks and which

'""St

compete and
or „or.e. the
ideology ^xi.pseau in
the
tne
&

1,

.

ne .or Spa.n.

xt .as not
necessarily the version
or reality
in Which all or
even a ..ority o.
Spaniards Relieved hut

U

was the one which
pervaded their political
culture and surrounded their everyday
life
For all
on those who had
y ay lire.
a choice
and chose to remain
in Spain, this
\^.nir.
.
^^^^ ideology
^
is
'
the one with
^
Which all analysis or
criticism must begin.^

Mechanisms of Social Control
The raochanismg for
-ujT maintm'ni
r,rr
+u
maintaining
the apparatus of social
control may be divided
into four i>ecT;ions,
sections
In .each section
will be found examples
of -official"
^^.o^v.!
uiiiciai Spain's
carrot-stick
approach to social control,
ideas, theories, laws,
practices
and customs are used to
elicit compliance while
coercion always
re,nains in the background
to enforce it if necessary,

m

,

gelgotive Hlstoriral A^-i-rirr

A point made several times in
the chapters on the textbooks was that "official"
Spain relied heavily on history
as
-proof" Of the validity and
appropriateness of the current

the dominant^ideolSrL^'Jhe on^' H^^ tautological situation.
Of the soSety must^Lpin blcaSse"it
J-i^
if the dTl
IS
°°"?^?r^'^°"
dominant
ideoloe-v.
For -rPTcinna
^ «u
..i-t^^Z
""^"'^i"'"
j.ax/.x,y buocessiui In
lpairL'rbeen"airi"succlssful"1„'?oJcln
jorcinxr ^Jh^^**^?'
the above-^rround
onnrlCl^ + ^/^« -1-^
T.>xi.

16^

-.i.e.

.Ms

historical' analysis Is
.elective. cHoosln, t.ose
elements or Spanish Mstor.
„.lch support the regime's
claLa
and ignoring or rejecting
counter-trends.
This is perhaps »ost
clearly seen in the texts'
treatment
Of the concepts of
^
^^^.^^ .^^^^^^^
the concept of
^3 .isslon-the universal
role which Spain
has been destined to play
i„ the world.
This mission is not a
-torial but a spiritual one.
for Spain is to carry the
eternal
values Of Roman Catholicism
to the world.

^
£^

It would be difficult,
of courae,
ui
courso to
i-f.
-rt
^
find
any interpre-

tation Of Spanish history
which did not assign importance
to
Catholicism and the imperial era.
But what "official' Spain
has done is to make these
elements the essence of the
Motherland and to designate adherence
to them as the measure of
patriotism. Thus, if one is not
a Catholic or. indeed, an
anti-catholic, one is out of step
with what is held to
be a

basic value of the nation.

Those who fail to hold the textbooks'

definition of patriotism are in the
"official" view true her-'
etios who have rejected an article

of faith in the religion of

being Spanish.
The designation of dissent as a kind
of heresy is an
important step for political authority to
take in justifying

repression— in Spain or elsewhere.

In the Spanish case this

can be seen in the use of the phrase
-well-born Spaniard" which
the student of Spain encounters in numerous
speeches by poli-

tical authority and even in the vocabulary of
the ordinary
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Spaniard.

It usually appears as
the last word on what is
really a debatable point.
Thus the latest "organic
law- of
the government will be
proclaimed as the best possible
solution
to the nation's problems
with which any -well-born
Spaniardwould agree. There are those,
of course, who do not agree
but
they are not -well-born.- not
real Spaniards, not the
Keepers
Of the faith.

Perhaps the non-Spaniard can
see the importance of
this "official" monopoly of the
concept of patriotism by reference to recent history of the
United States. It was during my
year in Spain (1972-73) that then
Vice-President Spiro Agnew
delivered a series of speeches in
which he tried to establish
support for the Vietnam War and especially
the policy of Vietnamization as the criterion of patriotism.
Those who could not
support Washington's conduct of the war
were no longer merely
dissenters from a government policy but
unpatriotic. unAmerican.
If Agnew 's campaign for unity (that is.
conformity) had been
more successful, it would have formed the
intellectual
^

and

emotional basis for the "weeding out of bad apples"
and "the
cutting off of dead wood," which is a common
feature of the

Spanish dictatorship.
What the textbooks depict as the ideal is very often
the common practice of everyday life in Spain.

A Spanish

mission that requires conformity, that can not tolerate heretical dissent, has had its effect on Spanish life.

We can see

in the following passage how strongly the notion of conformity
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m

imbues the culture
i.ure in w»vfl
ways that are not usually
seen as
political.
*

coll

f-^'^ays

lived, for thousands of
vears

have an especially well-developed
se^se of
in Don Juan, or Lazarillo
or
that I am given to scientific La CelestinaT
investigation
^^^^
^
^^is leads
?S donhr^H^'^'.^^^"^
that there exists a Spanish hMn^ me
of
XL fj;"?^"sually
V^ll
described, now and f orevir.
I^d
^ ^^^^
consider myself
^
«
foif^^^
a foreigner
in my own country. 2

It can be seen from this passage
that the notion of a
counter-culture exists in Spain as in
the United States but
that it is at once more difficult
to uphold and more political.

This is because the line between
"any well-born Spaniard- and
"those others" has been drawn more
rigidly and narrowly than
is generally true in the liberal
democracies.

-Being different"

in Franco Spain was not. then, a simple
matter of alternative

life-styles.

It was a profoundly political act and,
there-

fore, at times, a very dangerous act as
well.

Once "official" Spain had demonstrated— to its
satis-

faction-that its definition of la patria was the only true
it had to move on to show how the Franco
regime, the Estado .

2

r\/

de Miguel, Espana. p. I5. emphasis in original.

one,

16?
was the appropriate
expression of this definition.
I„ its atte.pt
to ™ake the new Franco
state see. appropriate,
the regime had
two basic tools
COe^rrlnr^ and
ov.^
coercion
the corporatist ideology
of Xal^
Although the use or force
in Franco Spain was a
developed
and sophisticated tool,
the basic outlines of
its nature
l

are fan,to „,ost Citizens of the
twentieth century and need
not be
examined carefully here.
We should, however, looic
at those
elegants of falan.is. which
are desired to prove its
appropriateness to the -official" version
of Spanish history.

inar

As we saw in the textbook
passafres, one claim of
falansism is that its organic,
corporatist .odel of the State
is "natural- because it is
the expression of the basic
and traditional elements of Spanish society,
the family, the munici^io
and the syndicate or guild.
Because it is supposedly
based on

such eternal verities it is a wholly
Spanish approach to governance which has not been contaminated
by foreign (and hence evil
or unworkable) ideas.

Another aspect of falangism which makes
it appropriate
is its emphasis on harmony. Falangism
acknowledges

the potential

for but not the inevitability of
class conflict in capitalist
society and seeks to mitigate it. Rather
than one class gaining
victory over others, all classes are to
function
as part of a

harmonious whole, each in its place.

The benefits of such

harmony to Spain's mission are obvious.
Falangism is itself an ideology of rejection? rejection
'Of

the foreign, evil "-isms" such as liberalism, socialism or

anarchism which had invaded Spain to her detriment.

Thus,

falangism and the Francoist regime were by definition appro-

168

Priate to the true Spain's
true needs because it
had heen born
as a native, natural,
organic response to the
plague of
inappropriate f oreign-based
politics which had been visited
upon Spain in her recent
past.
One of the strongest
supports of falangism to the
claims of appropriateness by
the regi.e was what was
referred
to earlier as political
alchemy. The regime contained
within
itself the mechanism for
constantly assuring its appropriateness because it was not a
government of mere laws and constitutions but the ever-evolving
expression of a "unanimous
spirit." It was a regime constantly
perfecting itself, making
itself more and more one with the
noblest goals of every
-well-born" Spaniard. Its political
alchemy would surely-

sooner or later-turn even its basest
elements into gold.
These aspects of falangism seem to
have been of great
service to the Franco regime in supporting

its claims to appro-

priateness.

In later sections, falangist "contributions"
to

the stability of the regime will be examined.

Next we turn from

interpretations of Spanish history to an interpretation
of the
effects of Spanish history on the contemporary
Spaniard*
the

myth of incapacity.
The "Mvth o f IncapacitY

**

A "myth of incapacity"— the notion the Spaniards are for
some reason unable to function as responsible, active partici-

pants in the political process— has been referred to at earlier
points.

This section begins with an example of the "myth of
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incapacity" in action.

Salvador Panikeri What is the Spanish
form
of experiencing (vivir) democracy?

Alberto Ullastrest A North American who
spent
some time amon,^ us, once said to me»
"In North
America we feel as if we belong to a great
Statei
but we are not sure if we form a nation.
You
opaniards do not feel yourselves to be a State;
nor a nation. You are like a Big Family."
That seemed to me a wise observation. We deal
^4":? ;things

with them.

m

the same spirit as a family deals

S.P.: Spain conceived as a family leads to
paternalism,
A.U.J

No.

S.P.J

It leads to the authoritarianism of the

Pater Familias

.

A.U.:
No, I am not saying that we Spaniards
live politics in a paternalistic or family
sense. I am saying that our social order, the
way we understand ourselves pertains more to a
family experience ( vivencia de familia than
to a state of law governed by pure rational
ideas. We Spaniards are v,'hat I call a poster iori democrats we value political power more
in order to throw out a ruler who governs badly
than to name a new one.
)

t

S.P.t

Are you sure?

A.U.i We Spaniards do not feel (sentir) the
law, we do not feel ideas
we feel man, we feel
life.
If we want to establish our own democracy
with possibilities of surviving we ought to do
it upon real bases, one hundred per cent Spanish.
To desire now to pull 10 political parties out of
the hat, without any ties, seems to me filled
with problems.
»

^Salvador Paniker, Conversaciones en Madrid ( Barcelona
Kalros, 1969)» pp. 30-31, Paniker is one of Spain's young, liberal, "roving intellectuals"; Alberto Ullastres was Spain's repre
sentative to the Common Market at the time of the interview and
considered among the more liberal Ministers with a modern, European outlook.
1
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This rather long quotation
points out several important
realities of Spanish political
life and serves as a good
transition.
Paniker, whose politics
might be described as of
the moderate opposition, tries
to pin down Ullastres. a
member
of •'official" Spain, to a
quite remarkable definition
of

"democracy.-

As seen in the texts, Ullastres
is talking about
"organic democracy'' which most
certainly is paternalistic and

authoritarian (whatever other "redeeming
virtues" it may have)
as Paniker observes. However,
Paniker's
objections succeed

only in getting Ullastres to deny
the interviewer's interpretation of his remarks and then to expand
in even more authoritarian terms on his original point. All
Paniker can do
is

express an incredulous— but respectful—
"Are you sure?"^
The passage quoted serves as transition
because it is
a prime example of another mechanism of social
control which
I call the "myth of incapacity."
Fortunately for the human
race, no socialization process yet devised has been
perfectly

able to transmit the "official" values of a society.

In Spain

as well, there have always existed those who "break faith"

with established values and promote "non-organic" politics.
To combat this tendency it was in the regime's interest to

This denial and subsequent confirmation is but one
example of the public style of many of Spain's officials. The
deceptions and "misstatements" of the Nixon-Zeigler era in the
U.S. are far surpassed by everyday Spanish practice. This
"yes-but" approach extends to laws and documents as well. For
example, article 12 of the Fuero de los Espanbles (Bill of
Rights) provides that "Every Spaniard may express his ideas
freely provided they do not attack the fundamental principles
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maintain a climate of opinion
that Spaniards were incapable
of
functioning in "non-organic"
democracy, particularly the
Liberal
democracy of the West.
As with other mechanisms of
social control, the "incapacity myth" operated on several
levels,
the intellectual and
pragmatic, the moral and
psychological.
It served the regime
as a rationalization for
repression of "non~organic, " unSpanish
dissidents or. to the degree that
the -myth" was accepted
by

the opposition themselves, it
narrowed the alternatives to the
regime which can be imagined by and
offered to the Spanish

people.
One unsvspected and perhaps unwitting
ally of the

"incapacity myth" was the perennial debate in
Spain over the
substance of the Spanish "character." Books
such as DiazIjOS-Esj^anoles v los siete nen^r^os capit.-^lPf.

(

The

Smninh

a nd the Seven Deadly Sin^ )^ have gone
through many editions;

Triunfo, a weekly magazine of Spain's "divine left,"
devotes
a special issue to national character and "Los
Espanoles"?^ and

one of the most important intellectual works of recent
years

of the State." School teachers in Spain may use any textbook
for their classes that they wish
provided it is on the
approved list of texts.
,

.

,

Fernando Diaz-Plaja, El Espanol v los siete pec^do.7
(Madrid
Alianza, 1972, fifteenth printing).

^?apij;B_lei^,

1

^"Los Espanoles," Triunfo
extra edition.

.

532 (December 9, 1972),
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has been La^n Entral.o
then,e of these

.,^.,£^1,.,,,^^^^

worKs-of which

the „ew3- .urin,

I

^ ^^^^^^^

have mentioned onl, a
few

n„

,ea. i„ Spain^-is the
supposed aecadence
or Spain and/or Spaniards.
The critioia. is biting
and sarcastic, at ti.es tinged
with hu^or and apparently
very ineffective because what was
said of Spaniards nearly
two hundred years
ago could be and is
repeated by today's critics.?
.ay be
that Spaniards have not
been sufficiently jolted
by their i.age
Of themselves to change
or. ™ore likely, it
is that this
eternal la.ent is not an
adequate approach to a people's
^
history.

u

Espasa-telpe? igjj)^"*''^^^"' A-Q.ue

Ll8,m.,nos

Fnp.n^ (Madrid.

character" can be divided
into two'cltegorles^'^'o^e
criticism which ineludes historf and ^hlinL^:^,
year 1898 an7the reasons fo? t^f f^f'"-}^^" primarily around the
I" ^his
^'"P^5=category one raSht mtn?ion ?aJv»+V
'^-^^^^^^^
Ortega
y Galset's KsMnrTnv?;tXS^= ?
or Sanche.-AiSi^f

ggif^:^["°

Lsifo?

TrluSio aireldv

?

the book by Diaz-Plaja and the

?rrih%\§f&ff^r^,-t^^?e%Lti^^
9

^^^^^ ^^^^
concentrate their criticism on
+h«
classes --who are presumed to be ab^e ?o
^now botter^^'whi^^r''
"coday's criticism is of the "averageSpaniard!
it may be that there is a
between qorifli
change and social criticism but not relationship
the desired onef ?he mo?e
''''
vi?ui:nt"(an5'in:?lec?S?nhe'critl'.lf'''
'""'l'"'
contemporary
United
States may be an
^vni^i!
example of fi^^'^'^'^Sthis.
For an analysis of the "historical sterility"

L
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None of these writers of course knowingly
contributed
to a policy of repression by the
government or to perpetuating
a "myth of incapacity." Their intention
was probably
the

opposite.

But. nevertheless, they appeared (to
this outside

observer) to help maintain a -gap- that has
long existed in
Spain between the ruling and/or intellectual
elite and the
masses of the people. The "gap" is one of social
distance
between rulers and ruled that has been bridged in
Spain only

by authoritarian and paternalistic politics.

It is a gap ex-

pressed in Ullastres' conception of "family democracy" at the
beginning of this section it is embodied in the notion of
i

"revolution from above," the only theory of "revolution" that
was "officially" endorsed in Franco Spain? '"^ it is revealed in
the pseudo-reformist ideas of Ortega y Gasset whose belief in
the role of an elite— any elite— in regenerating the nation led

from support for the Second Spanish Republic to opposition and
(by 1933) calls for vague parties-above-parties.
I cannot prove that the "incapacity myth" is just thatt

a myth.

Ideologies are not susceptible to proof.

But, as with

of Spanish self-criticism see P.E. Russell, "The Nessus Shirt
of Spanish History." Bulletin of Hispanic Studies XXXVI (I969) . pp.219225.
Among the fundamental doctrines published by a meeting
of the association of professors of Political Science were
"organic democracy" and "social revolution from above." Informacione^ . February 27, 1973.
12
Woolf, ed,, European Fascism pp. 286-287.
,
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any ideology, one can subject
it to two -tests",
whose interests are served by the ideology?
and what are the implications
of accepting a particular
ideology as true?
By way of "evidence" for the
first -test" let me paraphrase an anecdote by Jose Maria
de Areilza.^^
A French
doctor when questioned about his
progress in a new position as
a village physician replied that
things were going very well
since he was not so interested in
curing people but in creating
a "strong medical conscience" among
them, that is, convincing
the villagers that there were
desperate diseases lying in wait
all around them and that they must
depend solely on him to ward
off these dangers. Similarly, the
"incapacity myth" can be

seen as an attempt by Spain's "political
doctors" to persuade
people that they are "politically ill" and
make them content to
receive the small doses of "curative drugs"
administered by the
regime. Thus, the perpetuation of a belief
that Spaniards are
not possessed of the capacities for self-rule could
only

strengthen the rationalization of the dictatorship as "rule
by the best, not the many."
For the second "test" there exists as "evidence" the

influence of the "incapacity myth" on social science research
in Spain, specifically the relatively new field of survey re-

search pioneered in Spain lyAmando de Miguel and his associates.

13

^

/

y

Jose Maria de Areilza, Cien Articulos (Madrid
Revista
de Occidente, 1971), pp. 168-172"; Areilza is one of Spain's
outstanding political leaders.
»

1?5
As has been its custom for
several years, Infor^ani

op.<^

(a Madrid afternoon paper)
published on February 19, I973 part

Of the results of the latest
ICSA-Gallup poll on politics. The
most striking thing about the results
was not the responses to
questions about defense and armament,
censorship and public
information but rather the lack of response.
The percentages
of those who have "no opinion* ranged
from 32f. of the upper
class to 1-5% of that of the lower class
interviewed. Informaclones summarized that "almost two-thirds
of the Spanish population are on the margin of the public domain
as regards

politics.

The degree of depoliticization affects in
greater

measure women, those over thirty-five and the lowest
socioeconomic strata,"
In fact, the "apathy" of Spaniards as reflected by

opinion

suri'-eys

has a rather consistent history over the years

that survey research has been done.
the most interesting surveys

v/as

For our purposes, one of

the first attempt at voting

return projections made by DATA, S.A. for the I966 municipal
elections in Madrid and which were reported in the since pro-

scribed evening paper, Madrid (November 25, I966).

A survey

done by the DATA team before the election predicted a turn-out
of about

while the actual number of those who voted turned
out to be closer to 30^, 14 An important finding of the survey

V,

i>k

IQiio

Amando de Miguel, "Los sondeos de opinion," Universitas
(December 28, 1972), p. 68.

176

was the large percentage
of those who professed nn
intention
to vote and yet had no
candidate in n,ind at the ti„,e of
the
interview compared with a smaller
number of those who had a
particular candidate and intended
to vote.
The percentage of
this latter group (those who
had a candidate) corresponded
much more closely to the actual
turn-out and Amando de Miguel,
head Of the DATA research team,
has interpreted this result as
indicating that the lack of information
provided to the Spanish
people in general and especially
in regard to this election
conditioned the turn-out. 15

An interesting objection to this
interpretation was
offered by Jose Vidal Beneyto.^^
Vidal Beneyto offers

two

Objections to the DATA interpretation.

The first deals with

the climate in which public opinion
functioned in Spaini
The public behavior of the Spaniard in
general, but above all of lower-middle and
lower socio-economic positions, is marked
(es-t^ vertebr^do) by an inhibition
conditioned
by Ignorance, by mistrust, and also in some
measure, by fear. From this comes the tendency,
almost mechanical, not to direct falsification
as such, but to a partial concealment? to a
truth that is disguised so that it is known but
not completely exposed. Thirty years of assertions in monochord and in a permanent strident
tone, with dissidence possible only from the
imiriunity of anonymity, have accustomed the
Spaniard to deal with public issues in an
extremely subtle language, in which what is

^%t)id.. p. 68.
"^^Jose Vidal Beneyto, Eleccionea Municipales v Referen dum

(Madrid*

Cuadernos de Ciencia Social. 196^).
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most important is not
what one savs but
°^ "hat

is'^expreLed!!^ '

The second objection is
to the interpretation of
the
response of those voters who
professed an intention to vote
without having any candidate
at all in mind,

category of the
eJlctC^i?e^t°",f,*^^
^"
part

"

and h?^^!
tS vo^P
I?

an ambiguous

^f'^Se

"""^

°^

°^ *heir decifion not
alternatives offered.

toow'wL°%rvni? for! ?f ?

L

a llv th^t

^IS^
specific-

^^^f.""
rather

knows very well who not to vnto
wishes to make it cl ear that
hil
renunciation^of the vote does not
indicate
-^^airs hut exl^??^
l?e

? ?
f-nty and
ilor,

thrS^;S:!t\:f8^^^^1?

the
°Pi"i°"^-

reticence^Sftven'eliie oub?lf ?i ''^'"^^i^ ''^^
Following are IwS of toe^responfefSLr^d''^''^

trative officials and P?ocurado?e'
in IJe s^-nT^^'r"',

^^S^sLr!^"'"^

^"^""i"^"'° '

oiinSir^e'?dS! qSaulSeri?t

^'^"'^

^ politician and would find
it difficult to give some responses
asked X or in the survey, realizing
that
in order to do so, it is necessary
to
be not only interested, but
reallv
involved in politics.

Because of my position as Procurador
in the Corte^., completely free and
not
being subjected to any of the many
groups which, unfortunately, make themselves felt nowadays in the country,
and maintaining exactly this liberty of
opinion for the future, I can not in any
form, make knowTi that which you request
•

•

•

•

-de
18

Ibi^jL.*

p. 24,

Miguel, Espana

.

p. 2^5.

Emphasis in the original.
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It is not necessary here to
explore the arguments
Offered by Vidal Beneyto to
support his contentions nor to come
to any conclusion about which
interpretation (de Miguel's or

Beneyto's) was more correct.

The point to be made is that

these differing views really represent
two value positions.
The first admits that apathy and
ignorance is widespread while
hoping for its eventual diminution through
open public debate
and adequate dissemination of voter
information.
The second

takes a much more positive view of the
"political health" of
the Spaniard in maintaining that, dentro de
lo oue c^bP there
.

existed a public consciousness which was expressed

.

-"-^

Thus,

the "myth of incapacity" and the ideology of
paternalism of

which it is a part, can have a great influence on social
scientists' interpretations of their data.

Although it is not necessary to come to

a

conclusion

about the validity of the "incapacity myth" it is important to
realize that at least some Spaniards do not confirm the image
contained in the "myth of incapacity,"

Despite the fact that

the Spaniard is socialized from his or her earliest days to

believe him- or herself incapable of responsible action and
that researchers find this Spaniard to be, in general, ignorant

19

It might be mentioned that the contrast between these
two interpretations is not unlike that between American radicals
and pluralists in the field of Political Science over the
existence and/or significance of apathy in the U.S. electorate.
Vidal Beneyto 's argument obviously poses important objections
to the reliability of any attitudinal surveys in Spain,
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and apathetic, outbreaks, of protest, resistance
and organization do occur.
One of the more recent and, perhaps,
significant
of these attempts at organized protest is
the "Workers' Com-

missions."

As described by Jon Amsden, the "Commissions" were

outgrowths of the brief "liberalization" period in Spain
that
extended to the State of Exception and cabinet shuffle
1969."^
of

Encouraged by apparent "liberal" trends in political life,
Spanish workers, including some leaders of the official Syndicates, attempted to organize autonomous representation for

workers outside the government controlled Syndicates.

Amsden

has described the political workings of the Commissions this
way

I

By all reports, internal activities at
each level of the workers' commissions
organizations were characterized by the
strict observance of democratic forms.
Problems were debated and votes taken
despite the difficulties involved (i.e.,
those associated with the problem of
assembling more than about five people in
one place).
Of all the criticisms tha t
have since been made of the workers' com miss ions none include censure of their
internal political quality
Even the
Opus Dei magazine fvlundo World made the
following grudging observations
"The
most curious feature of these workers'
movements is that they appear to be born
headless as it were. From their beginning
the Commissions have involved collective
organization v/hich, when it comes to voting or pronouncing an opinion, each person
counts
This apparent lack of orp:anization
nevertheless, disappears at the moment of
^

.

(

.

20

)

.

Jon Amsden, Collective Bargaining and Class Conflict
in Spajn (London:
London School of Economics and Political
Science, 1972),
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actioni but the
directives behind th»
action can be ascribed
to nobody!.
It might be that
this cadre of committed
militants
an exception to a .yth
that holds true for

is

the "averase"
.et when A.sden,
instead of surveying workers,
listened to and Observed
the. in their dealings
with .anage.ent
in Spain-s informal
equivalent to collective
bargaining (the
^lii^Mo^EffiEresa), he ca.e away with
the following view of
the "incapacity myth^i

worker,

The worker^' delegates
on the whole
-i^^ ^^eir
lobs althoL'^-i^^^' \°
obviously not instantaneousiv ?hf5
aneously
that -fL"^"
they acquired the skills
interpretation of the conTrllT'^V: remarkable,
however, that
wf??h
with
reasonably brief period they had
^^ili^' especially
JnT.
middle-aged men who for the
mosfn.r^^rr^
^^ceived little formal educa^
tion
tI
'^^^^"'^ ^^^^^ performance
rn^nl^-ho^^
negated the often heard remark
oH^nv5^^^^^".^^^ employers and even syndicate officials to the effect
that
workmen are unequipped to representSpanish
thom"
PPca fo rm.acion"
?^^K^^S''"^^°^^"^^^i^
^Slight education) and " poca cultura":"^^

ma

This quotation, while significant,
could easily be
followed by quotes from other anthropological
and sociological
works on Spain which would lead to
different conclusions about
the validity of the "incapacity myth."
My own experience
in

Spain and with "objective" social science has
led me to conclude
21

IMdj., p. 100.
Note that participatory democracy is
seen as a lack of organization by Opus Dei opinion.
22

Ibid.

.

p.

12?.
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that social science is not
now equipped with the tools
to
answer such important
questions about morality,
politics and
hu^an nature. What this
discussion of the "^yth of
incapacityhas tried to show is that
there exists •evidence" for
a rejection Of and a belief in
the ".yth." Given this dilemma,
it
seems to rae that "npnti-ai
neutralso«' or 4.u
those who support progressive
forces in Spain must suspend
judgment about the "myth"
or

i:'eject

For to accept the "myth of
incapacity"
support a powerful mechanism of
social control,
it.

is to

one which puts
the very minds of Spaniards
in a political prison.

Social Pessimism
It was mentioned earlier,

in the Chapter on the Images

of the Individual, that social
pessimism (distrust of others)
is a powerful inhibitor of organized
threats to the status quo.

Functioning in this way it is part of the
"incapacity myth."
"Official" Spain hoped that Spaniards, or
at least those

who

sought to lead them in opposition to the Franco
regime, would
despair of the capacity of Spaniards to take control

of their

lives into their own hands.

Social pessimism reinforced this

despair by supposing that the politics of social change
was a
pure Hobbesian world where each individual could only be concerned with his own safety and where any social interaction was
a true zero-sura game.

As Samuel P. Huntington has commented,

-Mutual distrust and truncated loyalties mean little organiza-

tion."^^
23

Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Chanprinpr Soci eties (New Haveni Yale University Press, I968), p. 3I.
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A„ ex-Falan,ist. „o„
powerful critic of the
re.i^e. nas
observea the effects of
official!, encourage,
divisions on

Spanish societyi

civil war conf?^^?* ^u? ^""luered of the
aild its p^elg Sve d^?,r'"''' ^'^^ Government
'y encouragement and
Z in 7 wM^h twi
as th{ Serge^c^
'^^"ic:! gtjnce
of'fh^'f
01
the dreadful repronni nrr
/^-p
'"^'^ ^"^^ have^been
^"^-'^
obdu?a?rin ''««Pi"(r account
of the horrorq
T
,

^

•

•

:r.\V:^^ha^5ln?e!?^^^ 3u.3e2tiv^:^^t\L\us
^^^^^^ies. but behind
^h'\"
^^^^eavy and indissolvable
fact tha? ?n ?hn
^^^y interior of the passivelv
in^J^ 2?
effectively opposed groSps? Is
wen as
well
Is in ^h'
the heart of the groups that
have a
co^peraUof
Ind'
sondarUv^Irf';
alarming weakness today.
Ind
??
t!^
t
Ji'^^
And It IS certain that only
that
sible can be made to happen and which is posinto action of the communitarian the putUnf
conscience in
^^"^^^ ^^^^'^ meaning when
It'can'nnt'T referred
I'''
to concrete action and
^Ln^o+
i-^^
demonstration.
And whether we speak of an
intellectual group, of a guild of workers
or
ol a municipal community,
feeling oneself
united means feeling united for
somethinr under
conditions of autonomy and activity and never
conditions of passivity and mediation. 24

thefrLaLntL'f

^

m

The foundation of social pessimism in the
Catholic view
of human nature tends to discourage
collective action as well.
As we saw in the anecdote of the old man and
the idlers (Ch. V,
13^-35)

»

personal.

the Catholic view of social reform has often
been

That is, social evils are seen as the product of

Ridru^o, Escrito en Espana

.

p. 138.
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evil .en ana t.e resuXt
of e.U Hu^an nature.
T.e rectineati
Of societrs faults
lies i„ the salvation
of each inaiviaual
Better »en ™a.e a better
society-not the reverse.
This
Ls v
View
Of social Change has
served the Church well i„
allowing it
to coexist with a variety
of political regi.es
without (in its
view) .oral contraaictions,
since the social syste.
is of little
importance in the Church's
wor. of inaiviaual salvation,
the
Church neea be little
concerned with changes in
that social
syste. (unless they threaten
the well-being or existence
of the
Church, of course). However,
the concentration of the
Church on
the individual has tendea
to blina it to the importance
of

larger social structures such
as class.
has become involved in

Thus, when the Church

organisational efforts, such as
Catholic
labor unions, their organizations
have been ineffectual and/or
dominated by traditional sources
of political power.^S
r^e

Church then while having some
positive views of humankind,
particularly in the concept of free will,
contributes overall
to a strengthening of social pessimism
in its description of
human nature as concupiscent and its
notion

that social improve-

ment can come only through individual
betterment.
Sex and Social

Conl^ i-n-|

The chapter on the Images of the Individual
demonstrated
that the textbooks have very strong opinions
on the subjects of
25

examination of this process see Howard J. Wiarda,
Ihe
Catholic Labor Movement (Amherst, Mass.i Labor
Relations and Research Center, I969),
1.^0

^1?
D
Brazilian

human nature, sex ana
and momn+xr
morality.
and strict codes
aea of
Ror>i«i
oi social

o.

Extreme notions of urbanity
t:'

and personal conduct were
examples
Of ways in which the
natural vitality and
activeness of the
Child were discouraged.
The connections between
these images
Of the individual and
politics can be seen by
reference to two
aspects Of Spanish society
which are intimately linked
to the
apparatus of social control,
the interrelated concepts
of
honor and shame and the political
culture of machismo.

Mnor^n±^hsMe.

The concepts of honor and
shame have
for some time been recognised
as important and distinctive
features of Mediterranean societies.
Most authors have
explained the preoccupation with
individual and family honor
as features of "small scale,
exclusive societies where face-toface personal as opposed to anonymous
relations are of paramount
importance. "^^Recently, these approaches
to the concepts of honor
and shame have been criticized for
their failure to fully

acknowledge the way in which the concepts
differentially
interact with social classes and groups,
thus reinforcing
their importance as mechanisms of social
control.

"I would

then suggest that the distinctive characteristic
of these communities /marked by concepts of honor and shame/
is not their

size or the lack of anonymity of interpersonal
relations.
What appears to be important is the manner of
status determination directly linked to the nature of the social

structure."^''

26

J.G. Peris tiany, Honour and Shame
The Values of Medi terrane^p SocletY (Chicagoi
University of Chicago Press, 1966)^.11,
27 Verena
/
Martinez-Alier, M arriage. Class and Colour in 19 th
CgPti^ry Cviba (London»
Cambridge University Press, 19?-^^), p. 123
1
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For example, in nineteenth-century
Cuba. -The explanation for
the system of stratification
obtaining Must be 'sought in
its
economic base characterized
by a highly unequal
distribution
Of the means of production.
This unequal distribution of
resources was preserved by an
emphasis on heredity, with regard
both to property as well as
to status, coupled with a
class

endogamous marriage pattern, "^^

These elements of honor and shame
linked to status
determination and social structure
can be seen

as operating in

Franco Fpain as well.

The maintenance of honor and
the avoid-

ance of shame and of being
designated as sin ver^upn.. (without
shame) act as powerful restraints
upon the behavior of Spaniards.
As the American anthropologist,
Aceves. has observed (speaking
only on the village level)
The major agency of social control is
not
the law, but that seemingly omnipresent
group known as "they," In Spain, it is
phrased as que diran?— -What will they
say?" While many people say that they do
not concern themselves with what the public
will say or think, nevertheless they do
because a dishonored person cannot expect
to live a good life in the village. 29

Of course, the Franco regime did not invent the
concepts
of honor and shame.

It is rather, as in its selective histori-

cal analysis, that tn? rggj-me used a preexisting phenomenon for

ov^ purpogeg.
^

As Aceves again comments, "Both honor and

^Ibid.. p. 123.

29

Joseph Aceves, Social Change in a Spanish Village
(Cambridge, Mass.i Schenkman, 1971), p. 65.
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shame are intimately
link^^ w-^u
^'^^ ^^^^^
morality which ar
,
n
are
legitimized
by both sacred
(i
e
U.e.,
ch.
°
Church) and secular
norms as
n
to ^-v,
the nature of
propriety in behavior. "30
values Which
men constitute
constit.t proper
behavior are all tho..
i^hose seen In
*i
.

.

s

.3.

^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^^

o^xolal" an. thus .aae
support .0.

..o^x^r iaentical „Un
.support for the regime
on a national level
-levei.
To the .degree that
it was able to
It
establish the validity of t.h(= ithis link .between itself and a certain
version of morality the
regime had available
t e traditional
„echanis™ of social
control described by
.oeves.
Given the encouragement
of the state and its
control over local
leadership-the priest, the
.ayor. the teachers,
the ever-

"

P-sent m^^rdia^-spaniards

,

could in a very real sense
be

the instruments of their
own repression.
Public opinion and
social pressure would be
the major enforcers of
conformity and
the status <iuo while state
authority and more blatant
instruments Of repression remained
for those who were

sin^vergi^.

aa^^ESlltical^lture Of

Waohi-^mo.

Elsewhere 1 have
tried to give an account of
Spanish machismo as seen by males
and females at different
positions in the social hierarchy
and
Of my own involvement with and
reaction to
31
a machist.^ culture.

TWO of the individuals described
in that piece can serve to
illustrate the nature of Spanish machismo
as well as giving
30

-Ibid.

.

p.

65,

31

Richard Nuccio, "On Being Male in Spaini
^
Culture of A-achisino " (raimeo).
.

The
me i^oiixical
Political

18?
one example of the
possible class dif^
differentiated manifesta^
t^n.o
tions of a machisia
ethic.

Pepe was a waiter
in a local
(combination
bar, restaurant and
pastry shop) f.e.uented
by my wife and 1
when we first arrived in q,.
'"'""^ ''"'^ fascinated
Dy the .two americnnncj ut^« «
-^ricanoa Who speak some
Castilian and seen, inter-tea in Hi™, he so.eti.es
-resets" to add the second
round on
our hxu and always
Keeps us supplied
with peanuts or
He works si.ty to eighty
hours a week and takes
.rench and
History courses in a
private acade.y to "keep
an open .ind."
we talk about .any
things to the extent
of our ability to

...^

^

'

States really like7

Pepe is a.a.ed that two
people so youn. as
we could already be married
c;r,„!
married.
Tn Spam
0In
marriage is for those in
their late twenties. There
are cultural reasons for
this but
the main reason is economic,
two cannot live as cheaply
as one
when one can barely live.

Pepe has a novia (literally,
an engaged woman but in
modern Spain it designates a
serious relationship meant to
lead
to marriage in a distant
future), yet he talks of other
women
in his life.
"Tonight I have a date with a
fantastic
chick."

Pepe amplifies the adjective
"fantastic" with a smile and a
rolling of his eyes which are in
turn elaborated by the rising
and falling of his eloquent
Spanish arms in movements that
eraphically describe his date's most
appealing features.
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"But, don't you have a novia ?** I ask,
"Yes, of course.

"And you date other girls, too?
believe in being faithful?"

Don't you

"Oh, you must understand, this is Spain.
Being faithful is for the women, not for the
man .

Despite mass attitudes, of which Pope's is just one
-example, women's liberation is a "pop" topic of discussion in

Spanish intellectual circles.

Partly, this concern is a pre-

dictable by-product of Spain's emasculated intellectual elite's

preoccupation with all that is foreign.

And Spanish women are

entering the labor force in geometrically increasing numbers.
But the real explanation is a familiar page from the history
of women's liberation in the industrialized national

at a

certain point, men find the idea of female liberation profoundly
erotic.

Gentleman is the untranslated title of a new Spanish
magazine.

For Spain it is quite a production, its layout and

appearance part Esquire

,

part Plavbov

«

The first issue features

a cover story and three articles on women's liberation a la

espanola

.

All the articles are v/ritten by men, there are no

women contributors to the issue (unless you count the bikiniclad ones) and all the editors

are

male.

A friend, probably

the most well-known social scientist in Spain, is the author

of one of the articles and sees no contradictions in men writing

about women.
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"Women's liberation
n is
IS aft^r^
on hum^n
k
after all
liberation. This
is the same argument
given bv
gj-ven
Dy th«
the ki
blacks
your country
Whites can't understand
the Blao. experience.We .ust not
allow this to happen with
an issue as important
as women's
liberation,

m
•

women?"

-Then, you don't feel
threatened by the liberation
of

"Threatened?

ways?

Free womr.r>
rree
-pv.^^ i
women, free
love, more often, more
How can this be threatening?-

Fernando Diaz-Plaja has
captured the essence of the
traditional Spanish macho in
this humorous and evocative
passage
^^^^^-^-^^^E^ish^^

The sight of a woman more
coquettish or
podScIs
happiness
and'iJrtt\1io^"^ ^ Spaniard.
He
pursues
her wTth h
^^^^
^^i^h
^is
^^^^
steps
^i?
alternating
iLoDoff^
.T'-^^'-"^"
(a Spanish
^2£0£2§.
institution wherein a
male describes-outloud-the
virtues of a
particular lady and what use he
of them given the chance) with would maL
curses on her
^^^^
^^'^ Spaniard hal
^^^"^^
e^ffh^'^^P;
established once and for all the maximum
amount of skin that can be revealed
to his
eyes.
9nly one centimeter more seems to
insulting provocation, a practical
^nL^""
joke, a challenge. With the
facility he has
eyerythin^g in his own terms,
hi
he ^np!^;?^'''^^"?
doesn't see
this exliibition a
custom but an intention to humiliate foreign
him.
•

m

This same logic— Spanish women show
what they
£^£ht_to and no more— astounds Spaniards wh"in
they see drawings and photos from Paris.
How
IS It possible that all this can be
shown without people assaulting the stage? What's wrong
with the French? Aren't they men or what?
It^s useless to explain that there exists in
this neighboring country the same proportion
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between Custom and Desire that

p;ave lov to onr
'^^y
^^^^^^
^o^i'^t^rr^'/^r
For the Spaniard who lives in ^^^^^ o^'^an ankL
the perDetual
present, this isn't reasonabL!
their minds they prefer to believeIn the back of
tha? the
^^'^^
population
growth,
aren't
l.^'l^'^U^"'
^^'^ ^^^^ ^^'y donU ha?e'
the%ame\ro;d:"3r

From a restricted, exaggerated view
of the woman, the
line of thought does logically lead
to an equally

exaggerated

view of the male.

In Spanish society, the concept of
manhood

is a fragile entity not easily
maintained.

There is a proper,

"manly" way of performing nearly every
function from lighting
a cigarette to emptying the ashtray.
Threats to
this "mascu-

linity" are taken seriously.

Billy Graham's prescription

rapists— castration— was also

the procedure recommended to me

fo:
)r

by some liberal male friends for homosexuals.
The social class aspect of this mechanism of control

emerges from the characterization of Spain as an
authoritarian-

conservative regime dra\vn in the first Chapter.

As a counter-

revolutionary regime, franguismo found many of the traditional
social mores, particularly those of social and sexual relations,
to be suited to its goals of resisting rising lower-class con-

sciousness.

It seems impress ionfetfcally true for Spain, as it

was for r.Iartinez-Alier's study of 19th century Cuba, that the

lower and most disadvantaged classes would embrace these mores
roost tightly. ^5

^

33

^.j^^g^

identifying itself with the most

Diaz-Flaja, Los Espanoles

^-'See

.

Martinez-Alier, IVarria^e

pp. 1^8-l'!^-9,
.

pp. 120-124, for a dis-
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backward aspects of a machista
culture, franauis.o could count
on this most traditional mechanism
of social control to enforce
its own political goals.
As long as
the "gap" existed between

intellectuals and masses that was discussed
in connection with
the incapacity myth (p.l68 of Ch.
VI). there was little danger
in the liberal feminism of Gentlemen
reaching and affecting
our waiter friend, Pepe.
Yet, as in all total systems, this male
one contains

the contradiction that could produce its
inevitable downfall.

The position of the Spanish woman is the rock upon
which Spanish
society has built an authoritarian, repressive structure.
As

in many other societies, the woman has been made
the bearer of

traditional values but here to an unbelievable degree.

The

public/private dichotomy discussed in feminist literature^^
a severe one in Spain.

is

The woman's world, as we have seen in

the texts, is the private world of the family, the home and the

community.

In her private world she is meant to be the guardian

of traditional morality, the prime socializer of each new gen-

eration and the refuge of her husband from the public world of
economic necessity and the contention of powerful social forces.

cussion of her reasoning behind her conclusion that status
hierarchy and control of female sexuality were linked. She
cites Pitt-Rivers, "Honour and Social Status," in Peristiany
(ed.). Honour and Shame p. 49 and C. Lison-Tolosana, Belmonte
de log Caballerost
A Sociological Study of a Spanish Town (Lond on
Oxford University Press, I966), p. S'l, as giving evidence of a
differential evaluation of honor depending on social position
in Spain.
,

See Jean Bethke Elshtaln,

"Moral V/oman and Immoral

Mam
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Pitt-Rivers has,
doscribea this
public-private aiohot
sXi^hti. Ci^erent
te^s-.or the viii
.J
mvestigated

—

"""^

^J

I

There exists, then in +k«
Of the puebli two
prino?^?/''^'-^^^^^ structure
a. different
attaching to
aspect of
?
ciples Of authority
P^inand ^nn\-i^^is associated
with the r
bors. Of people
"^^g^who
pueblo. Eau^i\+Zu Uvrtf-^?'^^^?
? together in the
be the essence of n^f ^i''^?^^
^^^^^^^ to
sanctions orperLnal^on^?^^.^"^^^^^^^
the
gossip, and
slTor'^^\Tslril'e iT^T'''^
A person's
^£^XEmnz3 is wha+ moi.
?.

^^S

S^^H?:

Ind ?heZtriJSp'r"J^^^ ^° *hese
2CS££Uenza as well as th»H J-^.I?^*"'"® °f
neighborly
rSltti^" are
them to Se plrticufi^iv""'""^?''
<=ause
female sex. The^HriL?^^°S"^^<^ "^^^ the
the other Aandf if
°"
part?cul«ri
associated
with the male 4pv
i
I f!?^^"^^
°^
liness is ?hat

^Mch
subjection
of neighborly values iustl?5r^H'^
fo^ ?i ? reoORHized
as necessarv
iol ^ S5
enforcl'IK^rSl°e1^^?fg,^5!3|°"-i

and

Pitt-Rivers- description is
very similar to the
"ideal"
Of male-female relations
depicted in the textbooks
and is the
one to Which "official"
Spain gave its imprimateur.
But because
the woman is the cornerstone
of this value system she
is the
key to its maintenance.
This is why especially
under Franco
and still under his
authoritarian successors she can
never be
allowed the sexual or social
license permitted the Spanish
male
and Why women's liberation
was seen as a real threat to
the

edition'fSLtot- I'nir.'r^iry^r'^^^im^^^

IT^'
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Franco regime.
In the Francoist
system. woMan is the link
that binds
the fonnal and informal
mechanisms of social control.
She is
on the one hand, the
guardian of an "official"
morality with
Which the regime identifies
and which employs the
sanction of
:^^^Mmn^ to help promote conformity.
On the other hand, she
has a central position in
the family which is the
basic social
building block in Spain's
corporatist political structure.
The Spanish woman is then,
quite literally, the future
of Spain
Her political and social
progression is the only certain
guarantee
Of a non-authoritarian
alternative to replace
'

Iraflsukffio.

Corporati gm-Paterngl

ion,

It should be apparent from
a reading of the chapter on

S^in-

p

F'^^^

«=^°^P^ the ComIZist Manifesto
Thf^^^
f
women's
°^
are careiuily
cLefuilf w«;,.h^5\^''?^*^°'*iu''''?^?*''
watched by the authorities. See "iMoteqliberation
from

ppr?2:i7^'

°^ Machismo." Ma. I. r(Oc?ober

Wa),

Another ominous indication of the "official"
view of women's
stories in Spanish newspapers
"^f^^io-^l
Of t^e
of
the .^^irr^
arrest and imprisonment of "abortion rings."
In
exoer"embers Of these "rings" were usually^eAtirely mv
women
.nTLT^
and one suspects that they may, in fact, have
been simple consciousness-raising groups arrested on false but socially
acceptable charges.

19^

the I„a.es of the
State that the theory
of corporatism presented in the texts is
in itseif authoritarian
an. paternaX-tic and hence supportive
of strict social
control. Perhaps
n the ™eaio.al ti^es
fro™ which corporatism
supposedly springs
xne relations between rulf^-r u^^a ^ > ^
^^ler and ruled implied
by corporatism
were self-evidently
eneiicial for
J beneficial
for- all
on concerned.
However, in
20th century Spain, a country
which had had extensive,
practical
experience with all shades
of political organization
from
-

.

anarchism to fascism, a
corporatist order did not
appear to
every Spaniard as the ideal
arrangement.
It was rather maintained hy a judicious
combination of persuasion,
manipulation
and coercion.
Perhaps the most important
"contributions" of corporatism
to an apparatus of social
control were the authoritarian
and
paternalistic relations implied between
State and Citizen by
its theoretical conceptions.
Examples of this can

be seen in
the emphasis of corporatism on
order and hierarchy and the

peculiarly Spanish expression of
"sacerdote del mundo."
should also recall the illustrations
of Ch. in,
p. 88

We

which

diagram the ideal relationship of
authorities and subordinates
with the former ordering and the latter
obeying— all for the
common good. The central message of all
these notions is that

the top knov;s best and the bottom least.

The theme of authoritarianism and paternalism
is continued
as well in the corporatist view of citizenship, its
emphasis on

duties rather than rights and its notion that obedience, knowing
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one's place and Keeping
^^
keeDino- it.
4.u
is the
oorporatist idea of freedom.
consider also the organic
idea of participation.
The
Spanish conception of
participation is expressed by
the phrase
"participar es obedecer," -to
participate is to obey." One
does
not participate as an
individual by voting or doing
political
work but through groups which
are structured and controlled
by
political authority.
Indeed, the use of the word
"participation" is itself
another mechanism of social control.
It is one of a number of
rhetorical expressions which the
government used when it wished
to emphasize the "liberalizing"
tendencies of the regime. The
real meaning of "liberalization" in
the Spanish context can be
seen by examining two recent periods of
"liberalization" which
came almost exactly a decade apart.

The first period begins about I962-63 and
is marked by
the appointment of Manuel Fraga Iribarne
to the Ministry of

Information and Tourism.

It runs, with ups and downs, until

definitely ended by the State of Exception and invocation
of
emergency powers in I969. The second period can be said to
begin with the appointment of Luis Carrero Blanco as President
of the Government in June of 1973.

Two events, the assassina-

tion of Carrero Blanco in December of the same year and the
June, 197^ revolution in Portugal, made this period of "liberal-

ization" much shorter.

Parallels of actors and events between the two periods
are striking.

The post of Vice-President of Government from
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whlcH Crrero Blanco
,oss to .e the rirst
P.esiaent of Covern-nt was create, in the cabinet

s.ume of 1962-63. Pra.a Iribarne, Minister of Inf ormati
miormation and^ mTourism and
symbol of the
young, technocratic face
of th«
the n^^,Cabinet^ during the first
period,
was, in 1975. Ambassador
to England
tv.^
iingiand.
The author of the law
re.ovin^ prior censorship
i„ the 1960.3. he
was in the 1970.3
author of a refonn proposal
rejected by the regime. 37
However, the most important
similarity between the
two periods was the seemingly
contradictory combination of
increased repression with
"official" liberalisation.
A brilliant
student Of the regime. Max
Gallo. has captured the
essence of
"liberalization"!
,

.

This, then, was liberalization!
within the
^^^syim:^_o£_tM_XMzim, which coUI d "t bl
divergences would be
?n?!f
^e'^tai" professional claims
^ii^^}^'^'
allowed. AS Fraga Iribarne
clearly stated!
The government is convinced
that its prlnl
cipieo . . . constitute a sure
and definitive
and fund'a!'
'P^^^^^
mentally Christian.... The
mlJItanTch^i.'??''"''"''^
government will
'"^'^'"^
imply retro'
grlssion?"^'
P^^'^'"^^ opposition,
n!j;^f.^^^^ ^t^^"^^
provided
It was never challenged or
Anyone who sought to go further wouldattacked.
soon
be made to see reason, as in the
past, by
General Camillo Alonso Vega, Minister of
the
Gobernacion (Security), General Martin Alonso
and his army, the fiuMlMa^Civil and the military tribunals. Manuel Fraga Iribarne and
Munoz Grandes (former head of the Blue
Division, Spanish volunteers who fought with
the Nazis, now Vice-President) did not

37
Giniger, "Franco Regime Losing Its Grip on SpanA
iards,"
New York Time.g March 3, 1975, p. 1.
.

.
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the new,

'/'^^

°"

cSementJrJ^^
'^^ ^^^^'^ °f an
authority which
wf+h
„^°"^™?t^ shrewdness
and a seLe of
sooil?
ties, was prena^ert ?i "t Political realicontrolled conce^^lo^ '"^^'^ limited and
Which it cou!nS;r»:."^^^"^^<i^Ptations
<-ouj.a annul
and canalize at will. 38
A decade later the
newp<!t -hk
liberalization" was
described
in si.n
similar .terms

m

Change is freedom

ofpofi??^^

c^^po^?a?ivTaL%1S

"

repressive habit a^ J^ ^""^^?
thSse Who want it mos?.''

"""^

"^j'T

>>r?h°:\^^^^^^^^
"^"^^

thT"Le?ion%^j:'ri'^'^^ ?^ ^-^^ ^-^gi-e
allowed
fSedof'™'"^"^"!?" "^^^

ms

by
°^

is

Of the liberals Ind
l^Kisfr^i!^"'^
have been wedded '?o

tf.'rllLi:'^'''

Thus, the so-called
periods of "liberalization"
were
consistent with the "carrot-stick"
approach to social control
Characteristic of other ™echanis.s.
Calls for "participationwere in the Spanish context
ulti.atu^s to the regi^o-s
opponents.
"Official" Spain will give one
more chance to becon,e one
of
its "adherents ",^° those who
do not avail themselves of
the

38
197'f).

p.%iT^^°'
39

SfiaiilJJndeiiJiaiico (New York.

E.P. Dutton,

Giniger, New York Tlmp «, p. i,

une
mignt also mention the
oTLnrX'llTL'nliZ'l^'

political Ir intelfecCl cImStent.
phrase "canalize" in the Gallo quote
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opportunity

win

risk being designated the
anti-Spain, one of
those social cancers that ™ust
be cut out of the organic
state.
The reality and brutalness of this
stick of repression was not
missed by the Spanish opposition.
For in these two periods of

•liberalizatio„"-periods marked by calls
for "participation"
and "adhesion"-there remains one
last parallel,

the execution

Of an "anarchist** by /rarrote vil

TM^J^HyL as

Political

Met..np ho-r

Throughout this study the preeminence of the
family as
political metaphor has been apparent. As
seen in Chapter II.
there is nearly an "imperialism" of the family
in Spain because
of its monopolistic role in the socialization
process.
And in

the chapters on the Images of the State, the
Individual and the

Citizen the family is repeatedly used as an "ideal-type"
and
metaphor for multiple social and political relations.
Family, religion and the school served, in fact, as

models for the Spanish political order.

hierarchy

J

The supposed need for

subordination, and obedience in the institutions of

the family, the Church and the School were used as rationali-

zations and justifications for the authoritarianism and

above.
"Official" Spain was forever talking about establishing
"cauces (canals or channels) of participation." The phrase is,
again, richly descriptive of the way in which participation was
conceived of by the regime.

Garroting is a form of execution in which an iron collar
is fastened around the condemned 's neck and slowly tightened
until death occurs by strangulation or the crushing of the spinal
coluiim.
Julian Grimau was executed in April of 19^3 after worldwide protests. After similar international pleas for clemency,
Salvador Puig Anticli was executed by garroting on March 2, 1974,
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paternalism of the political
DoH + i^oi order.
Spaniards were viewed
as
political, children wno
who need
n^PH the
+w« guidance
of a father-figure
the £audillo.
Opponents of
^^S^"^^' li^e naughty children,
must be taught the error r»f +v,
'^^""^ °^ ^'^^^^
their own good and.
their .xsdeeds were too
great, would be politically
..disx

•

.

owned

,

Of course, it ™ust be
remembered that it was
actually a
certain kind of family, a
n,,^ of religion
certain kind
^
and a certain
hnd of schooling with which the
regime aligned itself.
Through propaganda, laws
and repression if necessary
the regime
sought to promote that version
of family, religion and
school
Which would provide the
proper context for its
dictatorial rule
and with Which it could
identify, if this identification
were
complete, opposition to the
regime would entail opposition
as
well to the most basic values
and institutions of the
society.
•

Chaos from Order and the Consumer
Society
We cannot leave this Chapter
on social control without
some final qualifying statements.
The first concerns a comparison of the harmonious order of
the textbooks with actual
Spanish politics and the second refers
to the political-economic
context of the apparatus of social
control viewed in the texts.

Social control in Franco Spain was not
so effective that
peace and tranquility did, in fact,
always prevail. Spanish
•reality was then as now marked by
strikes and shutdowns,

protest

and confrontation by workers, students,
priests and others.

And
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some of this "disorder"
raer wac,
was tacitly accepted
by the regime.
How could this be possible?
One answer can be obtained
by reference to the
analagous
area of sexual mores. In
contrast to the virtual
prohibition
Of sex in Spanish textbooks
and catechisms, Spanish
reality is
r^arked by a preoccupation
with the subject. This is
not to say
that workers strike in order
to taste of some forbidden
fruit
but that laws and principles
are in the Spanish context
ideals
held up as goals yet honored
more in the breach than in
practice.
For whatever reason-human
nature, free will, concupisence-order and disorder, prudery
and license were understood by moral and political
authority to be opposite sides of
the same coin.
True threats to the established
order would be
crushed without hesitation but before
this point was reached
there existed an area of understanding
that principle and
practice were not necessarily connected.

Finally, it is important to emphasize
that in concentrating on a Spanish ideology as conveyed
by the textbooks some
of the more material supports of the
regime have been ignored.
Chief among these was the economic "payoff"
of a rising standard
of living which the regime had been able
to provide since the
early 1960»s. In the final chapter there will
be more critical
comments made on Spain's economic "miracle." Here
it is

k2

Hov/ard Wiarda, "Law and Political Development in
Latin
Americai
Toward a Framework for Analysis," The American Journal
.of Qomparative Law. Vol. 19, Summer
1971, pp. 43^-'^63.
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important to note that the drive towards a Western
consumer

society was a major factor in obtaining compliance with
the
regime. The ideas and concepts examined until now formed

the

moral and intellectual justifications for the regime.

It is my

belief that Francoism could not have survived for nearly four
decades without this ideological apparatus and its mechanisms of

social control.

Yet it is probably equally true that at least

since Spain's international reemergence in the 1950's, continued

economic growth was a vital prop of the status quo.
In the final chapter we examine more closely the role

that ideology and economics will play in a future Spain,
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C H A P T E R

POST-FRANCO SPAIN:

VII

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES

FOR AN AUTHORITARIAN-CONSERVATIVE
REGIME

•

In a manner of speakinf^,
an authoritarian
^^^i^%^?i^ts in order to dLITelV^^jV ^^-^cessful, it will turn into
a
?r«H?^;n
traditional1 consei->vative regime as
the old
able "once more to
constitute the legitimacy base and
the
cnannels of communication in the
polity,

We return now to a consideration
of the point at which
this thesis began:
the typology of authoritarian
conservative
regimes.
Our task was to develop a perspective
on the Spanish
regime which could account for its
counterrevolutionary

ideology and which would highlight the various
mechanisms of
social control used to maintain it. It was argued
in those

early Chapters that the prevailing characterization
of Franco
Spain as an authoritarian regime deflected one's attention
from
the regime's origins in a class struggle, the Civil

V/ar,

and

its continuation of that war against rising working
class con-

sciousness by other means.

Although brutal physical repression

was no stranger to the Franco regime, our contention was that
.franquismo remained more than just a naked dictatorship even

after the heady fascist rhetoric of the 19^0 's was discarded.

'"Blondel, Comparing Political Systems

,

p.

22?.

203

In an analysis of
Spanish political education
textbooks we
established the existence
of a coherent and
consistent Prancoist
ideolo,. Which had served
the interests of the
re.i.e by puttin,
elite intellectual critics
on the defensive (Selective
Historical Analysis, Myth of
Incapacity, Corporatism-Paternalism)
and by appropriating
traditional mechanisms of social
control
(Social Pessimism, Sex and
Social Control, Family as
Political
Metaphor) for use against the
mass of the population.
However, as was stressed at
the conclusion of the last
Chapter, this ideological
apparatus of social control functioned
within a particular political
economic context.
This political
economy in my view was itself an
expression of the class nature
of the regime yet, as in the
case of the authoritarian regime
typology, a critical view of the
Spanish economic "miracle" is
not a part of the "conventional
wisdom" about Spain. Therefore,
a review of a key debate within
the political economic literature will be necessary in order to stake
out a perspective on
the Spanish economy at odds with the
prevailing idea that

Spain in the 1970

's

possesses the socio-economic basis for a

liberal-democratic capitalist system on a Western European
model.
This review of the modernization versus development
debate leads to a confirmation of the class nature of
the

regime on the political economic as well as ideological
level.
It requires, however, some revision in the original
authoritarian-

conservative regime typology as outlined by Blondel.
Finally, this critical evaluation of the political
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economic and ideological apparatus
of the Franco regime leads
inexorably to speculation on the
future of a post-Franco
Spain.
It is on this speculation over
alternative futures
for Spain and the Spanish people's
capacity to determine their
own future that the thesis concludes.

Socioeconomic Change and the Authoritarian
Conservative Regime
As was seen in the typology of the
authoritarian-conser-

vative regime developed in the first chapter, a regime
such as
Franco Spain tends to arise as a reaction to the evolving

break-

down of the status quo.

The challenge to the status quo stems

from demands for socioeconomic development (and participation
or liberalization) which are opposed by traditional groups.
If the strength of these traditional groups is sufficient they

will be able to fight back such demands and reimpose an earlier

order in which traditional values predominate.
Yet how can a regime supposedly founded on the rejection
of socioeconomic development be marked by the economic pros-

perity which Spain has apparently achieved?

Doesn't Spain's

modernity undermine its designation as an authoritarianconservative regime?
To answer these questions one must look more closely at

Spain's "economic miracle."
Any understanding of the evolution of the Spanish
economy over the last thirty-five years must begin with a
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Increase In Industrial Production,
1929-1959

.

—

'

Years

1929-31
1941-45
1946-50

*

-

Chemical

Electricity

Iron

Products

Textiles

100

100

100

171

79

76

1951

230
319

84
100

1952

95
129

362

113

1953
1954

183

380
395

99

112

199

105

135

1955

471
534
551

150
152

610
610
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214
217
214
233
258
259

1956
1957
1958
1959

165

216

Source: Stanley Payne, A History of Spain a nd Portugal,
Vol
of Wisconsin Press, 1973), p. 690.

Table

II.

of

agrarian

Source:

98
81

96
101

106
113

128
114
2 (Madison:

University

Variations in Spanish Agricultural
Production, 1940-1958
(1931-35 = 100)

Index

Year

production

1940

82.8
72.5
86.5
104.9

1945
1950
1955
1958

100
98

Population
level

117.3

Payne, Spain and Portugal

,

p. 691.

Agrarian
production
per capita

106

78.1

110

65.9

115
119
122

75.1
88.2
96.1
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recognition of the disastrous
economic consequences of the
Civil War.
Perhaps the clearest indication
of this are the
accompanying tables which show that
in several key sectors the
Spanish economy virtually stood
still for
the twenty years

from 1930 to 1950,

Other measures of economic growth
are equally dismal.
The per capita income of I929 was
not surpassed until
I954.

The gross investment ratio in Spain
between 19^0 and I958 was
lower than any European country except
Portugal.
On many
important indicators of a "modern" economy
such as percentage
of labor employed in agriculture, percentage
of employment in

manufacturing or the contribution of the manufacturing
sector
to the Gross National Product (GNP), Spain at
least until the

mid-1950 's must be ranked with or below countries such
as
Greece, Turkey, Portugal and Yugoslavia.^
The record of these years is not only an indication of

the effects of the Civil Wart it is also a commentary on the

adequacy of the Franco regime's response to the War,

It is

said by some that Franco had few if any ideas about economics

other than the assumption that somehow the economy would right
itself after the War,^

2

Indeed, it is an important question to

/

Manuel Roman, Th e Limits of Economic Growth in Spain
(New Yorki
Praeger, 1971), pp. 19-22, passim .
3

Fran c o's S pain, pp. 25-26. Charles Anderson put
"Most observers seem to agree that Francisco
Franco was guided by no rigid economic orthodoxy and that his
approach to economic problems was flexible, adaptive, and pragmatic." (The Polit ical Economy of Modern Spain (Madison
University of Wisconsin Press, 1970)) p. 27,}
-^Payne,

it differentlyi

1
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ask oust how .uch effect
government policy has had on
the postCivu war economy. The motive
forces of the economy seem
to
have been largely outside
governmental control.
The economic development
of Spain before
<l«Pe"denrupon two
major
"iT

?Ss!°

fb^

^

# rP-? ^-°^^"--iyf -1

If^hL

1960?^

^

?ypamics internal to the structure

revolution of the
L?^ ^^^J^^^ist
traditional structural

ten^io;.
accentuated by
IhTtT
'^^J^^J'^''^'''^^'
the magnitude
of the forces acting upon it-^^"^^ "^^^ European Common Market
for iLnt^h laboj^
and the resulting depletion
?
n?
'^"^^ ^^^^^^^^^
^P--^
industrj?^'"
As Roman comments at a later point:

Z5_7he transformation of the Spanish economy
responded
substance to the pattern of
resource allocation determined by the
interplay of market forces originating outside
the
systemj
(1) Flows of foreign exchange determined
the mam the poles of growth and the
rate of capital accumulation.
(2) The rate
of labor absorption in Western Europe determined the position of the supply schedule for
labor available to Spanish enterprise and in
conjunction with (1) determined the wage rate
(and correspondingly the rate of profits).

m

m

Was this development path substantially
affected by planning? The evidence shows it
was not. For the various development plans
were simple projections and more-or-less
reliable forecasts of events which would
otherwise have taken place independently
through the internal logic of the market
forces unleashed by the tourist revolution

if

y

Roman, Limits of Economic Growth

,

p.

22.
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Often outpaced the
projections of the plans
Patter^'s^^^Uar
to'th^t'rffj^f^edl^ t'he'";?'
?
o^^f^cial
plans,
this sense, then t? 1^
in
^PP^ars
legitimate
to
question thp 2?
significance of such planning
other ?h.^

t\'nILn'intended"?o^'L'"' T^"^"^^^
usually
accustomed to the T^fto"Ght
thQn,rh+ of someone
5
being
in charge.
Thus, Whether one looks
at the autarchic period
of the
Spanish economy-which led
to near backruptcy in
1959--or the
subsequent "liberalization-.-when
the government tried not
to
interfere with the market
forces of tourism and labor
export
-economic growth has occurred
despite or irregardless
of

governmental policy.
This evaluation suggests that
some of the contradiction
between Spain's apparent modernity
and the authoritarianconservative regime typology may be
mitigated by the quality
of Spain's economic growth which
occurred in spite
of not

because of the regime's policies.

Perhaps the kind of economi c

growth that Spain has experienced
is one which does not threat en
that directly the central values
of the authoritarian-conservative regime.
To pursue this question of the nature
of Spain's economic
growth, let us turn to a debate that
specifically concerns

modernization and development in the Spanish economy.

Ibid 0
pp. 112-113,
Besides giving the impression of
Delng
charge the plan also allowed the regime to take credit
for whatever growth occurred.

m
.

,

209

Modernization and Development
A series of articles and
rejoinders contained in several
^^^"^^
gQ"^Parative_Studie ^in Society .nd H^.tn>.y
tea]
irs

directly on the question of the nature
of economic growth in
an authoritarian-conservative regime/

The central points of

debate, and those which are of concern
here, are (1) the vitality of corporate group structures
in Catalonia and (2) the
nature of economic development in the
Catalan region (and Spain
in general).
At this point we will be dealing primarily
with
the debate over the nature of Spanish
economic development
while dealing in the final part of the chapter
with the question
of the vitality of corporate group structures
and their rela-

tionship to economic development.
The debate over Spanish economic development begins
with

Schneider et al. distinguishing between "modernization" and
"development"

t

Modernization refers to the process by which
an underdeveloped region changes in response
to inputs (ideologies, behavioral codes, commodities and institutional models) from
already established industrial centers; a
process which is based on that region's continued dependence upon the urban-industrial
metropolis. Development refers to the process by which an underdeveloped region attempts

Peter Schneider, Jane Schneider and Edward Hansen,
"Modernization and Development: The Role of Regional Elites and
Noncorporate Groups in the European Mediterranean," Comparative
Studies in Society and History 1^, 3 (1972), pp. 328-350? Oriol
Pi-Sunyer, "Elites and Noncorporate Groups in the European Mediterranean! A Reconsideration of the Catalan Case," CSSH 16 (1974),
.

,
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.he .,3tincUo„ .aae

Sc.nei.er

^

aeveXop.ent is unu..aX
in ..a. i. attributes
so.e
3i.„.ncant negative .actors
to t.e process o.
.oaerni.ation
contrast to the e:enprp n.r
-^x
^ "'"^^^^^ positive, prescriptive
aspects of
the modernization
^
literature
raxure.
Trv
in
their view development
is
Clearly a „ore .esira.le
process for the Xo„g-ran,e
weXl-.ein,
Of a nation although
they feel pessimistic
about the possibilities for development
e-iven the
gJ-ven
thP -Hnr^.-v,.
dominance of American and
Soviet military, economic
and puxxcicai
political lorces
fn-r.cc .
over most of
the Third World....

T"V"

m

•

Pi-Sunyer-s objection to
Schneider ei_al^ is that in
their
article they project a "wildly
erroneous" i.age of Catalonia
and, by implication. Spain
as an "economic backwater "1°
.

^"^^"^^^^^
p. 340.

et^,

"Modernization and Development,"

ana the Comparative Study of Societies,"
Conmarative Studies in
199(1973),
226, and Christopher
pp.
fi^ h '^"Th^ F^ot?7'
l^^w York R.view of Roog..
io^etber'a?.

i;75rpp!l7!^^:'^

9

Schneider et
Pi-Sunyer,

al.^,

"Modernization and Development," p. 349.

"Reconsideration," p. 125.
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Citin, a variety of
historical and statistical
information.
Pi-Sunyer .akes a case for
significant industrialization
(in
the industrialized regions
of
Spain).

contemporary
SDL?^h^^^n''^\^''^^^^^^°"
recognize
that over
the Dast ?wf ^^^^d^s
"^r^ the
pace of industri-

ali.^?fL

between 6 pnH
thaT hL >.

^"^^^"^^^^^ have fluctuated
year, a rhythm
^ P^"^ ''^^^

^^^^^ European
counties :'?h.r^^^"'"^^^
^^"^^ P^"" capita income has ino^ooofi
'^^^^
^^^^ $1,000 since
?g60
a^f'^^'" T^^^
^^^^ ^ave taken
lltoe in the
are
wp?l
ni^,
^^J"""""^^
well-documented ... and it is in reasonably
the
Catalonia that industrial
develoDrnenf has been most successful
development

P

H

And what can our perspective on
the debate contribute
to its resolution? In the
first place, it appears that Pi-3unyer
has, for whatever reason, ignored
the distinction which

Schneider et al, have drawn between
modernization and development.
They do not, in fact, argue that there
has
not been

significant industrialization in Spain; on
the contrary, they
argue that Spain and Catalonia are in the
process of modernization.
What they do argue is that modernization is not
the
same

thing as development and that

.

.in modernizing

societies

the nation and the region, and their respective
elites, are no

longer the prime movers ....

""^'^

There is support for this posi-

tion of Schneider et al^ from Spanish as well as other sources.
The Brazilian economist, Celso Furtado, has, for example,

''••'•

12

Ibid,

.

p.

126.

Schneider et al

.

"Reply," p. 239.
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distinguished between
modernization
t^rnization »„h
<
.
and economic
development in
ways very similar to
Schneider et al^
According to Furtado
increases in the income of
a community may result from at
least three different
processes.
a)

economi^develoM

which he defines as the
accumulation
Of capital and adoption
of more effective productive
processes,
b) the depletion of
nonrenewable natural resources,
and c) reallocation of resources aiming
at geographic specialization,

through the pursuit of comparative
advantages in a system of
international division of labor.
Modernization

is the process

whereby new patterns of consumption
(the introduction of new
products) are adopted as a result
of an increase
in income

generated by the type of changes
referred to in
above ^-^

(b)

and (c)

,

Using Brazil as an example of an
underdeveloped country
caught in such a process of modernization,
Furtado
goes on to

examine the implications of modernization
in the areas of income
distribution, technology transfers, foreign
domination and
growth
J

In sum, a certain profile of demand, corresponding to an increasing concentration in the
distribution of income, and to an increasing
gap between the levels of consumption of the
rich minority and that of the mass of the
population, entails a composition of investments that tends to maximize the transfer of
technical progress through MNCs /Multinational Corporations/, and to increase the
13

Celso Furtado, "The Post-1964 Brazilian 'Model* of
Development," Stu dies in Comparative International Development
8.

2

(1973), p.

iW.

.
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inflow of f6reign resources.
The policy
^^^^ demand profile will
al^o^'tPn^
a^so tend to maximize the expansion
of GDP
/Gross Domestic Product/. 1^

Therefore, Pi-Sunyer's figures on
growth (GKP) and
income do not tell us in themselves
that real economic developrnent has occurred in Spain.
In fact, the "problem in the area
of income distribution''^^ mentioned
by Pi-Sunyer is
just one

indication that Spain may be involved in
a process of modernization similar to that described by Furtado
and Schneider
et al

.

The Spanish economist, Ramon Tamames, cited
approvingly
16
by Pi-Sunyer,
would seem to see foreign control of industri-

alization in Spain more critically than Pi-3unyer.

Analyzing

the 25 largest businesses (by sales, 1970) in Spain,
Tamames

comments
It is interesting to note that of the 25
enterprises under consideration, Ik have
participation by foreign capital and in
7 of them the participation is total or
majoritarian, which is equivalent to their
complete control from outside /the country/
• • • .

1^

'

.

Ibid.

.

p.

^•^Pi-Sunyer,

125.

"Reconsideration," p. 126.

'"^'Ramon Tamames .
has vvritten a series of readable
and objective books on economic questions." Ibid
p. 126,
footnote 5.
,

.

.

/
17
/
'Ramon Tamames, Introduccion a la economia
espanola
(Madrid
Alianza Editorial. 1972), p. 19O, It should also be
noted with regard to Catalonia's primacy as regards industrialization that of the ten largest firms, seven are located in Madrid
and one (SEAT, the largest) in Barceloniaj of the 25 largest firms,
13 are in Madrid and six in Barcelona.
I

Although not utilizing the distinction
between
zation and development, Tamames
discusses the

mod,lerni-

effects of foreign

influence in terms not unlike those
of Furtado or Schneider
et alf

I

Between 1959 ... and 1971 foreign
investment has quadrupled. This contribution
of
external capital, even though it has undoubtedly contributed to the economic progress of the last years, also includes some
dangers. Given a continuation of this
tendency, at the same pace, it can have as
a consequence within some years a severe
reduction in the initiatives of our entrepreneurs, being overwhelmed by the greater
means of foreigners. In the last few ye ars
there have been many Spanish entrep reneur!:^
co nverted from industrialists to simDle merc|iaiLt.s_->-_i nto mere representatives for th e
Spanish market of a line of merchandise
res emblin/T that which they have stopped
J£E5duMll£L-2ILj!or^/h

reduced their volume of production .^^
•«

*

*

In sum, one can state that there are very
few Spanish enterprises of any size which
are not penetrated by a direct form of
foreign capital. Technologically the penetration is even greater ... ,19

To contrast Pi-Sunyer's view of foreign control with

that of Tamaraes and Schneider et al
the paragraph quoted below.

.

one need only refer to

To place it in context, one should

be aware that Pi-Sunyer in his original "Reconsideration" had

cited the production of nearly a half-million automobiles in

Spain as evidence of the degree of industrialization.

In their

reply Schneider et al. contend that this production is not

•^^Tamames, Economfa espanola
•^^

Ibid.

.

p.

398.

.

p.

39^.

Emphasis added,

215

Spanish but foreign
reign ('fiTL'v
(FIAT, ru^
Chrysler and Leyland).
in turn replies,

Apparently what matters is not
the
presence or absence of an
indUs^rial
base
not the presence or
absence of c^tntJ
manpower, npt the fact't'Sat

Pi-Sunyer

'

?Lse products
exported'^abroad!
ra?her'?H'^^P^^^
III
out rather
the degree to
and advanced techLlogy iswhich caT^it^^i
Lest I be misunderstood letof foreign origin
.
n,e raakfi? clear
'^^^'^l^"
Span!
ish) industrialization
isn^
Ldullrl^}?^""??
had evolved in a
vacuum, nor did I address
myself to the
advantages or disadvantages of
roads to industrializatiSn and different
deve^opment.^O
Once again Tamames provides
evidence that foreign control
is not merely a matter of
different paths to development but
rather that the path of foreign control
may not lead to development at allt

If one reviews the principle firms
of the
automobile line, of motorcycles, of electrical machinery and electric appliances,
of pharmaceutical products, etc., it is
easy
to thmk^that the major part of the
articles
Of some importance produced by Spanish
firms
those sectors are done under foreign
patent.... / Tj/here is no doubt that our
dependency is excessive, even unnecessary in
many cases, bringing a total stop to the
exportation of the production of several
industrial sectors, since the ovmers of the
patents only grant them— normally— for the
Spanish market. Saving honorable exceptions,
the Spanish businessman prefers the easy road,
of mediocre results, of acquiring a patent,
instead of looking for the technicians who
can study and construct a prototype to his
orders; it seems as if that almost grotesque
sentence of Unarauno weighs upon our entrepreneurs? Let others invent!

m

20
21

Pi-Sunyer, "Reply," p. 242.
Tamames, Bconomj'a espanola

.

Emphasis in original
p.

212.
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Even in the case where there is production
for export,
as in the production of automobiles,
communications

equipment

and electric appliances, it represents the
increased penetration and/or consolidation of foreign capital in
the exporting

industries.

Some anecdotal notes may shed further light on this
issue of foreign control.

The automobile sector mentioned by

Pi-Sunyer and Schneider et al. is an interesting illustration
of the nature of Spanish economic growth,

Spaniards themselves

refer to different automotive lines as more or less Spanish
with foreign marques such as Mercedes-Benz, which is manufactured elsewhere and assembled in Spain, being among the
least Spanish and SEAT (FIAT) among the most Spanish.

For

example, the "most" Spanish, mass-produced car in Spain in 1973

was the SEAT 1^30, a very pleasant vehicle which had a combina-

tion of a FIAT-designed engine in a FIAT-desimed body that was
not available in Italy itself.

automotive news of 1973

»

Yet in another tidbit from the

Citroen, the French automotive firm,

piqued Spanish nationalism by manufacturing its newest model
in a Catalan plant for sale only in France,

Spaniards had to

wait for more than a year to purchase a car made by Spanish

hands in a Spanish factory.
The issue between Pi-Sunyer and Schneider et al. is

2?

Ibid.

.

p.

213,
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clearly not that Spain's ranking
as the fifth European industrial nation has no importance
whatsoever. The question is

how one evaluates the fact of
Spanish hands operating imported
dies to press imported raw
materials into an item not to be
sold
in Spain.
The question that Schneider
et al, seem to be asking
is what would happen if all
of Spanish industry were nationalized tomorrow? Certainly Spain
would find itself possessed
of productive capacity and the
skilled manpower to operate it.
But it would probably find itself
without managerial talent and
initiative and absolutely dependent on
imports of foreign capital, capital goods and technology
to activate production.

Such a situation approximates the definition
of modernization
given by Schneider et al. Although Spain's
economy
is not

unlike other developing countries in this regard,
it is unlike
those of the first-industrialized nations and
also inany of i,he

socialist countries which have undertaken the proceos
of withdrawal and development contrasted with modernization by

Schneider et al.
If then, the Spanish economic "miracle" can be said to
be more modernization than development, how does this relate
to the issue of socioeconomic change and the authoritarian-

conservative regime typology?

It would appear that modernization

is a type of change more easily tolerated by an authoritarian-

conservative regime than development because it is less threatening to its system of rule.

One indication of this is the fact

that, as we have seen, modernization came to Spain in spite of
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or irregardless of
official government r.m .
policy.
^
^
ficant
policy undertaken bv th. ^
"^^
the waves or rorei.n
inl
^^^^^^"^

The most

-

resisting

"

—

s^ni-

"

Yet there is a more
centraT
^^.+
central feature
of modernization
tha .a.es it le.s
t.reatenin, to an
aut.orUa.ian-oonservative
regime,
the political position
or the working cla.s
unde.
moaernization. This political
position is a result or
the
differential effects of
modernisation on social
classes, .ocernization as described by
Schneider
i, obviously
^

et^

a

dependency relationship
between the developed and
underdeveloped
countries; dependency "theory
in turn offers one
insights into

the asymmetrical effects
of dependency on different
social
classes .-^

In the case of Spain,
dependency "theory" would lead
ore
to expect that Spain's
"national bourgeoisie" would
experience
the loss Of capitalist
"virtue" described by Tamames
in which
they becon,e "simple merchants"
and "mere representatives"
of

foreign capital.

rseraecio (New York:

This "emasculation" of a country's
entre-

Monthly Review Press, 1973).
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preneurial elite certainly makes development (as
opposed to
modernization) more difficult, if not impossible, in

the long

run, but this elite is. of course, well-rewarded
materially for

their loss of initiative and control.

Only the "psychological"

stimulus of an aggressive nationalism should impel this
••lumpen-

bourgeoisie" to question its dependent status.
The working class, on the other hand, faces a much more

complex position.

Its relationship to political and economic

power is similar to that in other industrializing nations in
that it must engage in confrontation with capital backed by
the authority of the state to gain social and economic bene2k
fits.
In many cases such a confrontation is between labor

and the representatives of foreign capital.

Moreover, in Spain

as elsewhere, the source of this foreign capital is often a

multinational company v/hich is possessed of superior bargaining
powers in its ability to tolerate lost production in one sector,

promote wage competition between different national working
classes, shift production to less "troublesome" sites, etc,^^

2k

Of course, the Spanish working class is at a special
disadvantage in this confrontation since strikes are illegal
(though more tolerated in recent years if they do not raise
political issues) and labor is officially organized into vertical 3 indicates dominated by the Falangist bureaucracy. Despite
continuing "liberalizations" under the current Suarez regime and
the legalization of the Spanish Communist Party, the legal position of the Spanish working class has not been altered.

^^For a general description of big capital's advantage
relative to labor in overcoming national barriers see Ernest
Mandel, E urope vs. America. Contradictions of Imperialism (New
Monthly Review Press, 1972), especially Chapter 10.
Yorkt
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This situation contributes to
a weakening of the political position Of Spanish labor
in several ways.
First of all,
under Franco, the working class
was in an inferior bargaining
position relative to international
capital for the reasons just
described and because of the restrictions
placed on its right
to organize and strike. Secondly,
already in a paternalistic
relationship with the State through the
corporatist system,
labor had to be even more dependent because
the State was the
only mediating agent between labor and
international capital
'

upon which the working class could exert some
force.

Thus the

dependent position of Spanish labor is due not only to
its
corporatist relationship with State authority, as described

Frederick

B.

Pike,

26

by

but to the process of modernization itself.

Modernization in these terms, then,

is a kind of economic

growth which does not absolutely challenge the counterrevolutionary goals of the authoritarian-conservative regime.

promoting the dependency of the working class, that

is,

In
in

decreasing its freedom of political maneuverability, modernization contributed to the goal of the demobilization of rising

working class consciousness, a central aspect of the authoritarian-conservative regime typology developed in Chapter

I.

Modernization may be an "easier" type of economic growth
in other ways as well.

Schneider et al

.

26

Economic development, as described by

would require consensus about the need to

Pike, "Capitalism and Consumerism in Spain of the 1960»s
What Lessons for Latin American Development?," Inter-American
Economic Affairs 26 (V/inter, 1972), p. 31.
,
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sacrifice for capital accumulation.

It v/as inherent in the

nature of the Franco regime that such a consensus would entail
a willingness to work for a common goal the results of which

would be distributed unevenly. ^"^

Modernization requires no

broad social consensus; rather the dislocations and distortions

produced by an essentially unplanned growth (or one "planned"
by foreign capital) were felt as individualized phenomena.
Thus, the regime was never forced as far into the contradiction

faced by other authoritarian-conservative regimes of eliciting

support for a national effort (war in the case of Italy and
Germany? development in the case of Spain) while attempting to

demobilize and depoliticize the underclass.

? ft

The process of modernization in Spain, therefore, does

not appear to be inconsistent with the authoritarian-conservative system of the regime.

Hov/ever, the authoritarian-con-

servative typology set forth by Blondel and

v/hich,

as I have

indicated in the first Chapter, offers a more accurate evaluation of Spain than that given by other conceptualizations,
needs to be modified.
As Blondel indicates, the Authoritarian-Conservative

'Of course, as is typical of countries undergoing a
process of modernization, governmental efforts to fit the domestic economy to the production profile of the multinationals rely
primarily on indirect taxes for funding. Such a regressive taxation policy results in forced savinp;s by the lower classes to
fuel the modernization process. See Furtado, "Brazilian 'Model,'"
"Modernization and Development," pp.
Schneider et al.
p. 120
and Consumerism," p. 22,
"Capitalism
and Pike,
,

1

^^See Chapter

I,

p. 29.
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regime arises as a react Inv, -h^
reaction to pressures
for socioeconomic
change and seeks to
impose
'"^^^^ an oo>,t
^^^lier order less threaten!
i.ng
to tradit.onal groups
and less susceptible
to revolutionary
e.ands
.et. the developmentalist
climate o. the mid-twentieth
century has made the fa^v n-p +u
task Of these retrograde
regimes exceedmgly more difficult. If SDain i« +
bpam is typical of the response
by
authoritarian-conservative rerimeq
xegj.mes to t-h^o
this dilemma (and the
parallels between
exween Spain
Smin and ^suchu countries
as Brazil and Chile
indicate that it is not
a-typical). a .ind of economic
growth
Which does not directly
threaten its central
counterrevolution
values has been adopted. For
the process of modernization
as
followed in Spain offers a
certain kind of economic
hette™ent
but one Which does not
fundamentally alter the class
relationships of the traditional
society. Because of the
reasons
already discussed, modernization
promotes dependency between
regions and countries while
diminishing the political maneuverability of the working class.
•

^

^

All of the qualifications and
comments we have made on'
Spanish economic growth bear on the
question of alternative
futures for Spain.
In the next section we take up
the question
of the relationship between this
Spanish political economy
and

the direction of politics in a
post-Franco Spain.

Alternative Futures for Spain
As these words are being written, Spain
is entering the
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post-Franco era.
ship, ^9

i3

His aeatn
dpath itself
^+o^i-r a
«
nis
microcosm of the dictatorj^^^^^ ^^^^

transition to a Movement

Monarchy dedicated to the fundamental
principles of Francoism
is possible.
What is not yet known for

certain is whether the

Spain of Juan Carlos, Arias Navarro
and, lately, Suarez will be
Francoism without Franco, as the radical
opposition contends,
or whether it will change or be
changed into something else.
One point of view on post-Franco
politics with
which

I

would like to deal at length is that
represented by some Spaniards and the American Liberal press.
The argument being
made by these observers is that the death of
Franco has removed
the major stumbling block to Spain's European
evolution towards
a liberal, pluralist democracy.

Finding the class and ideo-

logical conflicts that produced the Civil War muted if not

eliminated by passing time and Spain's economic advancement,
they call on the new king to break with the ultra-right old
guard and get on with the liberalization for which everyone is

waiting.

29

In a country with only one hospital bed for each 1,748
persons, a team of 32 medical specialists spent over a month
attempting to prolong his life. Meanwhile the Spanish right
took advantage of Franco's borrowed time to execute Operation
Lucero, a return to the darkest Franco years of censorship,
arrest, intimidation and terror by the old guard.
(See Claire
Sterling, "The Nightmare Spain Doesn't Want," New York Times
Wlaprazine
December 14, 1975, P. 18.)
.

30

See the article by Claire Sterling above, also Barbara
Probst Solomon, "Spain on the Brink," Now York Review of Books
XXII, 19 (November 27, 1975) PP. 22-27 and reporting of Flora
Lewis and Henry Giniger from Madrid.
,

»

22k

Much of what passes for analysis in
these arguments
amounts to no more than wishful thinking,
of the kind

that

pictured Juan Carlos as a closet democrat.

But what true

analysis is made consists of a rather
off-handed equation of
Spain's economic progress with the conditions
necessary
for

political democracy.
Such an equation of politics and economics is not
unusual
in the case of Spain and has been a justification
of the
dic-

tatorship which, by concentrating on economic growth,
promised
to elevate the capabilities of Spain's "underdeveloped"
citizenry; we have already seen this view in the "myth of incapacity"

and the textbook theme of social pessimism.

Politics and eco-

nomics have been so closely linked in the regime's nationalizations, that a Spanish minister at one time specified the

level of per capita income which would allow liberalization.

Although this kind of simple-minded economic determinism
imbues some of the optimistic interpretations of Spain, there
is a more sophisticated analysis which argues that economic

growth creates the material basis for a liberal democratic

31

The most eminent developraentalists of our country
have recently acknowledged that v/e have taken a
giant step toward economic take-off, though not
politics, and that with our 800 dollars of per
capita income we must wait for $1,500 to be able
to completely modernize politically.
de Miguel, Eg pan
p. 286.
De Miguel goes on to suggest that rather than wait for
the avera^re per capita income for Spain to reach $1,500, that the
regime grant civil liberties regionally with the wealthiest
regions of Madrid and Barcelona receiving them first.

—

.
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society and strengthens the middle
class, held to be
factor in promoting liberal democracy.

a critical

The "proof offered to support the
imminent triumph of
a new and modern Spain is the general
economic •'miracle" discussed in the first part of this Chapter.
Examples
of such,

to

my mind, naive views include the following

After suffering the violence of the Civil War
agd the aftermath of isolation and privation,
/.the Spanish people/ have entered into
a
period of relative prosperity with /~a_7
booming economy.
As a result, almost everyone agreed, the
average Spaniard appears to want a peaceful
change. Most do not want a return to civil
disorder} in the country as a whole extremist groups that do resort to violence apiDear
to have little support.

With prosperity, people have entered the consumer a^e, buying homes, cars and appliances,
often with time payments. This drives them a
further interest and stake in stability. 33
*

All of these viev/s on the social requisites of democracy in Spain agree with the seminal article on the subject by
Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy:
Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Poli tical Science Review 53 (March, 1959}| pp. 69-IO5.
.

In Lipset 's opinion, democracy (what I call liberal
democracy) was most likely in those countries which combined
effectiveness (essentially provided by economic development)
with high legitimacy of political institutions. The middle
class was important because it ". .
plays a mitigating role
in moderating conflict since it is able to reward moderate and
.democratic parties and penalize extremist groups." Ibid
.

.

p.

83.
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become
enSchPrt^?^^*'^^
considerable way in all fields.
?
fi"

£^a;:-!--,L-|-!:i-iL^-!---n,
responsible, technologically
deeply conscious of its socialadvanced and

importance.

Vl^^o^r ^P^i":, entirely different from that
^^gan. and that of
1936
when t^?
1936, \h.n
the "^PCivil War began, is the

best
legacy that Generalissimo Francisco
Franco
has left his people, because it
implies the
sociological base that makes
^
S^o^^S?'"''
possible and necessary a democratic
power
structure. 3^

The question of modernization or development
is raised
again by reference to these indicators of
economic growth and,
from the point of view expressed above, of
the "sociological
base of democracy." For as we have seen argued
earlier by

Schneider et_al^, the fact of economic grov/th may not
necessarily
imply the structural changes in the polity and society
that

true development entails.

While it is beyond the scope of this concluding chapter
to undertake an analysis of Spanish class structure, it would
be useful to examine the claims for a "new middle class" in

Spain and the importance of this class for Spain's political
development.

33

-"-"Henry

Giniger,

Shift," New York Times

.

"Spaniards Are Hoping for a Peaceful
October 26, 1975, p. 1.

Jose Maria de Areilza, "Spaini

Thinking about the
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^

In their first
article on "Modernization
and Developn.ent...

Schneider

,^,,,3, ^^^^

consequences or the

modernization process which
help to outline the
differences
between modernization and
development. 35 First among
these
consequences is the incorporation
of distorted metropolitan
life styles by dependent
regions.
Contrary to the self-imposed
isolation one might expect of
a developing
country, moderniza-

tion opens the doors to a
vision of the good life conveyed
by
tourists, by multinational
managers or through residence
in the
emigrant workers' ghetto of some
nothern industrial country.
The modern world as glimpsed
from these perspectives is in
many
ways unreal and while the
diffusion of blue jeans and rock
music
is not such a great horror,
cultural imperialism and Coca-

colonialism can at times have a more
serious impact on a
modernizing society. 3°
Secondly, the financing of modernization
through income
concentration, tourism and emigration
strengthens the dependence of a region or country on metropolitan
centers without a
radical reordering of either society. While
creating new

Future," New York Timer,. November 21,
1975, p. 1*3. Senor ^''"^^^
Areilza
was Foreign Minister in the first post-FraAco
cabinet!
35
v,v.

pp.

oM?^^^^^^^

et_al^,

"Modernization and Development,"

jJM-JJ-^^fif,

36

For example, "modernizing" Mexico has seen the
ment of corn meal and milk as staples of the peasant dietreplaceby
Coca-cola and Wonder bread— far less nutritious substitutes.
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markets for goods produced in the metropolis, modernization
relieves the social pressure of rural-urban migration and unem-

ployment through the service and construction jobs provided by

tourism and, in the case of Spain, by emigration to industrial
centers.

Finally, modernization is an inherently unstable process.
As has been shown in the recent world recession cum oil crisis,

significant and rapid declines in tourism and the demand for
emigrant labor are possible.

Such instability is the inevitable

consequence of dependence and has its affect on the modernizing

middle class:
Because it is unstable, modernization creates
a middle class which has the power to consume
but not to create new sources of capital. It
is a class without autonomy or leverage.
Typical of the new bourgeois type is his understandable tendency to invest in sectors of rapid,
but short-range profit; to speculate at the
expense of planning and to eschew industrial
or agrarian enterprises v;hich would require
heavy capitalization. The predominant economic
activities of such a type include real estate
speculation, commerce appropriate to the new
consumer markets which modernization engenders,
and perhaps agricultural or light industrial
production, cautiously capitalized because of
oo
its vulnerability to fluctuations on world
markets.... Excluded is capital accumulation.
^

A glance back at Ramon Tamames

'

description of Spanish

entrepreneurs in the first part of this Chapter will show general
support for the assessment made by Schneider

et.

al

<

of the

modernizing middle-class.

^"^Schneider et al.
p.

3^^.

,

"Modernization and Development,"
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Is there,

then,- a Spanish middle class
which will play

a democratic role by, in

Lipsefs words, rewarding moderate and

democratic parties and penalizing extremist
groups? It would
appear that liberal observ^ers of Spain
have been drawn into
the same confusion over the middle
classes that
has plagued

Latin Americanists for some time.

Beginning nearly two decades
38
ago.
students of Latin America forecast an important
role

for emerging middle "sectors" in Latin America.

As today in

the case of Spain, the emerging middle class was
supposed to
be the best hope for a liberal democratic reform of
Latin

America that would ameliorate its poverty and underdevelopment

without revolutionary violence.
In retrospect many of these studies seem to have con-

fused the growth of a middle range of income with the emergence
of a more or less cohesive middle class or sector possessed of
its own identity and able to fulfill the moderating role it

has supposedly played in democratic societies.

The experience

of the development decade of the 1960's led to a reevaluation

of this middle class

v;ith

more critical assessments.

Wow the

Latin American middle class could play an antidemocratic role
00

John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America
(Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1958). For additional
studies on the attitudes and behavior of the middle classes in
Latin America see Richard N, Adams. The Second Sowinp:i Power
and Secondary Development in Latin Anicr'ica (San Francisco
The
Chandler. 196?) Luis Katinoff, "The New Urban Groups
Middle Classes," in S.M. Lipset and Aldo Solari, Elites in Latin
America (New Yorkj
Oxford University Press, 19^7), pp. 61-93
and James F, Petras. Politics and Social Structure in Latin
America (Mew York: Monthly Review Press, 1970) PP' 3?-53.
1

;

»
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at t5.„es,39

, ,„^.„^ ^^^^^

development'^'' and,

in period.

Of heightened class
conflict, virtually
disappeared ^1
.

Simplistic comparisons of
Spain with Latin America
as
a Whole or even with
the most industrialized
Latin American
nations would lead to error
and confusion.
Yet one must wonder
.f a valid comparison
cannot be made between the
.elf-servin.
optimism that characterised
Korth American interpretations
of
Latin America in the Ijeo-s
and similar observations
•

about
In both cases, the middle
class is seen as the
best hope for a non-revolutionary
solution to economic and
political problems.'*^ Could it
be that the new Spanish
middle

Spain today.

^1

"Another thing that has confused us
is the mistaken notion that a middle class
exists in Latin
^^^^^ ^ "^^^^1^ sector, and
an ill-defmed one \^
anlirdpft'
at that.
In Chile, for examplethey always boasted that they were
politically
stable because they had a strong middle
class, a
identity and characteristics.'
M
L^"^^^
Now they are coming to see that their
belief was
anj^th.
What they were talking about has proved
to be a mere appendage of the upper class.
lower stratum of semiprof essionals and white-The
collar workers has nowhere to go except to the
working class. What emerges is a dominant class
and a dominated class, an oppressor and a mass
of oppressed "
—quoted by Gary MacEoin, Revolution Next Doo;r
(New Yorkj
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 19?l),p.83.
'

.

In the case of Latin America, disllusion with the
reformist tendencies of the middle class has not led to the
^
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clauH will prove to

be-

as disappointing in providing
the

sociological basis of democracy as has been
its Latin American
counterpart?
Clearly, the definitive answer to this
question will
como only at some critical juncture of
Spanish politics. For
the moment we have only the views of
Schneider et al
and

othcrs^^^ that a dependent middle class such
as that produced

by modernization will not play the moderating
role forseen for
it by Lipset. And, as I have tried to show, we
also

have rea on

to brieve that indices of per capita income, TV
sets per household, literacy rates and other marks of modernity
may signal

modernization not development; the growth of a middle
income
group not a middle class.
V^e

are left, then, with a picture of Spain in which

liberal democracy cannot be predicted—on the basis of
economic

growth— as inevitable.

V/ith its

dependent middle class, hesitant

bourgeoisie and politically repressed working class, Spain in

1976 most resembles the class profile of contemporary Chile,
Brazil or Argentina which are surely not examples of the ease

of creating liberal democracy.

abandonment of reformist approaches to change but to the search
for new agents of reform: the military and, lately, the Church,
Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Or3p:ins of Dictatorship
^mocracy (Boston: Beacon Press, I966) offers a sophisti.i;ated version of the Lipset argument in which the relative
independence of the middle class is a critical factor in determining its ability to bring about fundamental transformations
Of <j.lass structure.
flI}.Cl_iI

232

What is the future of bpain?

To give our answer to this

question we must look at two more levels of
Spanish reality:
the flow of the main Spanish ideological
currents

and, finally,

the capacities of the Spanish people themselves
for self-rule.
Id eolo^ and the M od el of tho. Two Spains ^^

Especially since the latter part of the 19th century,
Spain has often been spoken of as constituting two
levels

or

dimensions of reality.

Whether dichotomized along ideological

or cultural lines, there have been a multitude of models
of

two Spainsi

the-

rich and poor, industrial and agricultural,

official and real, etc.

However, two of these dichotomies

represent historical tensions that have had the most significant
impact on Spanish political development.

One is the ideological

tension between left and right and the other

a regionalist

tension between centralist political organization (led by
Madrid) and the demand for regional autonomy and rights,
V/ith these two dichotomies,

Amando de Miguel has con-

structed a typology which represents most of the ideological
currents of recent Spanish history and those which would be

most likely to figure in post-Franco politics.
The typology is as follows

Left

Right

Regionalism

Type 1

Type 2

Centralism

Type

Type 4

3

^\his section is based upon ajnodel and typology
developed by Amando de Miguel in Espana pp. 280-286,
,
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According to de -Miguel,
type
chist tradition and the
majority

1

corresponds to the
le anar-

of the Republicans.

It

represents, he says, "the
heroic and broken Spain, the
impossible Spain of Utopia.

Type 2 comprises the
bourgeoisie regionalist parties
(the Catalan Li^. the Valencian
Regional Right), Carlis™ and
a certain sector of the
"pre-technocratio ideology" of the
Primo de Rivera dictatorship.
It speaks for a small segment
Of the population.
Type 3 encloses a large part of
the Regenerationists (of
1898), Ortega y^Gasset and nearly all the
Communists and Socialists as well ac a significant sector
of the intellectuals of
the

Institjic^^

nv/hile

having enormous

spiritual influence, it has had scarce political
impact. "^7
Type 4 is composed of the early fascist
parties
(the

JONS and Falange) which were merged into Jose
Antonio's Falange.

Accion Espanola (Spanish Action) and groupings from
CEDA (Catholic right of Gil Robles) and other monarchists.

It includes

the basic components of the National Movement, successor
to

the Falange, Spain's only "party,"

^^ Ibide

.

p.

285.

See Vicente Cache Yin, La Institucion Libre de Ensenanz
a
^

(Madrid, 1962).

4?

'de Miguel, Espana

.

p.

285.
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If this typologi^ does, in fact,
approximate the ideo-

logical currents of Spanish reality,
liberal democracy once
again seems far from inevitable.
Type 1, left-regionalism, was attempted
as a liberal
democratic coalition in Spain under the second
Republic.
It
had its notorious problems and was decisively
defeated in the
Civil War. More importantly, the current regime
was founded
on opposition to the basic principles of
this left-regionalist

tendency.

How,

then,

is the

right-centralism of Francoism

without Franco to "evolve" into left regionalism?
Type 2, right-regionalism, can be dismissed as having

little potential political impact even given the resurgence of

regionalist pressures in Spain.
Type

3.

left-centralism, has, at first glance, possi-

bilities as a viable liberal democratic coalition.

Recent

developments in neo-Stalinist Communist parties in Western
Europe indicate a willingness to effect the "historic compromise"
of participation by the Western European CP's in governments of
ho

a liberal-moderate, social democratic type.

However, once again the nature of the current regime

places obstacles in the path to such a coalition.

Even the

48

For points of agreement and disagreement between the
Italian Communist Party (PCI), closest to such an "historic compromise," and the Spanish Communist Party see Kevin Devlin,
"'Differences' between Italian and Spanish CP's on Attitude to
Soviet Union," Radio Free Europe Background Report No, 155
(November 11, 1975)
.
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most "reformist" member nf
of tho
the Anas cabinet, Fraga
Iribarne,
denounced the idea of recognizing
the Spanish CP.'*? yet
because of PCE strength in
the trade unions

(through the'
illegal workers- Commissions),
any acceptance of independent
trade unions or the right
to strike will .ea„
automatic recognition Of the communist party. 5°
Therefore, we are likely to
see a continuation of the
labor conflicts which marked
the
first part of I976. When such
contradictions between liberal
principles and defense of class
position arise, we will .ost
likely see their resolution by
a resort to Francoism without
Franco,

We are left with Type ^, the
current regime, which will
attempt to continue essentially unchanged
with superficial

liberalizations but no abandonment of its
right-centralist
ideology and, despite its rhetoric, no
"evolution" toward a
pluralist, liberal democracy on a European
model.

49

}J^^?^iew with the French daily Le Fip:aro Fra^a
^-^^..S"
commented,
/'Spain is moving toward the establish^ient of 'a demScratic society but the Spanish Communist Party (PCE)
will
remain outside of the political arena," quoted by David
Frankel,
r^iounting Pressure in Spam to Finish with
Francoism," Int-r^
continental Press, lif, 2 (January 19, 1976), p. 1^2.
50
See Solomon, "Spain on the Brink," p, 2?,
Fraga Iribarne has also commented on the connections
between the trade unions and the PCEi
"/"T/he Workers Commissions are an organization dominated by the Communists, who
have entered the trade-union system with a precise objective:
to convert it into an instrument of a party, for the good of
only one party," quoted from the November 24, I975 issue of
the Buenos Aires daily La Opinion by Frankel, "Mounting Pressure,"
4-

.
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ment Itn^l

f

One may still ask. why
accept this fascination with
liberal democracy? Is Spain
faced only with a choice
between
.ome variant of the status
,uo and a problematic liberal
democracy? While recognizing that
in responding to this
.uestion
one moves from the level of
analysis to polemic (in the best
Latin sense), my answer would be,
no.
our discussion of the
process of political socialization
in Spain, the analysis of

"

m

political education textbooks and an
examination of the Francoist strategy of social control,
we have seen time and again a
closed, authoritarian, patrimonial
ethic which, if embraced
by all Spaniards, would forecast a
dismal future for democracy.
Yet, as we have stressed from the very
beginning, this is the
ethic of -official" Spain not all of Spain
and. in this regard,
I agree with those Liberal observers
of Spain we have just dis-

cussed.

Argument breaks out over whether this "official" Spain

is really just some dead, dried out skin covering
a new. brighter

Spain that has been struggling to break out of its old covering
and was held fast only by Franco and his ultrarightists

.

I

have, in a sense, been persuaded that Spain is, in fact, different? that the "middle v/ay" for Spain has no better prospects

now than it did forty years ago.

To put it another way, the

tensions and contradictions that produced the pre-revolutionary
conditions of the 1930

's

have in my view not been eliminated

by modernization and the consumer society but merely papered
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over
However, an assertion such
as this must rely on an
examination of more than just the
elite viewpoints expressed
in "official- political education
textbooks or on the equally
elitist perspective offered by the
typology of ideologies drawn
earlier. Inevitably one returns
to the question first raised
as an epigraph to Chapter 11,

is Spanish society more authoritarian than the government itself? 51

One intriguing response to this
question comes from
survey data reported on in a paper by the
head of the Spanish

national opinion institute (Institute de la
Opinion Piblica),
Kafael L6pez-Pintor.^^ Based on a national
sample of 1,000

males,

the survey revealed 4 types of personality
clusters

which Lopez-Pintor has labeled (1) "the politically
alienated
majority": 1^9% of the population; (2) "a rising democratic
generation"!

37% of the population;

establishment":

12^^

(3)

"The authoritarian

of the population; and

W

"the servants

51 In

addition to the epigraph, see the longer discussion
by de Miguel, " La sociedad espanola mas autoritaria que las
instituciones?" in Cu adernos para el Dialop-o extra number 35
^

.

(June, 1973), pp. 75--7T.
52

^

Rafael Lopez-Pintor, "The Political Beliefs of Spaniards
The Rising of a More Democratic Generation," paper presented at the Sixth National Meeting of the Latin American
Studies Association, Atlanta, Georgia, March 23-28, I976.
»

53

sample is biased towards those likely to show
greater political interest and involvement, i.e,, males over
15 living in cities with ^0,000 or more inhabitants.
-^^The
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of the authoritarian master":

254

of the population.

with

certain reservations. 55 these survey
results indicate that only
a minority are as authoritarian
or more authoritarian than the
refcime

itself.

Yet for reasons presented in the
previous chapter (see
the discussion of the "Myth of
Incapacity"), we cannot solely
rely on survey research for an answer
to this

question? diffi-

dence and submission to authority are still too
much a test of
loyalty to any Spanish regime for the appearance
of such

responses on questionnaires to be taken at face value.

answer sought is, however, not merely an exercise

The

in speculation

for we have both a theoretical debate and an empirical
case

study upon which to base our inquiry.

For the debate we turn

again to the series of articles and responses by Schneider et
al_t.

and Fi-3unyer; for the case study, the revolution of

5k

Ibid
The first three clusters are self-explap. ^,
natory.
The final one is a group v/hose conservatism and political authoritarianism do not fit their social status or
personality. They appear to be lower class beneficiaries of
the regime who are aping what they perceive to be the "party
line" or what we have called the "official" images of the
regime
.

-^-^The reservations concern the significance of the "no
response" and "alienated majority" categories taken to be indicative of little or no interests in politics. An interesting
comment on the context in which surve;;y^ research operates in
Spain was communicated to me by Dr. Lopez-Pintor in a private^
conversation. Since Franco's death, survey watchers have noticed
a fairly close correspondence betv/een the "no response" catep;ory
and public violence. Surveys taken contemporaneously with violent political confrontations have a high degree of nonresponse
(over 6C^); during periods of relative peace the nonresponse
returns to low (for Spain) levels. Clearly, lack of a response

2^o

flowers in Portugal, Spring 19?^.
Cor-porat e GroupR and Powpr

It might be recalled that the debate over the
nature

of Spanish economic growth engaged in by Schneider et al.
and

Pi-Sunyer was paralleled by a debate over the question of corporate group vitality in Spain.

Let us first set out the

vocabulary and substance of this debate and then examine its
relevance to alternative futur® f or Spain.

Schneider et al
has

"...

define a corporate group as one which

legal status, i.e., it is chartered, and controls

property which is vested in the group per se
corporate grou:^ has a life of its owni

.

Furthermore, the

it may well antedate

and survive any particular set of members. "^^

Examples of

corporate groups would include organizations such as political
parties, a bureaucracy or the local 4h Club.
A noncorporate group is not chartered although it may

have rules of entry and conduct for its members.

Individual

members of a noncorporate group retain control over their
property,
tion,

"In short, the noncorporate group may be a coali-

clique or patron-client chain, in which individuals pool

resources and skills."-^'

to surveys, especially those conducted by the Institut e de la
Opinion Fublica a government agency, is measuring something
besides low political interest.
,

^'^Schneider et al
p.

33^.
^"^

Ibid.

,

p.

33^.

.
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Schneider et_al.

postulate that corporate and
noncorporate groups exist
contemporaneously in all societies,
that is.

that one type is not more
Modern" or "traditional- than
another. Rather, the
predominance of a particular type
of
group relates to the distribution
of power in a system,
"it
is our hypothesis that
noncorporate groups occur where
the distribution of power in a system
has not been routinized, structured by more stable corporate
institutions.
By way of contrast,
corporate power is a function of
consolidated political systems
in which large segments of the
population are irrelevant to
the power field

The authors suggest that in a society
such as the
United States, noncorporate groups
proliferate at the very top
and bottom of the social order-where
power is fragmented and
fluid.
In contrast, the regions of the Western
Mediterranean

are marked by fragmentation of power throughout
the social
system. 59

This fragmentation was promoted in the past, they

argue, by the growth and/or imposition of a preindustrial
form
of capitalism.

In the present, it is perpetuated by the non-

indigenous industrialization imposed from without which

Schneider et al

call "modernization."

Pi-Sunyer's critical response

is

not directed against

these interesting but speculative contentions made by Schneider

^^Ibid.

.

p.

334.

^^Xbid.. pp. 335-336.

2^12

^i^.

but on a .ore empirical
level.

to be (1) that Schneider

ei^

His objections

depict Catalonia as

seetn

••.
^

society bereft of corporate
institutions and stable sociopolitical structures
.• when an
alternative historical
Picture can be drawn,^° and
(2) that
.

.

even

(l)f there

is a

dearth of Catalan corporate
groups in 1972 /the date of
the
research?, the reason does not

lie in the fact that
Catalan,

prefer not to operate in terms of
such structures or that there
are no historical antecedents
for

then,,

but rather that such

structures are more proscribed today
than they have ever been
before." ^ Thus, Pi-3unyer finds
Catalonia to be more corporate than Schneider
i„ the past (he does not
appear to
question their "facts" but adds new
"facts" and a more benign
interpretation) and argues that any lack
of corporateness

et^

in

the present can be attributed to
the political repression of
the Franco regime not to some
intrinsic Catalan heritage or

foreign economic domination.

Finally. Pi-3unyer alludes to

the Fortuguese case in which corporate
groups proliferated
overnight with the removal of the Salazar-Caetano
dictatorship,
a similar occurrence, he intimates, is to
be expected with the
end of Francoism in Spain.
This eventuality, he concludes, is

not accounted for by Schneider et al,

60,,,
^'-Sunyer,
,,

's

analysis.

"Reconsideration," p. 119.
this alternative history on pages 119-120.
...

IbidLj..

pp. 120-121.

Pi-Sunyer offers

2i^3

As previously in our
examination of the modernisation
vs. development debate,
our third perspective can
help to
clarify the issues of
contention over the vitality
of corporate
groups that separate Schneider
and Pi-Sunyer.
this
case our evaluation
udtion iinds
findo Pi-Sunyer
pf
more suooesfsful in his
response to Schneider et al .

et^

m

It may be recalled that in
Chapter

H

we discussed the

poverty of associative life in
Spain with reference to the lack
Of significant socialization
agencies beyond the family-the
"imperialism" of the family in the
socialization process.
Pi-Sunyer is right in attributing
the lack of corporate group
structures to the dictatorship for it
was a function if not
direct effect of Francoist rule.
Dionisio
Ridruejo, the Djilas

of the Franco regime, has described
the connection between
Franco's corporatist state and the lack of
corporate groups
this way

J

(W)e are seeing occur the opposite of what
the conquerors of liberal political pluralism
foresaw, when they thought— I will say more
correctly we thought— that on doing away with
electoral, ideological or party procedures,
natural" groupings, founded on the concerns
of everyday life or upon the most profound
necessities of man, would take on a special
force of cohesion. Nothing like this has
happened and on the contrary we note the lowest
index in the vi^or /tono7 never verv high in
Spain of the spirit of association. 6S
.

.

.

,

Ridruejo has described as well the result of this

Ridruejo, Escrito en Espa'na

.

p.

I32.

associative desert

in, political life,

the proliferation of

non-corporate groups based on personal power.

Thus,

Our system of living together is reduced
to
private relations, actually egoistic or generous, and in order to prove it, it would
be
enough to cite the excessive importance which
have acquired among us family nepotism, on the
one hand, and on the other, the ties of friendship and favor.... But now this vice— which
contaminated to a greater or lesser degree the
old systems of personal powers-has become custom
and even a total system.... Today everything
IS obtained in Spain
because one has a
friend. ^3
.

.

.

Pi-Sunyer, himself, quotes a similar conclusion drawn

by the Spanish historian, Salvador Giner, "Under post-Civil

War circumstances, with no political parties and without a
dynamic polity the traditional networks of patronage have

hardened into official and semi-official hierarchies."*^^
However, despite Pi-Sunyer's correctness in emphasizing
the important influence of the dictatorship on the vitality of

corporate groups, there appears to be more agreement between

Pi-Sunyer and Schneider et al« than either party is willing to
admit.

From our third perspective, the analyses of Schneider

et al. and Pi-Sunyer appear to complement rather than contradict

each other on the question of corporate group vitality.
To see how, we must emphasize the hypothesis of Schneider

^^ Ibid.

.

p.

13^.

^^Salvador Giner, "Spain" in M.S. Archer and Salvador
Class. Status and Power (New
Giner, eds., Contemporary Europe.
York! St, Martin's Press, 1971), PP. 125-161.

2/+5

^"^

about the importance of the distribution of power to

the corporatenesn or noncorporateness of a social system.

may be recalled, Schneider et al

As

argued that corporate groups

predominated in a system in which relationships of power had
been routinized and consolidated? power was controlled by noncorporate groups when it was fluid and fragmented throughout
the social system, as was the case, they argued, in Spain.
Yet,

is there not a jjaradox apparent in describing a

dictatorship as being marked by fluid and fragmented power
relationships?

Surely, the concentration and centralization

of power must be the greatest under such systems?

In fact,

the resolution of this contradiction lies in understanding

exactly how centralized, concentrated and personal the power
of Franco was.

Joaquin Romero Maura has provided just such an understanding in an insightful essay on post-Franco politics.

In

response to the question of where power lies, Romero argues
that,

"Analysts of Franco's regime, using the models of poli-'

tical science or the Marxist frameworks, have all along been

exaggerating the

suj^posed

"^^
pluralism of the regime.

Much of this exaggeration, Romero feels, was due to a

misperception of the relative importance of the various groups
that have been associated with the regime at different periods,

Joaquin Romero Maura, "After Franco, Franquismo?i
and_0j2l)OThe Armed Forces, The Crown and Democracy," .apvernment
^ition 11, 1 (Winter, 1976), pp. 35-6^*-.
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such as the Falan^e. Opus
Dei and others.

=^irL?--hirj^^?\-f^f
weif^ht calibre
of competitorr.

vyinf n ot

fn.^

In a sense, Romero is being
more cynical than Ridruejo
about whether rxanco,
Franco nnp
one r.-r
of the n"conquerors of liberal
poli-

tical pluralism--ever really
-foresaw- the emergence of more
••natural" groupings to replace
"electoral, ideological or
party procedures." The proscription
of such corporate groups
has promoted (though not necessarily
created) the fragmentation
of power to which Schneider et al.
refer. Within
this frag-

mented

fluid power field (noncorporate)
groups have at times
wheeled and dealed but always within the
limits set by Franco
himself.
For while most corporate groups have been
abolished,
one such group has not; rather it has
been strengthened and
arid

professionalized to a greater degree than ever before.
is from this

group— the Armed Forces— that Franco

drawn his power.

And it

has always

^''^

Thus, a fluid and fragmented power field lacking vigorous

corporate groups except for that one v;hich Franco controlled

66t.-u

•

j

iDJ-a

.

67

t

f

p.

37,

emphasis added.

.

IMlLir pp. 38-39. The special conditions of the Civil
^War which created this relationship and the reasons why the armed
forces have allowed Franco to draw upon their power with practically no interference is discussed in the Romero article itself.
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has served the dictator well.

Beyond himself and that corpo-

rate group with which he had a special
relationship, groups
were called to favor and dismissed with relative
ease.^^

Parties and other corporate groups that had the potential
to
mobilize countervailing power were banned. In their absence

what social resources remained were mainly organized by a
suc-

cession of noncorporate groups utilizing the instruments of
corruption, nepotism, patronage and personalismo described by
Giner, Pi-Sunyer and Ridruejo,

Neither should it be surprising, that a special kind of

industrialization should develop or bo allowed to develop in
this system.

This is, of course, precisely the argument

offered by Schneider et al. in designating Spain as an example
of modernization rather than development.

If,

then, Schneider

et al. ought to acknowledge the influence of the dictatorship

on corporate group vitality, Pi-Sunyer should consider the

possibility that the kind of dependent, foreign-dominated
industrialization or modernization which marks Spain may undermine corporate group vitality as well.

Surely the pressures

of real economic development (in capitalist terms) for legal

trade unions, collective bargaining Rud certain liberal political forms would be unwelcome in Franco Spain.

68

Such pressures

Throughout the history of the regime, an almost
almighty state has been presided over by an
almost almighty Generalissimo Franco, who may
not have used all the time all the political
and administrative resources at his disposal,
but who never found them lacking whenever he
wanted to make use of them.
--Romero, "After Franco," p. 3B.

2^8

have come to some degree even with modernization rather than

development but because of the differential effects of modernization on the working class and the bourgeoisie discussed

earlier (see pp. 218-22), these pressures have been more easily
resisted.

I

am arguing, then, for consistency in our analysis

of Franco (and perhaps post-Franco) Spain:

neither liberal

pluralism nor liberal capitalism are consistent with Francoism.
And what does this mean for the future of Spain and the

capacities of her people for self-government?

In the period

since Franco's death we have witnessed in Spain what Pi-Sunyer

insisted could be predicted from the Portuguese case;

despite

the policies of continuismo and the severe restraints still

imposed on political organizations and activity in Spain, there
has been a rebirth of political life.

Political groups have

emerged on all parts of the political spectrum; labor militancy
has risen and the largest and most successful strikes have

included political as well as economic demands.

Even without

the complete removal of the fascist legacy as in Portugal,

Spain is experiencing an impressive display of corporate group
vitality.
Yet there remain a series of structural and political

constraints that predict a difficult not a rosy future for
Spain.

The first of these structural constraints is that con-

nection between modernization and corporate group vitality which
we have just discussed.

The question still to be answered is

whether a Spanish (or for that matter, an Italian or Greek)

2^9

liberal democracy can be
built on top of a foreign
dominated,
monopoly capitalist economy.
As we have tried to ahow,
the
Spanish economy has •modernised"
not "developed", it Is. therefore, especially vulnerable to
the revision that the Western
economic order has been undergoing
for the last
decade.

Infla-

tionary growth fueled hy foreign
investment, tourism and emigration has ended for Spain and can
probably not begin again
in this same form.
The steps required to implement a new
program of capitalist growth have yet to
be defined
in Spain,

Moreover, as some have argued. ^9

^j,^

^^^^^^

^^^^^ ^^^^^^

require the kind of "discipline" that only
an authoritarian
regime could impose.
If Schneider et al

,

are correct, Spain's modernization

will also tend to reinforce and perpetuate
the fragmentation of
power in Spanish society that has been of such imporoance
to
the maintenance of the dictatorship and will frustrate
the

emergence of effective corporate group structures in the future.
The legalization of political parties, for example, will be

meaningful only when it becomes clear that party activity can
lead to the real exercise of State power.

For this to occur

there must be changes in the role of the armed forces,

69

v/hich

James Petras, for example, has tried to make a case
for generalizing from post-Allende Chile that capitalist development in the less developed countries requires a program of terror
and repression such as that followed by the junta. See James
Petras, "Terror and Economic Depression! The Chilean Junta's
Formula for Success," New Politic s. XI, 3 (Winter, 1976), pp.
59-68.
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still holds the key

to'

power, and the bourgeoisie, which under

conditions of modernization does not fulfill its "national,"
moderatin*^, function.

The political constraints involve the continuismo of
the Arias regime.

Unfortunately for Spanish democracy, the

themes and concepts of corporatism that we have discussed

throughout the thesis continue to be woven into public life.
The "reforms" announced by the regime have that vague and tenta-

tive quality so characteristic of the "political alchemy" of the

Franco years.

The family, the syndicate and the municipio con-

tinue as the official trinity of Spanish political life.
the

nev;

Even

bicameral legislature--one of the regime's most highly

'For an excellent discussion

of the dimension and nature
see Ronald Fraser,
Spain
in
post-Franco
of the class stru,";gle
(march-April,
Review
1976),
96
"Spain on the Brink," New Lef t
bourgeoisie
the
on
comment
following
Fraser makes the
pp. 3-33.
which confiiTns their inconsistent class position:

Objectively, it would appear in the interests
of Spanish capital, or certain sectors of it,
to make the ruptura /rupture, i.e., a break
with the franqui3ta_heritage to inaugurate a
bourgeois democracy/: re-establishing its^
hegemony on a new and "uncontaminated" basis,
via a "social pact" such as the right wing
of the PCE /Spanish Communist Party/ has proposed; inaugurating and fortifying a bourgeois
democracy as rapidly as possible and integrating this into the EEC. But the weight of
history (in the shape of the specific form of
capital accumulation in the Spanish state—
and the peculiar mentality this has given
Spanish capitalists) suggests that /the bourgeoisie in general is instead placing only
what it sees as the safest short-term bets,
be
in the hope that the present stake can
(p.
•doubled up' for the future.
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touted reforms— will apparently be
elected by "universal,"
••equal," "direct" and secret
suffrage among "representatives
of the family." As Triunfo, a weekly
Spanish
journal, has

commented
What significance does this phrase /representatives of the famil:^, pronounced lightly
in the context of the speech /of Arias INavarro
to the nation, April 28, 1976/, have? That
only heads of family will be elected, the sole
electorate in the referendums of the regime
that this current one wishes to continue?
One knows what are the resonances of the
introduction of the word "family" in politics
those of corporatism.
Corporatism is another
name for fascism, as Mussolini conceived it and
pursued it so completely 71
,

Thus, the analyses of this thesis have yet to become

history;

"official" political socialization has not drastically

changed with the death of Franco.

The final political constraint refers most directly to
the future of Spain.

It is suggested by the course of events

since the Revolution of Flowers in Portugal and is the most

direct response to the question of whether Spaniards are more

authoritarian than the regime itself,
Portugal has shown the incredible capacity of a people
to preserve values of free political activities despite decades

of repression.

The exuberance and enthusiasm of the Portu-

guese people in the first year after their revolution was a

tribute to the human spirit as well as to the Portuguese them-

_

^^"Antidemocracia, " Triunfo 693 (May 0, 1976), p. 6,
The quotation itself is an interesting gauge of the current limits
of the political press in Spain, Linking corporatism and
.

252

selves.
Yet the second year of Portugal's revolution has demon-

strated the inability of the Portuguese to create a political

system founded on the energy and spirit produced by liberation.
It appears that the authors of the Am erican Voter could extend

their conclusions:

apathy is not only good and necessary for

liberal democracy} it is apparently a requirement for social

democracy as well.

The failures of the Portuguese left--not

just the successes of the right

— have

dissipated that tremendous

commitment the Portuguese people had to a new and better future.
The Spanish had to pay for a few months of transition

with more loss of life than the Portuguese had to pay for
of their revolution.

a year

The future seems to hold more of the same»

unlike in Portugal, the Spanish ultra-right is in power--not
in exile.

For all its years of repression, the left is not much

more unified than in the Civil War it lost through internal
struggle
Are the Spanish people more authoritarian than the regime
itself?
v;hat is

This is a question to which there is no true answer.

certain is that any party or group that would construct

negatively.
a future, better Spain must answer the question

Any other response is, intentionally or not, support for

a con-

tinuation of the past, of the myth of incapacity and social

tolerated. However,
fascism with the current regime is apparently apparently not be
can
the connection between fascism and Franco
made directly.
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pessimism.

My own suspicion, born of
studying the Spanish, living
with them and coming to some
personal and at times unexpressible
understanding of them, is that
the best future for Spain
lies
in the direction of what Amando
de Miguel called "the heroic
and broken Spain, the impossible
Spain of Utopia. "72

Spain of the local and personal but
also of workers' selfmanagement and collective ctgxxcuj.xure.
aericultnrp
t+ io o q
it is a

Spam
•

without

an imperial vision but one that is most
human.
In the past this Spain was most
often though not most

consistently represented by the anarcho-syndicalist
tradition.
If this tradition survives today it has not
yet expressed

itself

in any concrete form; no group of anyveight
on the left speaks
to it yet.

This thesis has in many ways been a story of the
suc-

cesses of the right.

One should not be surprised for the

history of Spain is, as Antonio Ramos Oliveira has said, the
history not of revolutions but of counterrevolutions. The point
at which

I

end— at

the "heroic and broken

Spain"— is

just the product of my own prejudice and ideology.

not,

I

Rather,

hope,
I

believe, it comes from an understanding of that counterrevolu-

tion led by Francisco Franco and

de Miguel, Es paha

.

p.

v/hat

285.

the final defeat of the

He refers to left-region-

alism in his typology of the two Spains presented earlier in the
chapter.

25^

right will require.

Spain can begin her history of revolution

if she seeks that "impossible Spain
of Utopia."
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